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This thesis examines the way genocide leaves marks in the writings of targeted 
people.  It posits not only that these marks exist, but also that they indicate a type of 
psychological resistance.  By focusing on the ways Holocaust diarists depicted Nazi 
perpetrators, and by concentrating on the ways language was used to distance the victim 
from the perpetrator, it is possible to see how Jewish diarists were engaged in alternate 
and subtle, but nevertheless important, forms of resistance to genocide.  The thesis 
suggest this resistance on the part of victims is similar in many ways to well-known 
distancing mechanisms employed by perpetrators and that this evidence points to a “crisis 
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Introduction 
 
Thoughts on the Study of Perpetrators in Holocaust Diaries 
“Normal men do not know that everything is possible.” 
– David Rousset, 1947 
 
I: The Problem 
 
The twentieth century has been referred to as “the century of genocide.”1  From 
the intentional eradication of the Herero people of South-West Africa in the first decade 
of the 20th century to the “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia and Rwanda in the last, more 
people were systematically exterminated in the last hundred years than in all of previous 
recorded history.  This seemingly modern proclivity toward ideologically- or racially-
based mass murder has been pondered and researched as much as any other topic.  And 
while scholars have devoted a great deal of time to determining chronologies and 
identifying the mechanics of extermination, less work has been done probing the thought 
processes of those victims personally affected by genocide.  This thesis seeks to 
investigate a basic problem: how victims understood and represented their tormentors.  
II: The Thesis 
Attempts to explain the Holocaust since the 1950’s – from Hannah Arendt’s 
systemic arguments about totalitarianism and seminal theory of “the banality of evil” to 
Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s purported discovery of “eliminationist anti-Semitism” in 
                                                 
1 Found, among other sources, in Mark Levene’s “Why Is the Twentieth Century the Century of 
Genocide,” in Journal of World History 11.2 (2000), and in Eric Weitz’s A Century of Genocide: Utopias 
of Race and Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).  
2 
 
German society – have focused largely on perpetrators and their attitudes toward 
victims.2  While the actions and mentalities of perpetrators have been closely studied, 
their victims have received comparatively scant treatment.  This thesis seeks to redress 
that historiographical omission by examining the way a genocidal Zeitgeist leaves certain 
marks in the writings of targeted people.  It posits not only that these marks exist, but also 
that they indicate forms of psychological resistance.  It also suggests this resistance is 
similar in many ways to distancing mechanisms employed by perpetrators and that this 
evidence points to a “crisis of imagination” for victims and perpetrators alike in which 
the capability to envision negation and to identify with the “other” is detrimental to self-
preservation. 
In Holocaust diaries, perpetrators can appear, not appear, or appear in some less 
threatening and linguistically mutable way.  Therefore, each chapter in this thesis focuses 
on a different strategy Holocaust diarists used to deal with perpetrators.  Chapter one is 
important because it lays out the basic groundwork for the more theoretical chapters to 
follow.  In it, I examine the work of diarists Éva Heyman, Hannah Senesh and Dawid 
Sierakowiak.  While perpetrators are present in these chapters, they are often depicted in 
what might be termed “visual,” “descriptive,” “photographic,” or “journalistic” terms.  
For various reasons, although “Germans” appear occasionally, not much effort is devoted 
to analyzing or questioning their specific natures, desires or motivations.  In order to 
establish a kind of starting point, or a type of diary that bears some kind of resemblance 
to the other diaries I discuss, the writings of Abel Herzberg from Bergen-Belsen are also 
                                                 
2 See Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1951) and 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, (New York: Viking Press, 1964). See also Daniel 
Jonah Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1996). 
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examined at length in chapter one.  Chapter two examines the ways jokes, metaphors and 
tropes frequently come to stand in for Nazi perpetrators in the diaries of Etty Hillesum of 
Amsterdam, and Emmanuel Ringelblum of Warsaw.  These diaries manifest ways in 
which authors could confront perpetrators indirectly through the manipulation of 
language.  If the theme of chapter one is the “presence” of perpetrators in Holocaust 
diaries, the subject of chapter two is the “dissolution” of these concrete figures into 
shadows and phantasms.  Chapter three examines a final characteristic of Holocaust 
diaries: the “absence” of perpetrators.  Here I provide an in-depth examination of the lack 
of perpetrator analysis in the diary of Warsaw physician Janusz Korczak.  Although 
Korczak saw perpetrators up-close, both as a prisoner and as an administrator of the 
Warsaw ghetto orphanage, he only discussed perpetrators on four occasions.  In three of 
these instances, Korczak plainly resisted the very thought of perpetrators – and so the 
references to them are veiled and subtle.  It was only in Korczak’s very last entry, written 
just hours before his death, that he recognized the futility of avoiding perpetrators, and so 
addressed them head-on.  A brief conclusion will sum up my findings and suggest 
directions for further research.   
III: Victims and Perpetrators 
For victims, the “crisis of imagination,” can be defined as the tension between 
awareness/surrender and denial/resistance.  These categories are important because their 
presence is apparent, explicitly or implicitly, in all the texts I examined and indicate the 
author’s orientation to the world in written form.  The way these categories are combined 
provides an intellectual and emotional “fingerprint” that gives us clues as to how 
individual victims coped with trauma.  The extent to which hope was essential to these 
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victims and the importance of not seeing themselves as perpetrators saw them – as “lives 
unworthy of life” or as corpses waiting to happen – cannot be overstated.3  The sources 
seem to indicate that a complete, conscious awareness of the possibilities of annihilation 
and negation on the part of the victim impeded the capacity for resistance – decreasing 
chances of survival.  Only by mentally keeping the reality of genocide at bay could the 
victim cope with a world in which perpetrators sought to erase him or her spiritually and 
culturally and physically.4   Traces can be found in many Holocaust diaries of a tendency 
to avoid what seems obvious – the Nazi attempt to impose a final, physical solution to the 
so-called “Jewish Problem.”5  This is not to say that diarists had identical levels of 
awareness of how systematic and thorough the “Final Solution” was.  For instance, the 
head of the Warsaw Judenrat, Adam Czerniakow (1880-1942), was plainly aware of the 
genocidal complexity of Nazi plans and his powerlessness against them – hence his 
suicide, while other diarists (one thinks of Anne Frank, for example) were unable to see 
the bigger picture.  However different understandings might have been, violence was 
endemic toward the Jews of Europe during the Second World War and one wonders why 
                                                 
3 Euphemisms were very important during the Holocaust.  Phrases like “unnütze Esser,” (useless 
eaters) or “lebensunwertes Leben” (life unworthy of life) were essential to defining who was human or less 
than human during all phases of the Shoah, but especially in the beginning during the medical phase.  See 
Henry Friedlander’s The Origins of the Nazi Genocide.  The phrase “Final Solution” (Endlösung) is itself a 
euphemism that lends itself to radical interpretation.  See Berel Lang’s Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
4 See David Rousset’s The Other Kingdom, (translated and introduced by Ramon Guthrie, New 
York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1947) and also Primo Levi’s Survival in Auschwitz: The Nazi Assault on 
Humanity, (translated by Stuart Woolf, New York: Collier Books, 1993) and The Drowned and the Saved 
(translated from the Italian by Raymond Rosenthal, New York: Summit Books, 1988), Elaine Scarry’s The 
Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), and 
Jean Améry’s, At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities 
(translated by Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980). 
5 It is not being suggested that Jewish victims should have seen the genocide in its sinister entirety.  
The question is not whether they understood the actions taken against them as a matter of high policy, but 
whether they could recognize that they and their communities were in grave danger and whether they found 
ways to mentally avoid the implications of the implacable Nazi enmity amid the violence, deportations, 
slavery and mass murder that surrounded them. 
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questions like “Why me?” or “Why are they doing this to us?” or especially “What kind 
of person does this to another one?” did not appear more frequently in diaries from those 
years.  The absence of questions like these indicates denial and avoidance.  These 
mechanisms of avoidance, which kept awareness of genocidal intent from impinging 
upon consciousness, are of particular interest here.   
Implicitly, this thesis argues that perpetrators experienced a dynamic comprised 
of a tension between awareness/opposition and denial/surrender.  For them, 
comprehension of genocidal intent provoked mental opposition, whether in the form of 
the controversial psychological “doubling” Robert Jay Lifton describes, or in the 
drunkenness and mental breakdowns common among the Einsatzsgruppen troops in the 
east.6 Conversely, the ability psychologically to deny the victim’s reality and humanity 
allowed individual perpetrators to surrender to the Nazi imperative of genocide as state 
policy between 1939 and 1945.7       
Undeniably, some sort of relationship existed between perpetrator and victim.   
This thesis is concerned with one side of that relationship.  The historiography is replete 
with examples of how perpetrators required elaborate psychological mechanisms and 
rationales that enabled them to dehumanize Jews and inhibit their understanding of them 
as human beings.  Here, the problem is examined from the other side by probing how 
Jewish victims writing diaries during the Holocaust displayed parallel distancing and 
resistance mechanisms that limited their understanding of the Nazis’ humanity, though 
                                                 
6 See Leni Yahil’s The Holocaust: The Fate of European Jewry, 1932-1945 (translated from the 
Hebrew by Ina Freidman and Haya Galai, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 259. 
7 See Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution 
in Poland, (New York: HarperPerennial, 1993) and Yisrael Gutman, and Michael Berenbaum (eds.), The 
Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp (Bloomington - Published in association with the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum): Indiana University Press, 1994). 
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for very different reasons.  This method allows us to analyze Jewish perceptions of the 
perpetrator and permits us to ask how the individual writer of a Holocaust diary 
understood the desire of a Nazi to negate him or her physically and spiritually through an 
analysis of how that knowledge was reflected in the language used in their diaries.  
Together, this thesis interrogates the question of how victims represented and made sense 
of perpetrators in diaries written during the Holocaust.  
IV: Source Material 
As primary sources, I have used only Holocaust-era texts, among which are 
included diaries, notes, letters and memoirs written during the period 1939-1945.  When 
selecting sources, I decided that it was important only to look at the responses of Jewish 
victims written during the Shoah.  Valuable memoirs written after the fact, like Primo 
Levi’s Survival in Auschwitz, Elie Wiesel’s Night, or Jean Améry’s At the Mind’s Limits, 
are to be distinguished from works written concurrently with the genocide because they 
were composed in the aftermath of trauma, not in the crucible of the extermination 
process itself.  Hence, they may contain perceptions or philosophies that were not present 
among those persecuted at the time. Memoirs written after the fact, while important, have 
the disadvantage of being composed after the dominant, post-World War II narrative of 
the Holocaust had already begun to crystallize, transforming memory and imagination.  
Rather than include memoirs, I initially examined about 25 diaries that seemed to 
represent a broad spectrum of Jewish life throughout Europe during the Holocaust.  In 
order to develop a diverse portrait of Jewish understanding of perpetrators I consulted 
diaries by men and women, teenage boys and girls, Eastern and Western, assimilated and 
unassimilated Jews, intellectuals and workers.  When available, letters and notes from the 
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time were used as well.8  In the end, however, due to the constraints of space and time, 
only about seven diaries are analyzed at length in this thesis.  Every other source cited is 
secondary to the diaries and used only for interpretive purposes. 
The diaries provide evidence of a fulcrum located in the perpetrator–victim 
relationship at which the victim’s desire for survival met the perpetrators desire for 
negation.  By “negation” I mean the place where the idea and the act of genocide meet – 
where both Jewish victim and Nazi perpetrator come together in a moment of 
annihilation (almost invariably the annihilation of the victim).9  My reading of these 
sources indicates that a deep, conscious awareness of this negative focal point was 
anathema to both parties and that a close examination of the language used to describe 
each other reveals this aversion when psychological defense mechanisms are operating 
most forcefully.   
The construction of this thesis and its applicability to the broader field of 
comparative genocide studies is based upon the central supposition that an unequal yet 
reciprocal relationship existed between perpetrators and their victims.10  Simply put, the 
existence of a perpetrator requires the existence of a victim.  During the Holocaust, these 
relationships may have been brief or even momentary (like, for example, those of the 
physician conducting “selections” at Auschwitz-Birkenau and the people who passed 
                                                 
8 Alexandra Garbarini finds that letters, notes and diary entries, because most were designed for an 
audience broader than the individual, are best read together as “interrelated genres, “‘To bear witness where 
Witness must be borne’: Holocaust Diaries 1939-1945” (PhD dissertation, University of California at Los 
Angeles, 2003).  
9 See Klaus Theweleit’s discussion of negation and armoring in Male Fantasies, vol. I, Women, 
Bodies, Floods (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986). 
10 For some, any comparison of perpetrators and victims is difficult to acknowledge and is even 
perceived as disrespectful to the victims.  That is not the intention of this paper.  The point of this 
comparison is to demonstrate common human reactions to “inconceivable” experiences, or what in 
religious terminology might be referred to as “radical evil,” not to suggest any kind of moral or legal 
equivalency. 
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before him), or of a much longer duration (such as the relationship that developed 
between members of the Judenräte across Eastern Europe and the German occupation 
authorities).  In many cases, the relationship was largely imaginary because direct 
communication between victim and perpetrator rarely took place (think of guards in a 
watchtower and concentration camp inmates on the ground).11  However, to say that the 
details of this relationship were imaginary does not change the fact that both sides 
thought about and had opinions and impressions of the other.  Here, I have tried to 
determine what victims thought of perpetrators, not come to a conclusion about what the 
perpetrators actually were.  In the specific case of the destruction of the European Jews, 
Holocaust diaries are central to our understanding of the meanings of this relationship 
because they provide the historian access to a complex vision of the victim’s mental 
universe during that defining genocidal moment.   
Diarists had a wide range of imaginative reactions to their circumstances.  But if 
we recognize that some kind reciprocal relationship existed between persecutors and 
persecuted and that the dynamics of this relationship were as important on one side of the 
equation as they were on the other, then Holocaust diaries should be especially valuable 
when it comes to understanding genocide in general.  Victim responses during the 
Holocaust should give us an indication of the cognitive processes of those experiencing 
the “incomprehensible” as well as provide clues to what kind of responses we might 
expect from victims of other genocides (though those responses would undoubtedly be 
influenced by culturally and historically specific elements as well).  It is important to be 
clear, however.  While the idea of a “relationship” implies a mutually dependent or 
                                                 
11 Thanks to Professor Jeffrey Herf of the University of Maryland who brought this to my attention 
during a discussion of this topic. 
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symbiotic link, no moral equivalency between victims and perpetrators is suggested, nor 
are concepts as different as volition and compulsion forgotten. 
V: Historiography 
Recent research by Christopher Browning, Michael Burleigh, Robert Jay Lifton 
and others demonstrates that, in the case of the Holocaust, the commission of genocide 
was not easy for individual perpetrators to perform. The evidence indicates that Nazism, 
far from being infernally efficient at transforming “ordinary men” into killers, was at best 
only partially successful.12  The common stereotype of the icy, emotionless Nazi is as 
much a mask behind which a real human being hides as it is a myth that was assiduously 
cultivated by the leaders of the “thousand-year Reich.”13  Those perpetrators closest to 
the actual process of genocide in the killing fields and death camps, as opposed to high 
officials and lower Schreibtischtäter (whom we contrast with victims caught in the 
maelstrom of the Holocaust) did not just leap blithely into the bloody fray.  Instead, they 
required a great deal of internal or external pressure and conditioning to perform their 
jobs.14 In fact, among most historians of the Holocaust, it is now taken as a matter of 
course that certain defense mechanisms were employed, consciously or unconsciously, by 
mass murderers which not only eased the killing process, but also enabled it to occur on 
such an enormous, industrial scale.  For instance, the party line (and official propaganda) 
                                                 
12 See Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men, This view seems to contradict Daniel Jonah 
Goldhagen’s inexplicably popular “eliminationist anti-Semitism” theory. 
13 Hitler’s speeches, “table talk” and Mein Kampf are replete with references to “hardness” and the 
importance of pitilessness.  This talk worked its way into the speech of his mandarins like Himmler, Göring 
et al. 
14 See Michael Burleigh’s Death and Deliverance: ‘Euthanasia’ in Germany 1900-1945 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) and Ethics and Extermination: Reflections on Nazi Genocide 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), as well as Henry Friedlander’s The Origins of Nazi 
Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). 
10 
 
that continuously vilified Jews was used to rationalize genocidal behavior.15  Genocide 
became permissible because it was condoned and sanctioned by what passed for legal 
authority – absolving those performing it of responsibility for the act because the idea 
was not theirs. There was also the Manichean tendency, prized in Nazi Germany, which 
tended to view things in black and white or apocalyptical terms.  Most simply, at 
Auschwitz and among Einsatzgruppen units in the east, alcohol was used to numb or 
repress the conscience.16   
It is apparent that perpetrators and victims alike employed defense mechanisms 
like transference, repression, or denial.  They “numbed” themselves in order to maintain 
some kind of psychological equilibrium.  This raises the question of what it was exactly 
that they were trying to distance themselves from.  The answer may seem obvious at first, 
but, counter-intuitively, it seems to me that it was not so much the act of genocide that 
was bothering them, but the idea of it.  For victims, this is borne out in the diaries by the 
way writers are able to describe the “symptoms” of genocidal intent (“photographic” or 
“journalistic” descriptions of conditions and atrocities), but cannot seem to come to terms 
with the human will and motivation required to make genocide a reality.17  For the 
perpetrators, the importance of this distinction is apparent in a series of speeches Heinrich 
Himmler gave to SS leaders in Posen, Poland on the 4th and 6th of October, 1943.  During 
the course of a discussion about the necessity for eliminating the Jews of Europe, 
Himmler expressed his belief that the SS, as an organization, had remained “decent” and 
                                                 
15 This is exemplified by the “Befehl ist Befehl” defense seen at Nuremberg during every trial, 
including that of the Major War Criminals in 1945-46 and the “Doctors’ Trial” of 1947-1948. 
16 See Peter Padfield’s Himmler: Reichsführer SS (New York: Holt, 1990) as well as Yahil.  
17 An example of this might include Emmanuel Ringelblum’s frank recitation of atrocities in the 
Warsaw ghetto combined with his tendency to dehumanize Germans by referring to them as “They” or “the 
Others,” which serves to establish distance as well. 
11 
 
navigated a “Scylla and Charybdis” between becoming too hard and being too soft in the 
course of the “Final Solution.”  He was cognizant of and sympathetic to the mental 
difficulties his troops faced murdering the Jews of Europe (“Most of you know what it is 
like seeing a hundred corpses lying together, five hundred, a thousand…”), but to him 
there was a clear the distinction between conceptualizing and implementing genocide.  He 
states it explicitly - “I believe that it is better for us all to have endured this for our 
people, and accepted the responsibility (the responsibility for deeds not the idea behind 
them), and then take the secret with us to our graves.”18  For those perpetrators lower 
down the chain of command, this separation of act or deed (Tat) and idea or word (Idee) 
facilitated personal involvement in the genocidal process because it enabled them to 
inwardly rationalize their personal actions during the Holocaust while outwardly 
minimizing their participation in it afterward – as can be seen in an examination of legal 
defenses employed at trials of war criminals from Nuremberg to Bergen-Belsen to 
Auschwitz to Jerusalem.19 This polar separation of act and idea is a key, not just to 
understanding how perpetrators killed, but also to discovering how victims dealt with the 
ever-present possibility of death.   
The research represented by this thesis indicates that victims often found the 
genocidal picture too shocking to consciously accept as well, although my studies also 
indicate that, at critical moments, they allowed themselves to see what they had only 
                                                 
18 Heinrich Himmler, “Moral Dilemmas” in Roger Griffin (ed.) Fascism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995). p. 161-162. 
19 A deeply ingrained concept of the “Führerprinzip” was part of the cultural baggage of all Nazis 
in the Third Reich.  This “leadership principle” served to consolidate the power of those higher up the chain 
of command and absolve those farther down of personal responsibility.  In effect, however, it left a gap or 
vacuum of responsibility, allowing elites cover for morally reprehensible acts.  
12 
 
intuited and repressed before.20 While genocide was easier for perpetrators to commit 
than to admit, their victims found it was essential to ignore (but not to deny) the 
genocidal reality they were facing.  By analyzing the way the two basic human 
components of genocide – the perpetrator and the victim – interact with and think of each 
other, a more complex understanding of genocide in its entirety emerges. 
For perpetrators, regardless of which mechanisms were used, the aim was 
ultimately, as Robert Jay Lifton put it, to increase the “psychic distance” between killer 
and victim to the point where complete dehumanization of the “other” could take place.21  
Whether the Nazis used ideology, alcohol, or physical measures like numbering, shaving, 
or even what Terrence des Pres called an “excremental assault” to dehumanize their 
victims, it did require effort on the part of perpetrators to come to think of their victims as 
completely different.22  This dehumanization and distancing is apparent in perpetrator 
diaries.23  Close examination of victim diaries written during the Holocaust, reveals its 
presence on the other side of the genocidal equation as well. 
VI: Language and Trauma 
Scholars as different as Hayden White and Lawrence Langer have suggested that 
Holocaust survivors employ certain narrative patterns to describe their experiences.24  
                                                 
20 See Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem and Gitta Sereny’s, Into that Darkness: An Examination of 
Conscience (New York: Vintage Books, 1974).   
21 See Robert Jay Lifton’s The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide 
(New York: Basic Books, 1986). 
22 See Terrence Des Pres’ The Survivor: Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1976).  Also see Paul Ricouer’s discussion of dread and defilement in The Symbolism of 
Evil (translated from the French by Emerson Buchanan, Boston: Beacon Press, 1967). 
23 See the diaries of Dr. Friedrich Mennecke in Aly, Chroust and Pross (eds.), Cleansing the 
Fatherland: Nazi Medicine and Racial Hygiene (translated by Belinda Cooper, John Hopkins Press, 1994). 
24 See Lawrence Langer’s The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1975) and Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1991).  See also, Dominick LaCapra’s Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma (Ithaca: 
13 
 
Recent work on other sources confirms these arguments, and my own experience 
conducting interviews with survivors suggests that certain patterns, narrative strategies, 
and forms of speech continue to be employed by those who lived through the Holocaust.  
While interviewing almost three dozen Holocaust survivors and their children, it was 
possible to see these patterns in Holocaust discourse emerge clearly.  They appeared in 
the way stories were told, in the adoption of certain phrases, in the inclusion of certain 
characters associated with precise meanings and in the exclusion of certain elements 
central to understanding genocide.  The most significant exclusion was the tendency of 
survivors, speaking years after their experiences, to characterize perpetrators only in 
cliché formulations revolving around anti-Semitism and hate.  Attempts to come to terms 
with the humanity beneath the barbarity were non-existent.  My preliminary research on 
diaries suggests that some of the same defense mechanisms thought to have shielded 
perpetrators were at work among victims at the same time.  These psychological 
inhibitors provided a powerful bulwark against a frightful awareness of annihilation and 
mortality – maintaining sanity in the case of perpetrators and facilitating the will to resist 
among victims.  These distancing mechanisms, still found among Holocaust survivors, 
even sixty years after the events, are visible in the contemporary accounts as well. 
It is not hard to discover transparent instances of psychological defense 
mechanisms of denial and avoidance in the diaries.  One famous example might include 
the assertion by Anne Frank (1929-1945) “…I still believe, in spite of everything, that 
people are truly good at heart.” At first only the heartbreakingly naïve wishful thinking of 
a teenage girl, a closer reading suggests a protective denial of the exterminatory reality of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cornell University Press, 1994) and Saul Friedländer, (ed.), Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism 
and the “Final Solution” (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) as well as Berel Lang. 
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Nazi-occupied Amsterdam in 1944.25  Etty Hillesum (1914-1943), another Dutch Jew, 
reported people in the camp at Westerbork telling her “We don’t want to think, we don’t 
want to feel, it’s best to shut your eyes to all this misery.”26  While Hillesum derides this 
tendency to look the other way in others, a close examination of her diaries and letters 
reveal that, over a long period and almost without exception, she engaged in the same 
practice herself. 
The type of language in which they chose to communicate is the only means left 
by which we can understand writers of Holocaust diaries.  There are as many styles as 
there are diarists, but they share one common aspect.  Holocaust diarists are all in some 
way trying to come to terms with what Charlotte Delbo called “l’inconcevable.”27  
Victims alternately described perpetrators in what I call “journalistic” or “photographic” 
or “visual” terms – minimizing the analytic components of their entries – or they 
transformed them, through the use of tropes and jokes, into metaphors symbolically 
representing something other than mere individuals.  In some cases, victims ignored 
perpetrators completely – negating Germans textually even as their persecutors were 
attempting to negate them physically.  While the act of writing and documenting Nazi 
actions is viewed by most scholars as an act of resistance, the diarists’ excision of 
perpetrators is highly significant and suggests a more active and aggressive, though 
unconscious, form of mental resistance to Nazi genocide.  
                                                 
25 Anne Frank, The Diary of a Young Girl: The Definitive Edition (edited by Otto H. Frank and 
Mirjam Pressler, translated by Susan Massotty, New York: Anchor Books Doubleday, 1995), p 332. 
26 Etty Hillesum, Etty: The Letters and Diaries of Etty Hillesum, 1941-1943 (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002), p 587. 
27 Charlotte Delbo, Auschwitz and After (translated by Rosette C. Lamont, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1995), p. x. 
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In Holocaust diaries, we quickly discover the limitations of language.  Everyday 
language is used to transmit everyday ideas.  But, in an exterminatory and extraordinary 
environment, no language is able to convey the totality of meanings that one expects or 
hopes to find.28 In a genocidal atmosphere, words and meanings do not remain static, but 
fluctuate in an effort to express a traumatic reality. A wall exists in Holocaust diaries 
between the act/idea of genocide and the capabilities of language and imagination to deal 
with it.  The full psychological import of the trauma can only be inferred.  Quite simply 
put, genocide is more real than language.  In this sense, the Holocaust, as Primo Levi 
maintained, is beyond comprehension.29  While extraordinary experiences cannot be 
adequately conveyed through everyday language, nevertheless, it is only by “probing the 
limits of representation” that we can hope to historicize the experiences and mentalities 
forged in the moment of genocide.  This thesis is committed to acknowledging those 
linguistic limitations while analyzing them at the same time – increasing our knowledge 
of genocide to the extent it is possible.  Understanding in spite of language is possible 
because trauma has left traces and intimations behind in the choice of words and in the 
way they are employed, even if their full significance is not always apparent.  To this 
extent, the thesis is a work dedicated to finding meaning in Holocaust diaries.   
VII: Periodization 
Unfortunately, when examining these diaries, it is impossible to engage in that 
favorite pastime of historians – periodization.  It would be convenient to be able to say 
that as the war went on and the “Final Solution” progressed, for various reasons, 
                                                 
28 See Cathy Caruth’s Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1995). 
See also Judith Herman Lewis’ Trauma and Recovery (New York: Basic Books, 1997). 
29 See Levi, The Drowned and the Saved. 
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imaginations became more subdued and perpetrators receded out of focus.  However, it is 
not possible in 1939 to distinguish some kind of understanding of perpetrators that had 
disappeared by 1945 (or the reverse).  The reason this linear progression is not traceable 
is because we are dealing with the individual histories of people enduring different kinds 
of trauma at different times.   
This is not the kind of history based upon overall public opinion or things as 
prosaic as government documents, foreign newspapers, policy papers or radio broadcasts.  
In other words, this is cultural, not diplomatic or military history, and there are no broad 
generalizations to be made here about the effect of specific events or decrees on vast 
numbers of people.  The focus is on the individual.  What I am examining is a series of 
private moments in the lives of people as different as assimilated secular Dutch Jews in 
Amsterdam and unassimilated orthodox Polish Jews in Warsaw.  The similarities I am 
seeking to identify in these Holocaust victims lie in only one thing – their understanding 
of the people who wanted to kill them. 
VIII: The Holocaust and Comparative Genocide 
While Holocaust diaries are the specific lens through which victim responses to 
perpetrators and their motivations are examined, the goals of this thesis are broader.  One 
might regard this paper as an attempt to develop a theory of what could be termed 
“traumatized imagination” – in which I strive to discover the mental boundaries 
associated with the average person’s understanding of the “other” during the course of 
traumatic events.  It may also be seen as an attempt to establish a paradigm or method 
from which subsequent studies of genocide and imagination might profit. 
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  My research suggests that by constructing a rubric into which references to 
perpetrators fall (whether they are present in the text, or absent, or in some in-between 
state I term “dissolution”), it is possible to classify responses of Jewish victims to their 
circumstances and their persecutors in order to see the emergence of patterns.  This thesis 
indicates that these patterns form a picture of a traumatized imagination that can 
comprehend events “journalistically” or “photographically,” but which has great 
difficulty conceiving “analytically” of a will dedicated to annihilation.  The reality of the 
perpetrator is altered in the imagination of the victim, just as the historiography indicates 
that the victim was transformed in the mind of the perpetrator. 
The point of this analysis not so much to recover lost voices as it is to recover lost 
meanings buried in common texts. It should be noted, however, that it is not the intention 
of this thesis, nor is it possible within the constraints of this format, for this to be a 
comprehensive study of how victims in every Holocaust diary viewed perpetrators.  
Instead, the more modest goal is to discover how some victims of the Holocaust saw their 
oppressors and to offer some thoughts as to why there appear to be limits to their 
understanding.  
IX: Format and Representativeness of Diaries 
The thesis is divided into five chapters.  A short introduction and conclusion will 
buttress three chapters of primary research.  The title is explanatory of the work as a 
whole.  It centers on Jewish depictions of perpetrators in Holocaust diaries with special 
emphasis on how they understood the possibilities of genocide and how aversions to 
those possibilities constituted both actual and psychological resistance.  
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While the methodological approach to this study reflects an interest in the broader 
question of genocide, Holocaust diaries form the primary means of examining the 
problem.  This is for several reasons: first, because my own interests and research 
experience lies in the field of Holocaust studies and secondly, because the thesis format 
and length of this paper requires a narrower scope.  However, this leaves open the 
possibility for a larger and broader study to be undertaken in the same manner at a later 
time. Because many instances of mass murder contain actors falling into these categories, 
this method of analysis may also be used to analyze and historicize other genocides as 
well.   
I have not commented throughout on the question of how representative the diary 
entries examined in this thesis may be.  After all, those who actually wrote diaries only 
represent a fraction of those who lived and died during the Holocaust – and that group 
was, in many senses, self-selected.  Rather than focusing on how typical a certain writing 
strategy was, it seems more important to simply to demonstrate the existence of these 
strategies of depicting perpetrators and to assess the possibilities that exist for using them 
as a category of analysis. 
X: “Normal Men” and What is Possible 
In his 1947 book about Nazi concentration camps, The Other Kingdom, French 
resister, activist and author David Rousset famously remarked that “normal men do not 
know that everything is possible.”30  When I first stumbled across that phrase in an 
undergraduate course on the Holocaust at Michigan State University in 1995, it caught 
my attention – and, as an idea, it has remained in the forefront of my thought ever since.  
                                                 
30 John K. Roth and Michael Berenbaum (eds.) Holocaust: Religious and Philosophical 
Implications (New York: Paragon House, 1989), p. 99-105.  The passage also appears on p. xx. 
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Since discovering that comment, I have found that every approach I have taken to the 
study of genocide has been colored, for better or for worse, by the philosophy 
encapsulated in that short sentence.   
The comment contains several ideas that are important to this thesis.  First, 
Rousset was arguing that there are two different types of people (to say just “men” would 
be sexist and would ignore many of those diarists I have looked at) – people who know 
what is possible, and those who do not know what is possible.  Rousset is not saying that 
people are born differently, or that they are different because of their race or religion or 
ethnicity.  He is saying that they become different because of what they experience. In 
this case, he is saying that trauma – living through the Holocaust – changed the way 
victims understood the world.  “Normal men” (that is everyone else who did not 
experience Nazi genocide) cannot know it the way they do.  This is much the same 
argument that Jean Améry makes in his essay “Torture,” when he says that what is lost 
forever is “trust in the world.”31  In addition, people who are sufficiently traumatized 
cannot explain their experiences to other “normal” people with any degree of accuracy, 
nor can they convey the meaning of what they have come to know.  What they have 
learned is that every possibility, every degradation, every pain and every fear 
unimaginable to average people is always present, unmitigated and unaltered, in their 
minds.  This is to say that those who experienced genocide were forcibly set apart from 
the rest of the world.  Those who died experienced unimaginable horror.  Those who 
lived continue to experience pain and grief the likes of which those of us who mill around 
them uncomprehendingly will never understand.  These people have gained wisdom, but 
many have lost faith in humankind.  This is how I interpret Rousset’s short remark. 
                                                 
31 Améry, “Torture,” p. 21-40. 
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 One line of reasoning that I pursue in this thesis – that the diarists who wrote 
about their experiences in the Holocaust could not make “normal men” understand what 
happened to them – is only part of the argument.  As many times as I read the diaries and 
as much as I try to empathize with these writers, the more I realize it is impossible.  I 
could never “know” what these people knew.  However, after engaging these diaries long 
enough, I began to wonder if Rousset, and those who died, and those who lived, were 
themselves able to recognize all the “possibilities” genocide entailed.  Or if they were just 
as lost and confounded by it as “normal” people.    
The case I am trying to make in the following pages is that while Jewish diarists 
and those who lived and died in the Holocaust may have experienced something the rest 
of us have not experienced, they themselves did not necessarily “know” something we do 
not.  Due to their proximity to the event, they were only capable of understanding 
portions, or small pieces, of the larger genocidal process as it moved along.  One could 
argue, strongly I believe, that we “know” more today – of the facts at least – than most 
victims did at the time.32 In addition, even in those instances in which victims/diarists 
attempted to analyze and define the events that transpired around them and identify and 
explain the people who persecuted them, they were limited both by language and by their 
own imaginations.  In other words, the trauma of genocide is so great that even the most 
astute observers and the most talented writers were only able to allow a portion of the 
true reality into their consciousness – and consequently into the pages of their diaries. 
Some might ask the question then “What is the importance of studying Holocaust 
diaries if they do not really tell the whole story?”  This is a fair question, and I offer now 
                                                 
32 This was done, as much as possible, by design.  The Nazis rationalized and compartmentalized 
the Holocaust, disassociating the parts from the whole in order to maintain secrecy and also to create doubt 
and uncertainty among their victims.  
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two preliminary answers.  First, despite the fact that the numbers of victims is counted 
into the millions, only a handful of diaries have survived for historians to examine.  To 
me, it seems important to engage these rare works with all the tools at our disposal, if 
only to learn what people are capable of writing during times of genocide.  It seems 
important to know how these diarists used writing to resist, as well as to learn what they 
considered important to pass to posterity.  Second, and sadly, genocide did not disappear 
with the Nazis.  By asking questions about how much people can know and how much 
they can tell us about genocide, we are plumbing the bottomless abyss wrought by cruelty 
and hatred a bit further.  By pushing these boundaries of knowledge, by “probing the 
limits of representation,” it may possible to bring those who “know everything is 
possible” and those who do not “know” closer together.   
These diaries were not written in a vacuum.  Historicizing and analyzing the 
experiences related in them allow us to understand both the diaries and the history of the 
period more clearly.  The texts do not stand in isolation as purely literary artifacts.  They 
also represent specific and terrible historic moments in ways that would not otherwise be 
possible.  I make no pretense to have conducted a comprehensive survey.  I would claim, 
however, to have developed a rather unique rubric, or approach, for studying the 
relationships between perpetrators and victims as they exist within the pages of Holocaust 
diaries.  Only future research will be able to answer questions beyond the scope of this 
paper – questions regarding the overall prevalence of each of the three major discursive 
strategies across a broad spectrum of diaries, or the distribution of these strategies across 
different cultural, religious, generational and gender categories.  Work in the future 
should concentrate on these and other historical questions raised by the thesis.  Only time 
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will tell whether or not this line of inquiry will prove valuable for examining texts like 
Holocaust diaries that were produced in a genocidal environment. 
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Chapter 1: Presence 
 
Descriptive Accounts of Perpetrators in Holocaust Diaries 
 
“…words and events remain linked by the inscribing hand, a literal part 
of the experience and the record of it.” 
– James E. Young, 1987 
 
I: Introduction 
 
Noted Holocaust scholar James E. Young has written that  
…for diarists…bearing witness was less a ‘literary act’ and more a 
‘biological necessity’; for some it was even a ‘national obligation.’  So 
acute was the fear that their experiences would remain, in Himmler’s 
horrifying words, ‘a never-to-be-written page in history,’ that ‘literary 
testimony’ became for many victims the sole reason to survive.  When 
survival and the need to bear witness become one and the same longing, 
this desperate urge to testify in narrative cannot be underestimated.1 
 
All of the diarists examined in this thesis are examples of the compulsion to 
testify that Young is referring to.  They all seemed to recognize the importance of 
creating a historical document that captured the events they lived through for future 
readers, and they all took the time to create those documents.  Yet when historians ask the 
question “how do these diarists depict perpetrators in their writing?” something 
interesting occurs: in many diaries the perpetrators recede, change or even disappear.  
The question being addressed then, is not just “how do perpetrators appear in diaries 
written by Jewish victims during the Holocaust?” but also “Why, in documents 
                                                 
1 James E. Young, “Interpreting Literary Testimony: A Preface to Rereading Holocaust Diaries 
and Memoirs,” in New Literary History, vol. 18, no. 2 (Winter 1987), p. 406. 
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manifestly written for the purpose of creating a record of atrocity and murder, are the 
murderers strangely absent or held at arm’s length by the diarists?”   
I believe the answer to these questions lies in the tensions surrounding the 
production of these diaries.  As Young maintains, diarists needed to write.  However, 
they needed to survive too.  To survive frequently meant having to ignore the painful and 
terrifying genocidal reality around them.  I argue that obsessing, or even thinking, about 
the most frightening aspects of their daily existence – the perpetrators of the Holocaust – 
damaged the victims’ ability to cope with their situations.  Because of this tension 
between the need to write and the need to cope, the image of perpetrators was altered in 
the diary entries we read today.   
I have termed the conflict between the desire to testify and the psychological need 
to avoid the harsh reality of the Shoah a “crisis of imagination,” and this concept will be 
addressed and defined both here and (at greater length) in chapter two.  However, it is 
basically the concept that the tension between the need to communicate and the need to 
avoid painful thoughts or emotions – especially those associated with perpetrators –
makes Holocaust diaries unique, and allows us to increase our understanding of different 
levels, or forms, of resistance undertaken by victims. 
The thesis is divided by the way perpetrators are depicted in seven particular 
Holocaust diaries.2 This chapter will discuss two of these ways.  First, all of these writers 
                                                 
2 These diarists include Abel Herzberg, who wrote from Bergen-Belsen.  Of all the diarists, 
Herzberg confronts Nazi perpetrators most directly.  But, as I will show in this chapter, this confrontational 
approach seems to have been aided by Herzberg’s position as a relatively privileged type of prisoner.  
When things became worse, perpetrators faded out as in many other diaries.  Other diarists examined here 
include Éva Heymann and Hannah Senesh.  These two young Hungarian women tended to discuss 
Germans only in the most general, “visual,” “photographic” or “journalistic” senses – repeating what they 
heard from others or from the news.  Dawid Sierakowiak’s diary, written from the Łódź ghetto also 
discusses perpetrators “present” terms, but complicates the picture by transferring much of his aggression 
to other Jews by the end of his diary.  In Chapter II, I examine the diaries of Etty Hillesum of Amsterdam 
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were individuals who brought their own perspective and focus to their diaries.  Not every 
diarist had a hard time discussing perpetrators.  In fact, some presented detailed analyses 
and descriptions of them.  For instance, by examining the Bergen-Belsen diary of Abel 
Herzberg (1893-1989), it is possible to establish something of a baseline against which 
other accounts of perpetrators can be measured.  To be clear however, Herzberg’s frank 
and articulate discussion of Nazi cruelty and methods seems to be a less common 
approach than other types of discursive strategies in which perpetrators are treated in 
more abstract and distant ways.  
The second type of depiction is one that is primarily a recitation of facts gleaned 
from family, as in the case of Éva Heyman, or from news accounts (films and 
newspapers) of Nazi actions, as is the case in the diary of Hannah Senesh.  It might be 
helpful to consider these types of entries primarily visual or descriptive discussions of 
events and perpetrators in the broadest possible context, because there is seldom any 
mention of how the author actually felt about them and even less seldom a discussion of 
individual perpetrators.  In these types of entries, the average, day-to-day perpetrators are 
not really present at all.  Unlike Hitler, the grand perpetrator, who is mentioned in every 
one of them, run-of-the-mill perpetrators do not appear in these diaries – except perhaps 
in the most superficial sense.  This seems to be because the writer had not yet seen, or 
directly experienced, the genocidal world in which these individuals existed and wielded 
their power.   
                                                                                                                                                 
and Emmanuel Ringelblum of Warsaw, paying particular attention to ways they manipulate language to 
depict perpetrators.  In the final chapter, I look at the diary of Janusz Korczak of Warsaw, who avoided 
perpetrators as much as possible until the very last entry in his diary.  Overall, some diarists depicted 
perpetrators, but did so in general terms, avoiding specifics and individuals for the most part.  Others 
confronted perpetrators, but did so by manipulating language to make the confrontation easier to manage 
psychologically.  Finally, some diarists ignored, or negated, perpetrators to the greatest extent possible.   
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Eva Heyman was a thirteen year-old girl whose family did everything it could to 
shield her from events.  Hannah Senesh wrote from Palestine and had no personal 
knowledge of events and could only repeat what she heard about it in the world press or 
in rumors in her community.  However, one final diary – that of Dawid Sierakowiak of 
Łódź – begins to complicate the picture because he was there to experience Nazi 
repression personally.  And, while Sierakowiak frequently repeated headlines or relayed 
simple descriptive accounts of events, he also expressed the anger and rage one would 
expect to find under such circumstances.  His diary soon becomes problematic however, 
because he does not direct his fury at German perpetrators, but rather at his family and 
other Jews.  His diary provides an example of psychological avoidance and transference 
and demonstrates how, at times, victims held the real culprits and legitimate sources of 
their anger and misery – the Nazi perpetrators – at bay. 
By thinking about these ways in which diarists expressed or avoided their own 
feelings toward perpetrators, it is possible to see the active tension created by a “crisis of 
imagination” in which the need to relate experiences bumps up against the need to put the 
problems created by perpetrators out of their minds.  As much as possible, these diarists 
attempted to use “plain” language to describe what perpetrators were doing.  As my 
analysis progresses, this tension becomes greater.  In chapter two, the perpetrators recede 
into metaphors, tropes and jokes as diarists Etty Hillesum and Emmanuel Ringelblum 
begin to realize that their world has become “so extreme as to outstrip language’s 
capacity to represent it altogether.”3  Chapter three discusses only one diary, that of 
Polish physician Janusz Korczak.  It is a unique account in which perpetrators disappear, 
almost entirely, before making reappearing in the very last entry Korczak wrote, perhaps 
                                                 
3 Young, p. 405.  
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only hours before his death. Taken all together, I believe it becomes clear that Holocaust 
diaries contain extreme tensions – tensions which do not exist to the same degree in 
memoirs written after the war – precisely because the physical threat represented by the 
perpetrators was no longer present. 
II: An Example of a Confrontational Diary 
Not every Jewish diarist avoided descriptions of Nazi perpetrators.  Abel 
Herzberg wrote a very confrontational diary during the last year of the war while 
imprisoned in the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp.  I begin with his diary because it 
allows us to establish a point from which other diaries depart.  Herzberg’s frank and 
angry discussions of Nazi character, practices and ideology provide an important place to 
begin, not because other diaries were like his, but because they were so different.  When I 
began this investigation, I expected to find, across the spectrum of Holocaust diaries, 
evidence of the rage, frustration, incomprehension and protest I found in Herzberg’s 
diary.  When I did not, I was surprised.  Herzberg’s diary was in fact the outlier, a diary 
that in the end did not conform to the patterns I saw emerging in other diaries. Because 
Herzberg’s diary is so different from the other diaries examined in this thesis, I feel it is 
important to include most of his pronouncements about Nazis and Nazism, leaving aside 
only those that mention perpetrators in passing, or those that are redundant.  
By way of background information, Herzberg was born in Amsterdam in 1893 
and served in the Dutch Army during World War I.  He studied law and was well-known 
within Amsterdam’s Jewish community.  Herzberg and his family were arrested by the 
Nazis in March of 1943, but his wife managed to smuggle the children to safety.  He and 
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his wife spent several months in the Westerbork transit camp before being sent to 
Bergen-Belsen at the beginning of 1944.   
More than a year before the final defeat of the Third Reich, Bergen-Belsen 
consisted of a number of sub-camps, and conditions had not deteriorated as they later 
would.  The sub-camp to which Herzberg was attached consisted of Jews being “saved” 
on Himmler’s orders on the chance they could be exchanged for German prisoners.  In 
this camp Herzberg was one of the leaders, in charge of maintaining order and sitting in 
judgment of offenses committed by Jews against one another.  It was in this position – as 
a comparatively privileged prisoner in a comparatively privileged camp that he was able 
to write his extensive diary.4   
Rather than divide the analysis of Herzberg’s diary into like-minded entries as I 
do in later chapters, I believe it is more illustrative of this type of diary to allow it to 
unfold chronologically.  In this way it is possible to see swings in mood, theme or focus.  
This approach also meaningfully displays a fact that should not be ignored – that as the 
situation grew worse for Herzberg during the last months of the war, his direct 
discussions of Nazis tapered off.  This is not unexpected.  In the early part of the diaries, 
despite Herzberg’s belief that his conditions were comparatively worse than for other 
Jews, he still had time and energy to carefully observe his surroundings and to write.  
Toward the end, the perpetrators begin to disappear from his writings as he devotes his 
energy toward staying alive and to documenting the starvation and death around him as it 
was experienced by other Jews.  This seems to support the argument that the more 
                                                 
4 All biographical information from Renata Lacqueur “Biographical Note” in Abel J. Herzberg’s 
Between Two Streams: A Diary from Bergen-Belsen (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1997), p. ix-xi. 
29 
 
traumatic the environment in which a writer found him or herself, the less psychological 
and physical energy he or she was able to devote to literary resistance to perpetrators. 
Herzberg’s first really aggressive entry was directed at the barbarity of those who 
imprisoned him.  On 14 August 1944 he wrote 
Roll-call is like a religious rite, or at least a sacred act for that 
bunch of inferior anthropoids who, partly unfulfilled by the human ideals 
that their teachers and priests taught them, and partly out of genuine 
indignation at all manner of fine cant, have invoked with pounding hearts 
a stark and lewd heathendom which taught them that the absolute binding 
power of ethics and morals was nonsense, and that, in principle, whatever 
was advantageous would always be permitted.5  
 
At this early point in his imprisonment, Herzberg establishes what becomes a long-
standing tradition – symbolically flipping the tables on the “master race” by calling into 
question their supposed superiority.  In fact, referring to them as “inferior anthropoids” is 
one of the dehumanizing gestures which became a fundamental component of many 
Holocaust diaries.  As a lawyer, Herzberg is also highly critical of the “stark and lewd 
heathendom” that abandons ethics and embraces a “might makes right” philosophy – an 
opinion we would expect someone in a helpless position to subscribe to.   
Herzberg frequently used sarcasm as a strategy to deal with his anger.  On 17 
August 1944 he wrote, “I have a nine-year old daughter.  Have the Germans, those 
guardians of European culture, locked her away, taken her to Poland?”6 Clearly Herzberg 
does not believe Germans are “guardians of European culture.”  The comment indicates 
extreme anger but it also tells us something else that was common knowledge – for Jews, 
moving east to Poland was something that was greatly feared.  Though the details might 
                                                 
5 Abel J. Herzberg, Between Two Streams: A Diary from Bergen-Belsen (New York: I.B. Tauris 
Publishers, 1997), p. 11-12. 
6 Herzberg, p. 15. 
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not have been known, the prospect clearly angers and terrifies Herzberg and it is through 
sarcasm that he is best able to express his emotions at this time. 
On 17 August 1944 Herzberg made another observation common to many 
Holocaust diaries.  In it, he identifies, or conflates, Germans with products they create – 
particularly metallic or machine-like products.  In this case, he seems to indicate that 
barbed-wire represents a kind of national character.  He wrote,  
…barbed wire seems to be a Germanic predilection.  Wherever 
you stand or go there is barbed wire.  All high-grade stuff: good, quality, 
rust-free.  With long, thickly planted barbs.  Horizontal and vertical barbed 
wire.  Perhaps the ancient Germans used to have barbed beards.7 
  
The idea that peoples have common national or racial characteristics was, of course, 
common at the time, and Herzberg’s use of this kind of analogy might indicate that he 
subscribed to this point of view too.  But it also seems to demonstrate a more general 
point – namely that Jews were just as capable of essentializing their persecutors as the 
Germans were of essentializing those they persecuted. On the other hand, the entry is 
somewhat ambiguous because it could also indicate a more sarcastic tone in which 
Herzberg adopts the faulty logic of his persecutors to make a broader point – that 
explaining today’s phenomena in terms of fleeting cultural traits from the long past is 
patently ridiculous. 
Silence occupies an important place in the study of Holocaust diaries and 
memoirs, but the subject has seldom been brought up as articulately as Herzberg does in 
an entry dated 18 August 1944.  He wrote 
  Last night I watched a new transport of Polish women arrive.  It 
was a strangely mild August evening whose infinite beauty penetrates 
even to here.  For although they have robbed us of the world, they have 
not succeeded with the sky.  The clouds and the moon remain our 
                                                 
7 As we will see, this conflation can be seen in Korczak’s diary too.  Herzberg, p. 16. 
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witnesses.  Oh, if only they could speak!  But they cannot speak.  They 
remain silent and embody the silence as it were.  That silence which is 
filled with mysteries, of whisperings of the past, filled with an endless 
melancholy that evokes an almost intolerable longing.  The depths of 
sorrow become fathomless. 
In this silence the Polish women file past.  This too, takes place 
without any sound.  It is as if shadows are passing by, as if a film is being 
projected with the sound turned off.  Not a word is spoken.  Not a sound is 
heard.  Their feet shuffle silently along the ground.  If you look more 
closely you will notice that a significant number of them are walking 
barefoot.  If ever a film is made of this period and the director wants to 
capture the effect of the infinite wretchedness of evacuation, let him revert 
to the silent film.  Turn the music off too.  Show only their eyes.  Because 
not only are there no words with which to convey the misery of the 
dispossessed, no other sound is capable of it either – silence, silence, a 
bewildering silence.8   
 
Like James Young and Saul Friedländer would later, Herzberg recognizes the limitations 
of language.  Ironically, it is only through using language to discuss the paucity of 
language (a very self-reflective and post-modern notion) that Herzberg is able to describe 
it.  More importantly, he is also aware – even before the war is over – of the important 
place art holds in the process of conveying historical events to a future audience.  This 
seems to indicate Herzberg’s experience of another kind of “crisis” – not one of 
imagination, but one of language.  As many scholars would maintain after him, Herzberg 
felt that the experience of the Holocaust could not be adequately related.  In this case, it 
was not that  Herzberg believed it was too painful to describe, but because the idea of 
others attempting to imagine what had happened, either through the use of language or of 
art, seemed futile to him.  For Herzberg to say “show only their eyes” is for him to resort 
to the intangible – to imagination.  At the same time, however, even as he wishes that he 
could communicate his experiences to others, he acknowledges that it cannot be done and 
                                                 
8 It is said that eyes are the “windows to the soul,” and perhaps Herzberg is appealing here to a 
kind of knowledge that lies beyond intellect or emotion – one that can be conveyed only by other means.  
Herzberg, p. 18. 
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so, in the end, he (and the imaginary director of his film) must paradoxically resort to “a 
bewildering silence” to convey the most accurate meaning. 
Unlike some other diarists, Janusz Korczak for instance, Herzberg seemed to 
grasp Nazi goals and ideology completely.9  In an aggressive and disdainful comment 
written 19 August 1944, he again lays out his understanding of the Nazi raison d’etre.  
“In every country that it marched into in its clumsy boots the Third Reich immediately 
began to carry out the most sacred item of its manifesto: the extermination of the Jews.”10  
This clear understanding of Nazi purpose is, perhaps, one of the strongest points of 
Herzberg’s diary and one that gives him the fortitude to write what he does.  
Another means of resistance common to many diaries was to dehumanize 
perpetrators.  By doing so, the diarists removed these people from what was familiar, or 
from what was common between the two groups.  This was not unique to victims, and 
was in fact something done quite intentionally by the Nazis as they attempted to make 
genocide more palatable to those who had to carry it out.11  This insistence on 
dehumanization, on the part of both the Nazis and Jewish victims, seems to be an 
example of the need to maintain a kind of simple binary division of peoples in an uneven 
and hostile environment.  On 28 August 1944, Herzberg penned the following entry 
describing an SS man at Bergen-Belsen.   
The group had not worked hard enough; ‘der Rote Müller’, a sort 
of dressed up piglet, lazy as a pig on a hot day, fat and puffed up, with a 
red mouth and greenish slits for eyes, a cigar stump permanently stuck 
between a pair of clinging jellyfish lips, the Rote Müller felt that not 
                                                 
9 To be fair to Korczak, however, Nazi purposes were much clearer in the summer of 1944 than in 
early 1942 when he wrote the bulk of his diary. 
10 Herzberg, p. 20. 
11 See, for example, Terrence Des Pres’ essay “Excremental Assault” in his book The Survivor: An 
Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p 51-71. 
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enough work had been done.  Four days’ Brotentzug [without bread 
rations] for a group of forty men….12 
   
This account of Nazi as animals or monsters is similar to descriptions by other diarists 
(like Emmanuel Ringelblum’s portrayal of Nazi perpetrators as “Frankensteins” or 
“bloody dogs,” which will be discussed at greater length in chapter two).  This tendency 
to dehumanize the hostile “other” continues in an entry from 30 August 1944, when 
Herzberg wrote, “Those who had not gone to bed yet but were still sitting up had to jump 
to attention, to listen to the roaring, the braying of the SS louts, learned through 
propaganda and training.”13  These animal metaphors – Nazis as lions and jackasses – are 
apt comparisons to Herzberg.  In this entry, Nazi perpetrators – as cruel and powerful as 
lions, as loud and ridiculous as jackasses – are nevertheless symbolically being stripping 
of their power and placed under the control of some other force.  To Herzberg, it seems 
that these men are nothing more than trained circus animals, only doing as their masters 
allow or as instinct dictates.  At least that is the position his language puts them in. 
Sometimes, Holocaust diarists referred to Germans as they may have tried to 
portray themselves – but through the use of sarcasm, managed to convey the exact 
opposite meaning.  In the same entry of 30 August 1944, Herzberg refers to the SS as 
“their lordships” on two separate instances.  This is also very similar to a strategy 
employed by Emmanuel Ringelblum in his Warsaw diary in which he refers to Germans 
as “lords and masters” (see discussion in chapter two).  
An important entry on 1 September 1944 is another example of the kind of 
castigation and recrimination one would expect in many Holocaust diaries.  Here 
Herzberg wrote   
                                                 
12 Herzberg, p. 34-35. 
13 Herzberg, p. 41. 
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One day there will probably be peace again and then war again.  
And people like us, people who are convicted of crimes they have not 
committed, who are persecuted yet are innocent, who look at each other, 
and whatever we may think of each other, know we are innocent, we who 
with our wives and children are punished day after day by people to whom 
we can reply only with silent contempt, we who know their crimes, their 
immeasurable guilt, their lawlessness, and have discovered the extent to 
which they have repudiated every human responsibility for us, we who 
suffer for them, we who are made responsible for their responsibility, we 
who are accused of everything that belongs to their criminal intent, who 
are said to want everything that they bring about, who are said to aspire to 
everything that they wish to achieve, we who are imputed with every 
wickedness for the mischief-maker and who bleed for their misdeeds, we 
who know this from our history, again from generation to generation, we 
the eternal scapegoat, the brother of him who was beaten to death, who are 
branded with the mark of Cain the fratricide, we are not even satisfied 
with the illusion of the horizon – but we also want to know what lies 
behind it, like a child that stands at the seaside and asks: Where do the 
waves come from?14  
 
This single long sentence is the most complete depiction, critique and repudiation of Nazi 
perpetrators I found in any of the diaries I studied.  Herzberg seems to pass through every 
negative emotion, from “contempt” to scorn to anger, as all the blame for the Holocaust – 
the complete culpability – is placed on Nazi shoulders.  Here, Nazis are thoroughly evil.  
The question is not asked why they are evil.  Nor is the question asked why Jews are the 
“eternal scapegoat.”  It suffices for Herzberg that this is the way things are and 
questioning it is a pointless exercise, like asking where waves come from.  It also 
bespeaks a kind of cultural resignation based upon countless years of dealing with the 
same anti-Semitic phenomena.  The sentence demonstrates something else important, 
however.  As Young has said, diarists felt compelled to not just to write, but to testify.  
Testimony implies not just relaying information or narrative, but also calling for 
judgment.  It seems clear that by testifying in this way, Herzberg was looking forward to 
the time when perpetrators and the idea of Nazism would be placed on trial.  The passage 
                                                 
14 Herzberg, p. 53. 
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almost reads like a prosecutor’s opening statement – something unsurprising since 
Herzberg was a lawyer in civilian life as well as a jurist within the world of Bergen-
Belsen.  The passage is a declaration both of Jewish innocence and of German guilt and 
as such seems a remarkable depiction of perpetrators (in general, though not specifically).  
It is interesting to note the timing of this indictment as well – 1 September 1944 was the 
fifth anniversary of the beginning of the war in Europe, something Herzberg 
acknowledges earlier in the entry. 
On 4 September 1944 Herzberg returned to a more general critique of individual 
SS men.  “The men who are required to work are being beaten terribly.  Fritz, the Red 
Müller, Count Turd (so named because he is responsible for the latrines) and Rau are 
hounding men with a plank of wood.”15 Obviously Herzberg is indicating sympathy with 
those at the mercy of these perpetrators and anger at those doing the beating, but he is 
also demonstrating another strategy for dealing with a hostile “other.”  By using humor – 
in this case a scatological humor reference to one of the SS men –  Herzberg (and indeed, 
all the Jews who used the demeaning nickname), is attempting, through the use of 
mockery to even out a disparity in power.  The SS man, as “Count Turd” is not so 
powerful, or so great a threat, as he would otherwise be.16 
Herzberg is testifying again in an entry of 7 September 1944.  
This morning, the commandant himself came to select the men.  He sent everyone 
to work.  Men up to eighty years of age, sick people with thirty-nine and forty degree 
temperature; he sent for the hospital soldier, generally known as the Herr Sanitäter, 
abused the Jewish doctor, and gave himself away completely.  ‘Ihr glaubt wohl wegen 
                                                 
15 Herzberg, p. 65. 
16 This also seems to be a Jewish version of the Nazi habit of designating a “Scheißmeister” – an 
old Jew to monitor the latrines at camps like Auschwitz, Buchenwald and Treblinka. 
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der kleinen Frontsverschiebung könnt Ihr alle sabotieren! Ich schneide euch den Hals 
ab.17 
  
Here he is providing evidence of murderous intent – witnessing in advance – against the 
leadership of the Nazi camp. 
On 8 September 1944 Herzberg plainly laid out the way prisoners at Bergen-
Belsen physically resisted the demands of the Third Reich.   He wrote, 
The Germans say we are lazy, indolent slouches, slow and 
incapable of work.  Jews do not know how to work.  They guess correctly.  
We cannot work under these circumstances and will not do it.  They can 
drag us here, whip us and beat us, we will do it as slowly and as sluggishly 
as we want and not a fraction more than the minimum.  Of all the methods 
of undermining the system, this is one of the best.  To the Kraut it must 
seem as if he is chewing on a sticky mass, or walking through thick 
syrup.18  
 
It should be noted again, that Herzberg was in a camp for relatively privileged Jews.  
Because they were being saved for exchange with German prisoners (under the direct 
orders of the Reichsführer SS no less), the amount of punishment that could be meted out 
was somewhat limited.  It is almost impossible to imagine this kind of resistance taking 
place in Auschwitz, where, for example, the goal was either immediate Vernichtung in 
the gas chambers, or the slower Vernichtung durch Arbeit of day-to-day life in the camps. 
There are several important points that can be gleaned from Herzberg’s entry 
dated 12 September 1944 in which he wrote “Whenever there is a westerly wind, all over 
the camp one can smell the bones smouldering in the crematorium.  The bones of the 
Jews smell exactly like the bones of the Aryan Häftlinge when they are burned.  What a 
wonderful smell the bones of the Heroic Teuton Warriors will spread when they are 
                                                 
17 “You seem to think that because of the small shift of the front you can all start committing 
sabotage!  I’ll cut your throats.” Herzberg, p. 71. 
18 Herzberg, p. 81-82. 
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placed on the fire.”19 The first point is that this is yet another frank acknowledgment of 
Herzberg’s bitter anger and even hate of the Nazis who were murdering so many people 
in the less-protected or privileged camps around him.  The second is the clear expression 
of his desire to switch places with the murderers.  It is not enough now to stop the murder 
of Jews – Nazis themselves must die and their bodies will smell wonderful burning.  He 
also makes a point about equality.  Why are Jews being singled out, he implies, when the 
bodies of Aryan Häftlinge smell the same as those of Jews?  Finally, the sarcasm 
continues – Herzberg believes the Nazi are anything but “Heroic Teuton Warriors.”  
Calling them that is a mark of extreme scorn and contempt.  The delight he feels in 
German death continues in yet another sarcastic entry written later that week.  On 17 
September 1944 he wrote.  “The transport from Westerbork brought us newspapers.  I 
read the Deutsche Zeitung für die Niederlande of 8 and 9 September.  It is a pleasure to 
read how courageously the Germans are falling in battle.”20  
Something unique to Herzberg is his tendency to personify one specific – indeed 
one essential symbol of Nazism.  On 19 September 1944 he declares that “The 
crematorium will have a good laugh today.”  In the midst of the death-throes of the Third 
Reich, Herzberg gloats at the prospect of the continued death and destruction of Germans 
and Germany.  He continues,  
‘Der Herr Sanitäter’ has died.  What is more, he died by his own 
hand.  He used to threaten it: ‘Wenn die Sache schief geht….’ Despite this 
threat, die Sache ist nicht recht gegangen.  Der Herr Sanitäter had drunk a 
large bottle of rum, and with the courage of melancholy drunkenness, had 
pressed his revolver to his head. 
When he has arrived at the throne of eternal accountability, they 
will call a number of witnesses.  Material witnesses.  Jews from Bergen-
                                                 
19 Herzberg, p. 91. 
20 It is also indicative of Herzberg’s privileged position that he is able to read newspapers at all.  
Herzberg, p. 100. 
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Belsen, who had stood before him trembling with fever, whom he had 
refuses to make Dienstfrei.  Jews who had been sent out to work last 
winter when they had longed for a little warmth and rest.   
In heaven they will stand before the throne of justice.  All that the 
Herr Sanitäter can do then is to hope for God’s mercy.  Woe betide him 
on his day of judgment.21  
 
Again, Herzberg is providing evidence of Nazi atrocity – this time to an imaginary, but 
higher court – not one presided over by man, but by God. 
Early in the fall of the last year of the Third Reich, before things passed into total 
chaos, Herzberg seemed confident in victory – not just of the Allies, but of the Jewish 
people and Jewish culture.  In an entry dated 28 September 1944, Yom Kippur, he writes 
“And every enemy, including the SS, exists for us as if they were yesterday, as if they 
were last year’s snow.  They are worthless.  They lead to emptiness and vanity and we 
will survive.  Next year in Jerusalem.  With these words the Day of Atonement ends 
too.”22  These ideas express a belief in the resilience of the Jewish people even in the 
middle of the Holocaust.  For Herzberg, the concept of the “eternal Jew” is something to 
celebrate.   
The crematorium is again an active, living participant in an entry dated 3 October 
1944.  “The ugly skeletal men were all starving with hunger…each of them could already 
see the refuse cart waiting to take him to Hitler’s silent ally standing in the background: 
the crematorium.”  He continues later in the same entry, “…a couple of stray Canadians 
arrived and began to fire at us.  They were really angry and their machine-guns crackled 
lustily.  We had two casualties, the Schneebaumlager one, and the poor Häftlinge eight.  
The crematorium had a feast.”23  
                                                 
21 “If things take a bad turn”…”Things did not go right.” Herzberg, p. 104. 
22 Herzberg, p. 118. 
23 Herzberg, p. 133. 
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Herzberg reverts back to legal language in the entry of 5 October 1944.  “…we 
must do everything possible to avoid becoming accomplices of the Germans.  We must 
stand by our principles.”24  Here, Herzberg again explicitly recognizes the criminality of 
the Nazi regime and implicitly expresses interest and satisfaction that when the day of 
reckoning finally arrives the Nazis will be seen for what they are by all men, by history 
and by God.  This is why Jews must remain together – a coherent community – and not 
sully themselves by colluding with their enemies in any way. 
The entry of 9 October 1944 is long and remarkable.  In it, Herzberg lays out what 
almost amounts to a short version of Jewish history – one that clearly and unabashedly 
posits the primacy of Jewish culture and thought, and one that savagely critiques 
German/Christian culture.  He wrote 
Here we see this man, face to face, in his true light.  We – and I 
believe this to be our [Jewish] historical, our eternal, experience – 
encounter him in his nakedness, far away from the path of civilization, 
there where he feels no embarrassment. He gives reign to his passions.  He 
does what his heart desires, he pursues the lust of his soul, and we are his 
spoils and his sacrifice. We Jews see man in the crevices and depths of his 
true nature.  We see him as the fly sees the spider, as the roe deer sees the 
panther.  
And we even managed not to hate him. Instead, out of a most 
profound love for mankind and out of a vital urge and a philosophy of life, 
that could not be surpassed or tempered, we gave him a rule of life.  Out of 
an all too great mercy for mankind we gave him the principle of 
accountability and retribution so that he might control himself.  
However, it was made into a kind of ‘love’ and ‘mercy’ which, 
from a psychological point of view, meant the enfeebling of accountability 
– and therefore became acceptable to him.  
And when one sees here how men, big strong men, send women 
and children on transport, shouting, cursing, raging, or when one has seen 
just once how the SS man transports corpses with a cigarette in his snout, 
unmoved as if he is transporting manure – no worse – as if he is 
transporting bricks, then one knows: this is man.  Ecce homo! 
And even more than unmoved, the SS man is pleased with himself, 
precisely because he is unmoved.  That he has succeeded in attaining this 
                                                 
24 Herzberg, p. 135. 
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state in the face of the most extreme human suffering, that and that alone 
he calls victory and power.  It is the victory over the principle, which he 
senses to be a Jewish principle: the principle of the omnipresent Spirit, as 
God is called by the Jew. Ha makom.25  
 
According to Herzberg’s viewpoint, the Jews existed first.  Others were encountered 
later, almost as secondary beings, as they climbed up lower rungs on the ladder of 
development.  Nevertheless, he admits that, historically, the Jew has been subjected to the 
lower creature/man.  Even though he qualifies his initial statement, in making this 
assertion, Herzberg flips the prevalent (at least in Nazi Germany) vision of Aryan and 
Jewish relationships and assigns the power and the wisdom to see true nature to the Jew, 
not to the Aryan.  This could be considered the expression of a will to power and control 
– one that is natural and almost necessary among powerless people in situations like the 
one in which Herzberg found himself.  He also asserts that while the Jews were 
frequently the victim of those with more power, the true moral superiority lies with the 
Jew, who is responsible for the Judeo/Monotheistic ethics and the law which gave the 
“other” (the Gentile/Aryan) the opportunity to grow and mature as a culture.  Throughout 
this passage, Jews are tied in Herzberg’s mind to the moral, the correct, and the legal.  
Continuing his history in a positively Nietzschean vein, he asserts that these Jewish laws 
and morals were only acceptable to the Gentiles/Aryans in the watered-down form of 
Christianity – the “love” and “mercy” which entailed an “enfeebling of accountability.”  
This short “history lesson” which – quickly traces man’s progress over thousands of 
years – out of some sort of Hobbesian state of nature, to Christian times, to 20th century 
man, to the individual SS man, to the complete elimination of what is human in man –  is 
                                                 
25It is interesting to note that Herzberg uses a Christian phrase, Ecce Homo, to indicate man’s base 
nature.  The phrase, used by Pilate during Christ’s trial is loaded.  The trial was the place where Christian 
anti-Semitism can be said to have begun.  It is, of course, also the title of a book by Friedrich Nietzsche.  
Herzberg, p. 141-142.  
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meant by Herzberg to encapsulate the basic structure of history according to the Jew.  
Regardless of whether other Jews felt this way or not, this is a fascinating insight into the 
mind of an intelligent and well-educated Jewish man who, suddenly powerless and 
surrounded by enemies, found it necessary to interpret history not just in a pro-Jewish 
light, but in one that was actively hostile to Gentiles/Christians/Aryans/Nazis. 
The entry dated 13 October 1944 is both a kind of elitist class critique as well as 
one that continues Herzberg’s assault on any political philosophy based strictly on power.  
He writes 
Germany is governed – and this is Hitler’s secret – by the 
Feldswebel [Sergeant].  He gives the soldier good fodder, and the officer a 
leg up.  He earns a good salary, pulls on his boots, and with his 
unbelievable insolence and unsparing coarseness walks through the land: 
the taskmaster, the slave driver, who will ‘niederschlagen,’ [and] 
‘ausradieren’ everything, the servant as ‘Herr.’  The ruffian as the chosen 
one, the depraved in the role of the man of noble blood.  The unworthy, 
who is fooled into thinking that because of his muscles, he has been called 
upon to form the ruling race and will, therefore, ‘in die Fresse hauen’ 
[and] ‘im Arsch treten.’  The lazy good-for-nothing who finds everything 
‘Scheisse’ except getting others to work for him.  Others, he envies and 
hates for their achievements and talent. 
And as everyone has a rotten or worthless spot in his soul, there are 
many, many National Socialists and many, many men in the SS.  They 
will be sorry enough, but regret is also one of the begetters of the 
incurable disease that Germany suffers from: Deutschtum.26  
 
Although this assessment of perpetrators starts out simply as a critique of the lower or 
middling classes, by the end, it is German-ness itself that is the culprit to blame.  Not 
only is Deutschtum responsible for his problems, but it is also the object of Herzberg’s 
derision.  The critique continues on 21 October 1944.  This time, the healthy German 
bodies are envied – something that is again no surprise coming from someone reduced to 
eating sporadic rations of stale bread and the occasional rancid mussels. In this case, 
                                                 
26 “To smash down,” “To eradicate,” “To smash their faces in,” “To kick in the ass,” “Shit.,”  
“German-ness” or “Germanity,” Herzberg, p. 146-147. 
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however, he is also calling into question the very masculine virtues that the SS extol in an 
attempt to shame those who harass the “wretched heap of wrecks” to be found in the KZs.  
If they are truly Aryan warriors, or real German men (something he has already 
expressed doubts about), Herzberg believes they would be fighting their more powerful 
enemies.  He writes 
  There is no news.  There is only the endless bullying, provoking 
and tormenting by the SS, and every day anew it amazes us that a body of 
perfectly fit, well-fed men, at the peak of their lives, tall, muscled, strong 
men, who in fact could be the flower of the nation, actually have no other 
work and no other worry than daily to harass this wretched heap of wrecks 
formed by us men, women and children.  Daily, now that the German 
fatherland is in great danger and the German nation finds itself in a 
historic crisis, in which lasting decisions are made about its fate, its 
happiness, indeed its life and death.  One would like to shout at them: 
gentlemen, have you nothing better to do now?27 
  
It did not seem occur to Herzberg that he and the remaining Jews really were perceived 
by the regime as Nazism’s most powerful enemies.  The illogical nature of National 
Socialism, and Hitler especially, who found it more important to win the war against the 
Jews than the war itself, is something Herzberg does not even consider.  As with many 
other Holocaust diarists, the extent of Nazi irrationality is something Herzberg finds 
difficult to comprehend. 
Herzberg’s diary began on 11 August 1944.  As we have seen, for about three 
months he managed to pay close attention to perpetrators.  However, by mid-November, 
these depictions started to become fewer and farther between. The level of analysis began 
to deteriorate as well, until by December 1944 Herzberg’s perspective, at first so different 
than all the other diaries I have examined, was reduced to the straight journalistic type of 
reportage of news that other diarists used as well.  For instance, on Christmas Day he 
                                                 
27 Herzberg, p. 155. 
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repeated rumors like the following:  “Yesterday it was alleged: Brussels retaken.  The 
Germans again forty kilometers from the coast.  470,000 Americans taken prisoner.  
Significant retreat in Holland.  Probably it is all much exaggerated, but the fact of the 
German initiative and offensive remains.”28  
Up until 8 November, Herzberg wrote 51 entries, many (as we have seen) dealt 
with perpetrators.  He wrote 61 more entries afterward, and in these, perpetrators are 
present only in passing, with a few exceptions like the following.  20 March 1945.  
“Aber: kapitulieren werden wir nie.  We, the SS, still have plenty to stuff ourselves on.  
The rest does not matter.”29 This statement does not really seem to be a direct quote from 
the SS.  Rather, it is more likely Herzberg is putting words into their mouths – projecting 
his own sentiments about their stubborn refusal to surrender and greed into their mouths.  
Only one other statement regarding perpetrators is worth considering in this context.  On 
10 April 1945 he wrote a short entry.  He wrote “The SS are allowing the ‘organizing.’  
This afternoon they cut off the water because of an air raid alert.”30  This statement is of 
some interest because is demonstrates that metaphors (“organizing” is a metaphor for 
resistance through theft from the SS) which began in eastern camps like Majdanek and 
Auschwitz had been appropriated and were being used by inmates in the interior.  This is 
unsurprising considering that as the Eastern Front collapsed, thousands of concentration 
inmates (like those from Auschwitz Herzberg mentioned in his 18 August entry) were 
transported to the interior of the Reich.  The final sentence is just another example of 
reportage. 
                                                 
28 Herzberg, p. 186. 
29 “But we will never surrender.” Herzberg, p. 203. 
30 Herzberg, p. 210 
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Through this brief analysis of Abel Herzberg’s statements on perpetrators it is 
possible to accomplish several things.  The first is to demonstrate potential literary or 
discursive strategies for dealing with both a painful experience as well as the need to 
communicate.  Throughout his diary, Herzberg alternately writes in angry, sarcastic, 
dehumanizing, metaphorical, philosophical, historical and journalistic styles.  Not only 
that, but although he early on recognizes the important role of silence in trying to convey 
genocidal reality, it is only in the end that his diary manifests that silence with regard to 
perpetrators.  In other words, Herzberg’s diary represents a unique example of the genre 
of Holocaust diaries by illustrating many of the possible ways a diarist could deal with 
perpetrators.  It also demonstrates the progression one individual worked through while 
trying to come to terms with a brutal, genocidal world.  In examining other diaries written 
during the same six-year period, few of the writers laid out their vision and understanding 
of Nazis as clearly or articulately as Herzberg did, but those who did discuss them used 
many of the same literary styles that he employed.  In order to make the point that these 
other authors avoided perpetrators in their diaries, it was necessary to look at someone 
who did not.  For this reason Abel Herzberg’s diary has been examined first. 
III:  Depictions of Perpetrators at a Distance 
Abel Herzberg was a grown man, well-educated and intelligent.  Because of his 
privileged position in a unique camp, he was able to observe perpetrators closely and pen 
his entries in relative safety.  Herzberg’s long pronouncements on the nature of Nazi 
perpetrators stand in stark contrast to those of Éva Heyman (1931-1944) and Hannah 
Senesh (1921-1944) – two young Hungarian women who tend to speak of Nazis only at a 
distance.  Their accounts are filtered through what they have been told by others, or what 
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they may have seen in newsreels, or read in newspapers.  There are a couple of good 
reasons for this discrepancy.  First, Heyman was only thirteen years-old when she wrote 
her diary.  Her family was well-educated, not to mention being committed socialists to 
whom politics were second-nature.  However, Heyman’s mother (whom she refers to 
throughout the diary by her first name, Ági) and step-father tried to shield her from 
events as much as possible.  Of course, much of the worry, fear, and general 
consternation the family felt as a whole comes through in Éva’s diary.  It is not that 
Heyman had no experience with Nazis at all.  In fact, as her diary makes plain, her best 
friend had already been taken away by the Nazis and sent to Poland before the diary 
began.  However, her direct experience was very limited, and the one close call she did 
have before she was deported to her death in Auschwitz-Birkenau on 2 June 1944 did 
manage find its way into a dream she wrote about. 
The influence her family had on her is plain to see in an entry from 14 February 
1944.  In it Heyman wrote “…Ági thinks that the Russians don’t tell lies, and neither 
does the Voice of America; only the German radio and the Hungarian radio tell lies.”31  
Éva’s tone is not one that questions her mother’s judgment.  As someone well-versed in 
politics, Ági understood the idea of propaganda and misinformation very well.  One 
senses from this account that it is not that Ági is deluding herself, but that she is trying to 
make things simpler for her daughter.  This tendency to reduce things to the simplest 
formulations is something common to many Holocaust diaries.  It is as if there was not 
the time or energy to qualify every statement.  Or perhaps it was easier, in an 
                                                 
31 Éva Heyman, The Diary of Éva Heyman (translated from the Hebrew into English by Moshe M. 
Kohn, Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1974. p. 29. 
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environment of total war, to ignore the tendency of one’s own side to adopt the same 
morally dubious tactics practiced by the other side (lies and propaganda).  
In the same entry, Heyman continues “I heard Ági tell Grandma that at the 
Journalists Club the night before they had said that the government was preparing to do 
something terrible, and Jews who weren’t born in Hungary would be taken to Poland 
where a horrible fate was in store for them.”32  Again, Heyman is relating something she 
heard from her family.  The comment is illustrative of the fact Hungarian Jews, (the last 
European Jews to feel the full power of Hitler’s “Final Solution”) were aware of the 
events taking place in Poland.  From Heyman’s point of view, however, what this 
“horrible fate” was could be was not yet questioned.  Continuing with the same entry, 
Heyman demonstrates her youth and naïveté.  She knows that bad things are happening, 
but the idea of an ideology or political philosophy is not yet clear to her.  At this moment 
in her life, people are defined by deeds, not ideas.  Here she wrote, “I don’t know what 
Fascism is, but one of the things it probably means is deporting Jews to Poland.”33  As in 
Herzberg’s diary, while Jews might not grasp the full significance of the experience they 
are living through, “Poland” has become a kind of shorthand for the worst kinds of fears 
and a synonym for German depravity and evil. 
Éva’s attempts to understand the ideas that gave structure to the events occurring 
around her continued in an entry dated 26 February 1944.   
I don’t know what ‘politics’ actually is, though everybody is 
always talking about it: I really don’t understand it, or who does it, but 
they do it very badly.  I’ll just be a photo reporter, that’s all.  But I promise 
you one thing, dear diary; I won’t photograph a single Rightist because I 
hate them with all of my might!34  
                                                 
32 Heyman, p. 31. 
33 Heyman, p. 33. 
34 Heyman, p. 43. 
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This quick entry gives us a clue to Éva’s view of the world: politics – however it is 
defined – is done badly (and who could disagree with her analysis?).  She believes it is 
simpler to dream a little dream of being a photographer.  Finally, her statement indicates 
that, even though the causes of the war were unclear to her, hate in response to hate was 
still possible, even for one so young.  
Éva‘s nebulous and ill-defined ideas of Nazis and Nazism end on 19 March 1944.  
In an entry that resonates with fear and trepidation, she wrote “Dear diary, you’re the 
luckiest one in the world, because you cannot feel, you cannot know what a terrible thing 
has happened to us.  The Germans have come!”35  Here, Heyman gives us a clue as to 
how it is possible to deal with trauma.  It is better not to be able to feel at all than to 
suffer.  The Nazis come like the end of the world, making Heyman wish she could not 
feel, but at the same time, she believes it is necessary to live and to feel this trauma 
through the act of writing the entry.  This entry is important because it underscores the 
idea of a “crisis of imagination” in which Holocaust diarists had to come to terms with 
the need to speak about what was happening, and at the same time numb themselves with 
regard to its full meaning.   
Heyman divulged her dream to become a photographer in an earlier entry.  On 25 
March 1944 she made another statement that gives an idea of how the war made the most 
sense to her in photographic or cinematic terms.  She wrote “I was on my way home 
when the German soldiers came marching in, with cannons and tanks, the kind I’ve seen 
in the newsreels.”36  A cinematic version of the war is just that – images and maybe some 
short journalistic descriptors that relay what is happening, but contain no real analysis of 
                                                 
35 Heyman, p. 57. 
36 Heyman, p. 62. 
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why it happens.  This is Heyman’s first real experience of Nazis, yet she finds it 
impossible to discuss it in any other way than to say it similar to films she has seen.  It is 
clear that she is avoiding – or perhaps has not yet really probed the idea of the Nazi 
perpetrator, as she herself admits in the next day’s entry.  On 26 March 1944, she wrote 
“Dear diary, until now I didn’t want to write about this in you because I tried to put it out 
of my mind, but ever since the Germans are here, all I think about is Márta.  She was also 
just a girl, and still the Germans killed her.  But I don’t want them to kill me!”37  The fear 
in this short entry is palpable.  Heyman is terrified.  She knows her friend has been 
murdered and this realization allows her to understand her own mortality as well.  But the 
idea of death is something she must not think about and she tries “to put it out of [her] 
mind.”  But again, she is compelled to write about the fear, to write about the Nazis and 
to write about the murder of her friend.  Again, we see the tensions of a “crisis of 
imagination.” 
Things quickly became worse for Éva and her family, as she related in brief and 
factual entry dated 28 March 1944.  “Early this morning the German and Hungarian 
Police took Uncle Sándor and everyone they knew who is a Socialist or a Communist.”38  
Clearly the genocidal pressure was increasing and the little girl’s world was becoming 
more and more dangerous.  This short entry again relays information.  It is almost a 
journalistic account.  Something happened, that is all.  Éva makes no effort to discuss 
why this happens.  She merely records the event.  It seems plain that she is still trying to 
keep certain things out of her immediate consciousness.   
                                                 
37 Heyman, p. 63. 
38 Heyman, p. 64. 
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Shortly after this entry, Éva and her family were moved into the ghetto in 
Nagyvarad.  The next month’s entries are devoted almost exclusively to life in the ghetto 
with all its horrors and deprivations.  However, as much as she may have wished to keep 
a conscious awareness of Nazi perpetrators at bay, subconsciously she was still trying to 
cope.  In a fascinating entry of 5 May 1944 she wrote “I dreamt that Pista Vadas was the 
driver of the truck [taking the family to the ghetto], and I was awfully angry that Pista 
Vadas had become an S.S. man.”39 Pista Vadas was the young Jewish man Heyman was 
in love with (a youthful crush, at a distance).  It is interesting that in order for Éva’s mind 
to let perpetrators through – even in a dream – they had to be disguised in the form of 
someone Heyman loved and could trust.  What the dream reveals then, is not a 
perpetrator at all but a Jew in an SS uniform.  The actual German human being is 
nowhere to be found.  This type of imaginative alteration dealing with the uniform 
continues in other diaries and will be examined later in the thesis. 
As things moved from bad to worse, Heyman, like Herzberg, began to ignore 
perpetrators even more.  In fact, in the last month of her life, they disappear entirely.  One 
final entry on 18 May 1944, written only about two weeks before Heyman was deported 
to Auschwitz, again conveys a young child’s fear of death and the unknown.   
Although she quotes her grandmother, one senses that she is appropriating the words for 
herself too.  She wrote “Even Grandma said: I really don’t want to die, because maybe I 
will yet live to see a better world, and all those people who are now so inhuman and 
wicked will be punished.”40  This entry expresses two important things.  First, it displays 
dread and horror in the face of imminent death.  Secondly, and more importantly, the 
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40 Heyman, p. 97. 
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comment, like many of Herzberg’s, testifies to the desire to see justice served and 
perpetrators punished for the pain and misery they have caused.   
We now turn to the diary of one of the great heroes of the Holocaust, Hannah 
Senesh.  Interestingly, although Senesh clearly felt the need to resist Nazi aggression very 
strongly, her diary is almost devoid of comments on perpetrators.  Categorically, her 
diary could almost fall under the heading of “Absence” or “Silence,” were it not for the 
fact that she repeats some of the visual or cinematic elements Heyman expressed and 
periodically makes short personal comments on their significance.  Although both young 
women were Hungarian, Senesh was considerably older than Éva Heyman (born in 1921 
rather than 1931) and could therefore express a more mature opinion about the war.  
Unlike Heyman, she was also not present in Europe during the period in which she wrote 
her diary.  Writing from a kibbutz in Palestine, Senesh’s diary clearly conveys the mental 
as well as physical distance from the perpetrators of the Holocaust.  Although she 
sympathizes with her family back in Hungary, and she editorializes somewhat, it seems 
that, for someone who would eventually give her life to fight the Nazis, she thinks far less 
about them than one would expect.41 
Her entry of 8 September 1939 lays out, in few words, the immediate cause of the 
war.   
The war we feared has begun.  It broke out over the matter of Danzig and 
the Polish Corridor…If they had really wanted to they could have preserved the 
peace.  But they didn’t want to – so there is now war between Germany and 
Poland.  The Germans have already captured a large part of Poland, and France, 
and England, Poland’s allies have entered the war.42  
                                                 
41 Senesh eventually volunteered to become a paratrooper and an officer, and she worked with 
British forces behind enemy lines.  She was captured, tortured and eventually shot as a spy on 7 November 
1944. 
42 Hannah Senesh, Hannah Senesh: Her Life and Diary The First Complete Edition (Woodstock 
VT: Jewish Lights Publishing, 2004), p. 81-82.  
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This comment is completely neutral in terms of perpetrators.  The war is to be feared, but 
the “they” who could have avoided it could include any or all of the Great Powers. 
 Her tone is more personal on 14 May 1940 when she says  
I was struck by the realization of how cut off I am from the world.  
How can I have the patience to study and prepare for an exam while the 
greatest war in history is raging in Europe?  We are witnessing, in general, 
times that will determine the fate of man.  The European war is engulfing 
vast areas, and fear that it will spread to our land is understandable.  The 
entire world is gripped by tension.  Germany grows mightier daily.43 
  
In this entry, Senesh begins to express what she is compelled to do – namely to act.  
Writing is not necessarily something her psychology requires.  Senesh wants to act, not 
just react – this is why she questions her patience.  The enemy is no one in particular – 
she has not seen perpetrators or experienced the war – it is only that “Germany” grows 
mightier and hence must be fought. 
Senesh’s comments of 4 June 1940 are worth mentioning because they indicate 
that she was attempting to identify with those who were suffering under Nazi oppression.  
“I can’t feel a thousandth of what Mother must no be living through.  She is suffering for 
our plans, dreams, which perhaps in this world holocaust will turn to ashes.”44  This is of 
interest for several reasons.  First, it acknowledges the idea that imagination is limited – 
she cannot understand what is happening to her mother in Hungary.  She expresses 
anxiety because all of the hopeful Zionist dreams she has invested so much hope in could 
go up in flames.  Finally, “this world holocaust” is an important phrase.  In it, Senesh 
seems to indicate her realization that the flames of war could exceed the bounds of 
Europe and completely engulf the world if something is not done.  Her use of the word 
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44 Senesh, p. 99. 
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“holocaust” is the only example I have found in which the word that would come to 
resonate around the world as a synonym for Nazi atrocity is used during the war by a 
diarist. 
Senesh again repeats simple news in her entry of 17 June 1940.  “The Germans 
are on the threshold of Paris.  Perhaps today the city will fall.  Paris and France and the 
entire world.  What is going to become of us?  All I ask is, how long?  Because that Hitler 
must fall, I don’t doubt.  But how long has he been given?  Fifteen years, like Napoleon?  
How history repeats itself.”45  Clearly, Senesh understood the stakes at play in this war, 
particularly the extent to which those stakes affected Jews.  At this point, before she goes 
back to Europe to fight, she is concerned with only one major villain, rather than the 
innumerable soldiers and functionaries who competed to fulfill Hitler’s anti-Semitic 
wishes across the continent.46    
The only time Senesh truly expresses fear, it not in relation to what is happening 
in Europe, but what might happen in Palestine.  On 23 April 1941, she wrote  
But no one dares ask, what will happen if the Germans come here?  
The words are meaningless – on paper.  But if we close our eyes and listen 
only to our hearts, we hear the pounding of fear…Whether I want to or 
not, I must imagine what the fate of the Land will be if it has to confront 
Germany.  I’m afraid to look into the depth of the abyss, but I’m 
convinced that despite our lack of weapons and preparedness, we won’t 
surrender without resisting strongly.  Half a million people can face up to 
a force, no matter how greatly it is armed.47  
  
This entry is very revealing and recapitulates some of Herzberg’s themes.  First and 
foremost it expresses the resolution to resist and fight back – even if the wish itself is 
                                                 
45 Senesh, p. 100. 
46 It should be noted that Senesh finished her diary and left it for her brother on the eve of her 
departure from Palestine for Europe.  We have no personal records of her thoughts or feelings after she 
arrived and fought in the war zone of Eastern Europe – only second-hand testimony. 
47 Senesh, p. 119. 
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naïve and fanciful.  It also acknowledges the inability of words to convey or to help cope 
with the trauma a German invasion of Palestine would create.  Finally, like Herzberg, 
who repeated some Nietzschean philosophy in his diary (in relation to the “weakness” of 
Christianity), Senesh paraphrases Nietzsche from Beyond Good and Evil – admitting her 
aversion to looking into the “abyss” of German aggression – an admission which also 
reinforces the idea of a “crisis of imagination” in that she is saying she does not want to 
think about certain possibilities that might befall her or her comrades. 
The last two entries in which Senesh substantively address perpetrators goes back 
to the model of the simply descriptive account of what is happening in the broadest geo-
political sense.  On 9 July 1941 she wrote.   
Germany attacked Russia about two weeks ago [it was 16 days] 
and swiftly captured Russian Poland, as well as a good part of Finland, 
and has begun advancing toward the interior of Russia.  According to 
radio reports, the Nazis are now encountering strong Russian opposition.  
Everyone knows that the results of this struggle will be decisive to the 
future of the world.  The suspense is enormous.48   
 
Cleary, despite expressing her opinion about the importance of Operation Barbarossa, 
Senesh is clearly dependent on news reports and the radio to let her know what is going 
on.  The final entry pertaining to Nazis or Nazi Germany was written on 6 July 1942.  It 
simply states, “The Germans are at the gates of Alexandria.” 49 Although she wrote 
sixteen more diary entries after this one before she left for Europe at the beginning of 
1943, there seems to be no more for her to say about perpetrators.  As with Herzberg, the 
more traumatic the environment was in which Senesh found herself, the less there was to 
talk about. It seems plain that there is some link between the intensity of the atmosphere 
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surrounding the writer and the ability or desire to deal with those who are responsible for 
that intensity. 
IV:  Distance in Proximity – The Diary of Dawid Sierakowiak 
We have seen how some Jewish writers, like Abel Herzberg, took direct aim at 
Nazi perpetrators in the pages of their diaries.  Others, like Éva Heyman and Hannah 
Senesh found it necessary to describe perpetrators in “photographic” or “visual” terms, 
due to their limited knowledge of events and their distance from the situation.  The diary 
of Dawid Sierakowiak (1924-1943) is different from Herzberg’s in that he does not 
undertake much analysis of individual perpetrators, though he did have the opportunity to 
observe them.  It is also different from the diaries of Heyman and Senesh because it was 
written by a keen observer from the very center of the Holocaust – the Łódź ghetto.  The 
diary is far longer and more complicated than that of either Heyman or Senesh, but even 
though he was almost as close to the Germans as Herzberg was, he finds it difficult to 
sustain any consistent analysis of their character or nature.  In fact, as the diary 
progresses, Sierakowiak becomes angrier with the Jews of the ghetto than he is with the 
Nazis.  This diary, then, occupies a kind of middle ground in which perpetrators appear, 
and appear as perpetrators – not as metaphors or tropes as we will see in the next chapter, 
yet remain analytically undefined.  Much like Heyman and Senesh do in their visual, or 
media-driven depictions, Sierakowiak’s preferred method of reporting is to relay what the 
Germans do.  There are too many instances to mention in which he reports a new order 
that has been posted, or mentions the visit of a prominent Nazi personage.  A short 
description of the most salient perpetrator depictions will have to suffice to indicate some 
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his experiences as well as how those experiences bear similarities to other themes 
introduced in this chapter. 
  On 4 September 1939, only three day after the war began, Sierakowiak, only 
fifteen years-old at the time, penned this optimistic entry.  He wrote 
…optimistic but outrageous news reached us about the Germans 
having torpedoed an English passenger ship carrying several hundred 
exceptionally rich and influential American citizens.  Eight hundred 
people died!  And even before receiving this information, Roosevelt had 
announced that the United States would not stay neutral!  What will he say 
now?50 
 
Clearly, through this almost rote repetition of the incident with the RMS Lusitania in 
1915, Sierakowiak and the other distressed Jews of Łódź hoped to invoke some of the 
hope that had been kindled when that passenger ship went down and the United States 
began to move toward hostilities against Germany in the First World War.51  Sierakowiak 
and the other Jews of Łódź would of course have to wait until the end of 1941 for the 
United States to enter the war against the Axis – and by then it was much too late to make 
any real difference for many of them, including Sierakowiak, who died of tuberculosis 
and starvation in August of 1943. 
On 9 September 1939 Sierakowiak got his first personal look at the Nazis.  He 
wrote 
 I go to the Pabianicka highway to watch the arriving troops.  A lot 
of cars.  The soldiers are not so extraordinary; only their uniforms make 
them different from Polish soldiers – steel green.  Their faces tough, 
boisterous.  They are the conquerors after all!  A car full of high-ranking 
                                                 
50 Dawid Sierakowiak, The Diary of Dawid Sierakowiak: Five Notebooks from the Łódź Ghetto 
(Translated by Kamil Turowski, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 33. 
51 1,198 people died aboard the Lusitania, including 128 Americans, one of whom was Alfred G. 
Vanderbilt. The rumor in the ghetto seems to be clearly based on this incident, with President Roosevelt 
simply taking the place of President Wilson. See Melvin Maddocks (ed.), The Great Liners (New York: 
Time-Life Books, 1978), p. 136-137. 
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officers with grim faces passes at lightning speed.  People on the street are 
quiet and look at the passing troops indifferently.  Hush, hush!52 
 
This entry is ambiguous.  First the soldiers are “not so extraordinary,” but by the end they 
are “conquerors after all.”  This early in the war (nine days in), the people of Łódź, 
including Sierakowiak, did not yet know what to make of the occupying forces – this is 
the reason for the indifference he mentions – though there is clearly some dread and 
trepidation present as well.  As time when on, however, it became clearer to the Jews of 
Łódź what their German conquerors had in store for them. 
Only three days later, the first real violence enters Sierakowiak’s diary.  In his 
Dziennik, or diary, on 12 September 1939 he wrote about the beginning of the new and 
miserable life that awaited the people of his city for the next few years.  “People are 
being seized again for forced labor; beatings and robbings.  The store where my father 
works has also been robbed.  The local Germans do whatever they wish.  There are 
numerous stories of how they treat Jews at work; some Germans treat them well, while 
others bully them sadistically.”53  The treatment of Polish Jews becomes more intense 
within just a few weeks and by 4 October 1939, after a particularly shameful incident in 
which he was put to work in front of gaping and laughing non-Jewish citizens of Łódź, 
Sierakowiak has this to write.  “It’s our oppressors who should be ashamed, not us.  
Humiliation inflicted by force does not humiliate.  But anger and helpless rage tear a man 
apart when he is forced to do such stupid, shameful, abusive work.  Only one response 
remains: revenge!”54  This passage is interesting because it attempts to rationalize – and 
thus mitigate – the feelings of shame he feels at undergoing this experience.  At the same 
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time, his rage and intensity are still great enough for him to desire revenge.  Over time, 
however, the hope of avenging himself on Nazis seemed to fade away for Sierakowiak.  
As lack of food and constant pressure from the Nazis and from the Jewish ghetto 
authorities mounted, much of his energy was diverted into keeping himself alive and 
much of his remaining anger turned elsewhere.  
Unlike the diaries of Heyman and Senesh, the fact that Sierakowiak does not 
attempt much of an analysis of Nazi perpetrators cannot be explained away by saying he 
had no contact with them.  In an extended entry written 28 October 1939, he relates a 
long story in which the Sierakowiak’s home was entered by a German officer searching 
for radios and other contraband.  During this intrusion, Sierakowiak and a friend were 
assigned a few hours of heavy labor under the supervision of a Nazi soldier.  Rather than 
make them walk their heavy load all the way to the police station, the officer supervising 
the young men, a man who “sympathizes” with them, allows them to take their burdens 
there aboard a streetcar.  Although, in itself, the story this event is fairly innocuous, it is 
one of several close confrontations between the diarist and individual Nazis.  The event 
terrified Sierakowiak and his family, leading him to write at the end of the day “Don’t let 
this kind of day happen again,” but it did not cause him to rethink or begin to analyze the 
perpetrators in any new or different way.55 
In the first of the five surviving notebooks comprising Sierakowiak’s diary, there 
always seems to be some surprise when confronted with violence.  He wrote in an entry 
dated 12 December 1939   
A horrible day…On my way home I suddenly saw a horrible scene near 
Kilińskiego Street.  A German dressed like a wagon driver was following a Jew, 
hitting him on his back with a huge stick so hard that the Jew (who was trying not 
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to turn around, not to be hit in the face) kept bending lower and lower, while the 
German reeled in his effort.56 
 
The next diary, detailing life in the ghetto from 1 January 1940 – 5 April 1941 is missing.   
 
By the time the reader catches back up with him, Sierakowiak has endured much more 
suffering and is much more experienced in ghetto life.  The tone of the later diaries is 
more stark and resigned.  It is clearly important for him to write, but the possibility that 
he might not survive is not lost on him. 
12 April 1941 sees Sierakowiak turning to straight reportage.  He writes, “Just as I 
expected, the Germans have broken through the front line in the Balkans, and gained 
enormous victories in Yugoslavia, Greece and Africa.  In the near future they will 
become the overlords of all of Europe, excluding, of course, the Soviets.”57  
Sierakowiak’s faith in the Soviets is, of course, premature, as entries over the next few 
months attest.  In fact, on 23 June 1941 he incredulously writes “It’s all true!  Today’s 
newspaper brings an official declaration of war against the Soviets by Finland, Italy, 
Germany, Romania and Yugoslavia” – another demonstration of reportage.58  It is at the 
point where the war expands into the Soviet Union that the first real hints of despair 
become evident in the diary.  The very next month, Sierakowiak expresses the opinion 
that the Germans must be in league with Satan.  On 20 July 1941 he wrote.  “If only those 
Krauts did not lumber any farther, you could say it would not be so bad.  But so far the 
bloody beasts keep moving on.  All of the Devil’s power must be helping them.”59  These 
dehumanizing and demonizing images are the first real emotional characterizations of 
Nazis since Sierakowiak’s initial and ambiguous impression of German soldiers in the 
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opening days of the war.  His opinion is obviously much stronger at this point – but still 
he neglects to ask himself (or his readers) why Nazis are doing this and why they are the 
way they are.  Like Herzberg, he seems to take it as a given. 
As conditions deteriorated further in the ghetto, Sierakowiak turned the anger he 
was still capable of against more visible forms of authority.  His first target was his 
father, whom he accused multiple times throughout the diary of stealing food from 
himself, his sister and especially his mother, whom he held dear.  The second target was 
the Jewish ghetto leadership, symbolized by Chaim Rumkowski.  There is no doubt that 
in the entire history of the Holocaust, no Jewish figure is as problematic as Rumkowski, 
or “King Chaim” as he was sarcastically known to his “subjects.”  In the most positive of 
analyses, he comes off tyrannical and authoritarian.  In the worst, he is depicted as a 
traitor, perhaps even as vile as the Nazis themselves.  There is no doubt where 
Sierakowiak stood.  On 30 August 1941 he wrote.  “Rumkowski gave a truly ‘Führer-
like’ speech in the afternoon” – a speech which cut payments for food rations.60  Likening 
Rumkowski to Hitler was not an idle comparison.  To Sierakowiak, both men were trying 
to accomplish the same thing – the death of all the Jews of Łódź.61  The complaints 
against the corrupt ghetto government continued.  On 17 April 1942 Sierakowiak wrote 
that “A meat ration of 10 dkg per person has been issued.  In addition, 3 kilos of 
vegetables and 10 kilos of slaggy coal per family.  Systematically we are being pushed 
closer to death.”62  Although he does not say who is pushing the ghetto population toward 
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Ghetto” in <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/lodzdep.html> Yad Vashem, 2006. 
62 Sierakowiak, p. 155. 
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death, the ambiguity of the statement and the context in which it is delivered indicate that 
the hostility could be directed at both the Nazis and the Jews who Sierakowiak feels are 
abetting them. 
By 24 April 1942, Sierakowiak’s understanding of perpetrators was considerably 
different than it was during the first days of the war when Nazis were “not so 
extraordinary.”  “Today,” he writes, “the German medical commission visited our 
workshop.  They are people from another world; our rulers, masters of life and death.”63  
Starvation and exhaustion are beginning to take their toll on the young man.  The 
historian must be sensitive to instances of sarcasm in works they analyze, but in this case, 
I can find none.  Sierakowiak is not like Herzberg or Ringelblum – mocking the Germans 
by using their own words or perceptions against them.  Rather, at this point, less than a 
year before his death, Sierakowiak seems genuinely mystified by these people, these 
aliens “from another world.”  As mentioned above, Nazis made it a point to draw stark 
contrasts between themselves as overlords, and other peoples (especially Jews) whom 
they conquered.  It seems that in this moment of weakness, Sierakowiak is adopting the 
Nazi frame of reference, placing the “rulers” above him, and above the other starving 
inhabitants of the Łódź ghetto. 
Like Herzberg, Sierakowiak seems to have no trouble divining the Germans’ 
goals vis-à-vis the Jews.  Even though the entry of 17 August 1942 discusses optimistic 
developments, Sierakowiak is still suspicious – still counting on Nazi brutality and anti-
Semitism to do their worst.  He writes.  “There’s been an incredible uplifting of spirits in 
the ghetto [in response to Soviet military initiatives].  The Jews are raising their heads 
again, but they’re very frightened by the rumors circulating about the Germans’ intention 
                                                 
63 Sierakowiak, p. 158. 
61 
 
to finish off the Jews in Europe before they lose the war.”64 Indeed, as historians have 
been fond of pointing out for many years, Hitler was more concerned with winning the 
war against the Jews than the one against the Allies.  Starvation and disease may have 
wracked his body, but Sierakowiak’s diagnosis of the situation was absolutely correct. 
Finally, on 5 September 1942 an event took place that shattered Sierakowiak to 
the core.  That day, he wrote “My most Sacred, beloved, worn-out, blessed, cherished 
Mother has fallen victim to the bloodthirsty German Nazi beast!!!”65  Obviously, in this 
instance, Sierakowiak is blaming the perpetrators, not other Jews, for his mother’s death.  
This well-placed castigation changes very quickly, however, perhaps because it gives him 
no relief. Later the same day he felt compelled to write “Dear Mother, my tiny, emaciated 
mother who has gone through so many misfortunes in her life, whose entire life was one 
of sacrifice for others, relatives and strangers, who might not have been taken away 
because of her exhaustion had it not been for Father and Nadzia [Sierakowiak’s sister] 
robbing her of her food here in the ghetto.”66 Blaming starving family members for his 
mother’s death, rather than those who made the ghetto possible, is another sign that 
Sierakowiak had begun to internalize the script written for him by the perpetrators of the 
Holocaust.   
The death of his mother marked the beginning of the end for Sierakowiak.  The 
remainder of the diary, while filled with valuable information about the events in the 
ghetto, tells us precious little about how he thought of Nazi perpetrators.  He himself 
summed it up best the evening his mother died, writing “Nadzia screamed, cried, suffered 
                                                 
64 Sierakowiak, p. 208. 
65 Sierakowiak, p. 218. 
66 Sierakowiak, p. 219. 
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spasms, but these days it doesn’t move anyone.  I am speechless and close to madness.”67  
In this short sentence, Sierakowiak tells us what he can about reactions to trauma.  Like 
so many other diarists, from Herzberg to Hillesum, he pronounces the unspeakability of 
the events he is bearing witness to, and recognizes that genocidal reality is another kind 
of reality – one in which madness reigns supreme. 
Madness and murder are the subjects of the last entry I will examine in this 
chapter.  On 11 March 1943, six months after the death of his beloved mother, 
Sierakowiak again strikes out at the Jews who have come to stand in for Nazis in his 
world.   
Lunatics, perverts, and criminals like Rumkowski rule over us and 
determine our food allocations, work, and health.  No wonder the Germans 
don’t want to interfere in ghetto matters: the Jews will kill one another 
perfectly well, and, in the meantime, they will also squeeze maximum 
production out of one another. 
 
This conflation of Jewish victims with their oppressors is not something unique to 
Sierakowiak.  In many diaries, like that of Emmanuel Ringelblum, this is a common 
quality, and it points to several things.  First, it tells us that the Nazi perpetrators, at the 
point this effect occurs, have become so completely part of the world of the victim that 
they are no longer looked to as the first cause of the horrible conditions afflicting them.  
Secondly, it tells us that, at least to some degree, the Nazis were succeeding in breaking 
down the solidarity of the Jewish community.  If diarists like Sierakowiak, who felt 
compelled to tell the story of the ghetto in their writings, also felt compelled to blame 
other Jews for their misfortunes, the work of subjection was almost complete.  Finally, 
this entry is another example of a “crisis of imagination” in which the pain of dealing 
with perpetrators themselves has become too much to bear – and so secondary sources 
                                                 
67 Sierakowiak, p. 221. 
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are found upon which to pour scorn, derision and hatred.  The transference of emotions 
from one painful object to another that is less painful or threatening is a common 
psychological reaction to trauma and one that can be seen in many instances in other 
diaries.  Dawid Sierakowiak’s diary simply lays out the dynamics of this effect most 
clearly. 
V:  Conclusion 
When they attempted to deal with them at all, Dawid Sierakowiak, Hannah 
Senesh and Éva Heyman tried to deal with perpetrators in plain, descriptive language.  
These writers either did not have the maturity (as in the case of Heyman), or they did not 
have the proximity to perpetrators (as in the case of Senesh), or they lost the strength to 
criticize perpetrators as time went on (as in the case of Sierakowiak).  In this sense they 
stand apart from the way Abel Herzberg was able to criticize perpetrators, at least in the 
early part of his diary.  However, all three of the diarists examined in the second part of 
this chapter did manage to make some kind of statement about perpetrators, even if it was 
simply to express fear of them.  In the diaries I will discuss in the next chapter, the idea 
of the perpetrator itself changes as the language of reality is altered in genocidal 
circumstances.  It is to the ways diarist’s employed metaphors, tropes and jokes to deal 
with perpetrators throughout some Holocaust diaries that I now turn.
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Chapter 2: Dissolution 
 
Jewish Diarists, Perpetrators, and Depictions of the Inconceivable 
 
Metaphor is probably the most fertile of man’s resources, 
its effectiveness verging on the miraculous.  All other 
faculties keep us enclosed within the real, within what 
already is… Only metaphor aids our escape and creates 
among real things imaginary reefs, islands pregnant with 
allusion. 
– Jose Ortega y Gasset,1925 
 
I: Introduction 
 
 
In a short entry dated 5 October 1940, Emmanuel Ringelblum, a Jewish historian 
and resident of the Warsaw ghetto, recorded a joke.  “There’s a Jew riding in a streetcar.  
When he comes to the Hitler Platz, he cries ‘Amen!’”1  The noun Platz refers to a city 
square in both German and Yiddish, but the verb platzen also means “to burst” or “to 
explode.”2  Ringelblum was playing with words – quite literally swerving from one 
meaning to the other.  Surrounded on every side by enemies, Ringelblum and everyone 
else who repeated the joke were symbolically doing what no one had been able to do 
physically – killing Adolf Hitler. 
The ways language was used to define and resist perpetrators is addressed in this 
chapter.  In some instances, the lines between perpetrators, collaborators and even other 
Jews began to blur or collapse.  In other cases, like Ringelblum’s joke, victims used 
                                                 
1 Emmanuel Ringelblum, Notes from the Warsaw Ghetto: The Journal of Emmanuel Ringelblum 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1974), p. 68.  
2 Ringelblum wrote in Yiddish - Platz spelled ץאלפ  
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language to indicate aggression, hostility and the will to fight.  In every situation 
however, the kind of language these victims used was indicative of the presence of 
defense mechanisms that protected the solidarity of the Jewish community and the 
identity of the individual writer.  If diarists did not depict aggressors as distant or abstract 
actors responsible for the misery they saw everywhere around them, they used linguistic 
swerves to transform aggressors into something “other”— something more capable of 
being resisted than the merely human.3  Resistance was frequently contingent upon the 
ability to repress, deny, or avoid unpleasant realities.  The Jewish writers examined here 
demonstrated psychological defense mechanisms even as they attempted to define the 
perpetrators, explain their actions and convey a sense of hostility toward them. 
The introduction examined the historiography of psychological defense 
mechanisms during the Holocaust.  Chapter two demonstrated how, with some 
exceptions, diarists had no trouble depicting the physical dimensions of persecution – the 
blood, the beatings and the barbarity – but did have problems comprehending the agents 
of persecution and the motivations that drove them.  What is clear from this analysis is 
that victims experienced difficulty imagining and recording accounts of individual or 
                                                 
3 To avoid confusion, “linguistic swerves,” or “turns” will be used in place of the word “tropic.” 
The word “tropic” derives from the Greek tropikos and the Latin tropus – meaning “a turning.” In 
conventional usage, the word connotes a certain style or discourse. Here, the “swerve” discussed represents 
“a turning” from one possible meaning toward another in an effort to relate two or more ideas, but without 
the literary and historiographical baggage “tropic” entails.  See Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: 
Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 2.  In this chapter, these 
swerves are considered in their metaphorical and comedic manifestations. Paul Ricoeur’s study of 
metaphors also supports this interpretation.  He argued that “The metaphor [swerve] was correctly 
described in terms of deviance.”  To him, a metaphor was a “transfer” and the goal of this transfer was to 
fill a “lexical lacuna” of meaning between writer and reader.  Paul Ricoeur, “The Metaphorical Process as 
Cognition, Imagination and Feeling,” Critical Inquiry, vol. 5, no. 1.  Special Issue on Metaphor, (Autumn 
1978), p. 145.     
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collective wills dedicated to personal or Jewish annihilation.4  Diarists not only resisted 
death, but they resisted the idea of death as well.  
The difficulty writers had coming to terms with an “incomprehensible” will to 
genocide indicates two things: first, the presence of psychological mechanisms of 
defense; and secondly, the near impossibility of manipulating ordinary language to 
convey the experience of trauma.5  The evidence suggests that keeping an awareness of 
murderous Nazi intent at bay enabled some Jewish diarists to maintain the mental 
equilibrium needed to get through the day.  Although Jewish diarists moved physically 
and temporally toward a moment of confrontation and negation with Nazi perpetrators, 
they ultimately recoiled from the possibilities of that meeting in their writings.  This was 
the Jewish diarist’s “crisis of imagination.”  The closer victims came to the moment when 
the idea and act of genocide become one, the more necessary it was to psychologically 
avoid that moment.  This tension is apparent in a range of sources penned during and 
after the war by Jewish victims, but it is particularly evident in Jewish diaries written 
during the Holocaust. While diarists felt compelled to commit their experiences to 
posterity in writing, these writers could not fully acknowledge the scope of the 
experiences they were living through.   They desperately tried to convey some sense of 
the reality to the reader, as well as any potential meaning they felt it might contain, but at 
                                                 
4 There is a great difference between contemporaneous Jewish accounts of genocide and post-war 
testimonies.  In the latter, perpetrators appear in a distinctly different and more obvious manner than in the 
former.  It is my contention that for those caught in the maelstrom of the Holocaust, engaging in 
speculation about the nature of persecutors and their motivations was problematic because it broke down 
mental boundaries separating perpetrator from victim. 
5 In 1937, Anna Freud enumerated ten defense mechanisms: regression, repression, reaction-
formation, isolation, undoing, projection, introjection, turning against the self, reversal and sublimation.  In 
the case of the writings examined here, the focus is mainly on avoidance/denial – the repression of painful 
external stimuli. Anna Freud, The Ego and Mechanisms of Defense (translated from the German by Cecil 
Baines, New York: International Universities Press, 1946), p. 47 and 190.  Also see Cathy Caruth’s 
Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1995) and Unclaimed Experience: 
Trauma, Narrative and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).  
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the same time pulled away from a horrifying new actuality that faced them.  These 
opposing tendencies make Holocaust diaries singular, and it is by examining the way 
perpetrators are depicted by the victims of the Holocaust that historians are offered a 
unique perspective on the way Jews experienced trauma and facilitated psychological 
resistance during the Shoah.   
One method of reading these diaries and of seeking out the broader meanings and 
contexts included in them is through an application of the techniques developed by 
historically-informed literary critics.  Hayden White argued that “…to write a history 
mean[s] to place an event within a context by relating it as a part to some conceivable 
whole.” 6   By this he suggests that no historical event can have meaning if it stands alone 
and that history is the attempt to create a context able to bridge the difference between 
two discrete events.  One way this could be done, he contended, was through the use of 
linguistic mechanisms like metonymy, synecdoche, metaphor or irony, which link 
disparate elements together.  In Holocaust diaries, noticeable departures in style, syntax, 
tone, tense, imagery, or the use of irony or jokes pointed toward similarities and alternate 
meanings when used to describe perpetrators.  They indicated a victim’s attempt to come 
to terms imaginatively with an “unimaginable” situation which represented a “rupture” in 
the “cultural continuum.”7  When examining these diaries, it is possible to detect a 
writer’s need to avoid the implications this kind of imagination might have led to.  In 
many instances, creative use of language was the only permissible way diarists had of 
venting their anger and aggression toward those who persecuted them.  
                                                 
6 White, p. 94. 
7James Young in “Interpreting Literary Testimony: A Preface to Rereading Holocaust Diaries and 
Memoirs,” New Literary History, vol. 18, no. 2 (Winter 1987), p. 404.   
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Linguistic swerves often indicate the presence of forms of psychological defense.  
In fact it is a long-recognized observation that certain linguistic devices serve this 
function.  In The Tropics of Discourse, Hayden White paraphrased noted literary critic 
Harold Bloom, and argued that,  
…a trope can be seen as the linguistic equivalent of a psychological 
mechanism of defense (a defense against literal meaning in discourse, in 
the way that repression, regression, projection and so forth are defenses 
against the apprehension of death in the psyche), it is always not only a 
deviation from one possible, proper meaning, but also a deviation towards 
another meaning, conception or ideal of what is right and proper and true 
“in reality.”8 
 
Writers of Holocaust diaries were trying to represent a new and “incomprehensible” 
reality to their readers.  However, the language they used – that of our mundane, 
“everyday” world – was unable to convey the new and extraordinary circumstances the 
writer was attempting to describe. To the diarists, perpetrators were anything but 
“ordinary men.” 9   The evidence suggests that perpetrators were understood as an evil, or 
a malignancy representing the exact opposite of the true “human.”  To acknowledge the 
perpetrators’ humanity would have broken down the boundaries between “us” and 
“them” necessary for resistance. The need to maintain this separation was a central 
component in the diaries of Holocaust victims.  This is why David Rousset’s comment 
that “normal men do not know that everything is possible” is so important.  In this case, 
the reader or historian (Rousset’s ostensible “normal man”) is left with the difficult task 
of attempting to reconstruct a historical event using an “inconceivable” text.   
                                                 
8 White, p. 2. 
9 This is not to assert that Christopher R. Browning’s description of German killers as “ordinary 
men” is incorrect.  It is to say that to Jewish victims writing diaries at the time, it was less important what 
Nazis were in “reality” than what they were imagined to be. See Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 
101 and the Final Solution in Poland, (New York: HarperPerennial, 1993). 
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II: Sources 
With few exceptions, Jews were the only group singled out for complete 
extermination during the Second World War.10  By submitting to Nazi control, most other 
groups could reasonably expect to survive – if they did as they were told, kept their heads 
down and remained inconspicuous.  However, from 1941 on, Jews could not acquiesce to 
the full range of Nazi demands in any way other than through their deaths.  Therefore, 
any action they took which kept the individual alive longer or which perpetuated the 
community was an act of resistance.11 The sources presented in this chapter are explicitly 
acknowledged as examples of opposition and resistance, whether they are classified as 
preemptively aggressive, or reactively protective.12  In either case, the point is not to 
lionize these forms of psychological resistance, but show that they were an inevitable 
                                                 
10 Soviet Kommisars were explicitly singled out for death by Hitler’s Kommisarbefehl.  But, as 
historians like Arno Mayer point out, Jews were conflated with bolshevism in the Nazi mind.  Sinti and 
Roma (“Gypsies”) were also singled out for annihilation.  See Christopher Browning’s The Origins of the 
Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2004), pp. 220-221 and Arno Mayer’s Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?: The Final 
Solution in History (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990).   
11 Martin Gilbert ended his history of the Holocaust with the assertion that “To die with dignity 
was a form of resistance.  To resist the dehumanizing, brutalizing force of evil, to refuse to be abased to the 
level of animals, to live through the torment, to outlive the perpetrators, these too were resistance.  Merely 
to give witness by one’s own testimony was, in the end, to contribute to a moral victory.  Simply to survive 
was a victory of the human spirit.”  The Holocaust: A History of the Jews of Europe during the Second 
World War (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985), p. 828.   Lawrence Langer took Gilbert to task 
for the final two sentences, saying it was “like strewing violets in Dante’s and Virgil’s path as they toil 
downward through the noxious atmosphere of the Inferno….”  Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of 
Memory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 165.  The analysis in this chapter supports Gilbert’s 
implication that resistance was not only a common, but an intrinsic component of human psychology 
during the Holocaust.  However, it also concurs with Langer’s contention that to portray resistance as a 
triumph of the human spirit is like “building a monument to hope on the rubble of decay.”  Langer, p. 165.  
To find any redemptive value in the Holocaust would be an attempt to find meaning in most meaningless of 
events.  
12 In other words, the level to which behaviors or modes of thinking had to rise in order to be 
classified “resistance” was qualitatively higher for groups not singled out for complete extermination.  For 
Jews, resistance was tantamount to survival, and any action, thought, or state of mind that maintained the 
individual ego or built communal bonds can be defined as resistance. Resistance for Jews and non-Jews 
were ontologically distinct categories.  Kalí Tal said that “Bearing witness is an aggressive act.  It is born 
out of a refusal to bow to outside pressure or to repress experience, a decision to embrace conflict rather 
than conformity…”  In this instance, Tal is discussing witnessing after traumatic events, but her comments 
are applicable to contemporaneous Holocaust writing as well. Worlds of Hurt: Reading the Literatures of 
Trauma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 7.   
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reaction to the trauma produced by genocide.  The linguistic swerves considered here are 
neither sacred, heroic, nor mystical.  Rather, they represent struggles to reclaim agency 
amid Nazi attempts to shut off every avenue of opposition.13  They are written examples 
of diarists’ desire to bolster their own psychological well-being.  If psychological and 
physical well-being were interconnected, the act of writing diaries was meaningful 
resistance because it helped the victim to stay alive.  The linguistic resistance recounted 
here represents an important conflict over the dregs of autonomy and power.  Therefore, 
concepts of “resistance,” first as a psychological phenomenon and second as opposition 
to Nazi domination and authority are inextricably linked.  
Two sets of primary documents are scrutinized here: the “chronicles” of 
Emmanuel Ringelblum of Warsaw, and the letters of Etty Hillesum of Amsterdam. These 
have been selected because they represent works by individuals with opposite 
personalities and styles who nevertheless employed many of the same kinds of linguistic 
devices to relate their experiences to readers.  Both writers were ultimately victims of 
Nazi genocide, but as individuals and as Jews, they were very dissimilar.  They were of 
two different generations – one raised before the Great War, the other after.  One was 
from a largely Jewish milieu in Eastern Europe and the other from the largely non-Jewish 
cultural milieu of Western Europe.  Ringelblum penned his account from a ghetto while 
Hillesum wrote from occupied Amsterdam and later from the interment camp at 
Westerbork.  Despite these drastic differences, both writers retained similar linguistic 
constructions that suggest the presence of psychological defense mechanisms and 
                                                 
13 Resistance and mechanisms of defense were present on both sides.  The deadly thing in the Nazi 
case was that the intentional creation of structural mechanisms of resistance (euphemistic speech and 
formal strategies of physical and psychic distancing, for instance) weakened the need for mental and moral 
resistance – perpetuating and intensifying the genocidal outcome.  
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underscore the difficulty they faced conveying traumatic experience.  In the examples 
that follow, the presence of tropic or linguistic swerves indicates the coding of different 
levels or categories of experience which, taken individually or combined, form the basis 
for a new language of genocide and atrocity. 
 Emmanuel Ringelblum (1900-1944) was a professional historian who received 
his doctorate from the University of Warsaw for a dissertation on the Jews of that city 
during the Middle Ages. When the war began, he coordinated social aid in the ghetto and 
was a member of the political underground.  Yet he is most famous for founding the 
Oneg Shabbat Archive documenting Nazi atrocities and for keeping a running chronicle 
of life and death in the ghetto.  These entries were translated into English in abridged 
form as Notes from the Warsaw Ghetto.14  Following the “liquidation” of the ghetto, 
Ringelblum and his family were taken prisoner by the Nazis.  They were executed amid 
the ruins of Warsaw on 7 March 1944.15 
The Notes are an account of events in the Warsaw ghetto from slightly before its 
formation in October of 1940 until the end of 1942, when it was dismantled and the vast 
majority of its residents deported “to the East.”16  Ringelblum’s writings have been 
referred to as a “chronicle” rather than a “diary” by Jacob Sloan, who translated 
Ringelblum’s oeuvre from Yiddish to English.  Yet Sloan argued that the entries were 
                                                 
14 Currently, the only English version of Ringelblum’s works is in the form of Notes from the 
Warsaw Ghetto: The Journal of Emmanuel Ringelblum.  This version, translated and edited by Jacob Sloan, 
is somewhat problematic for reasons to be discussed below. 
15 Israel Gutman, ed., Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, vol. 3, (New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1990), p. 1283-1285. 
16Warsaw Jews made up approximately 300,000 of the 800,000 victims murdered at the Treblinka 
death camp.  See Konnilyn G. Feig’s Hitler’s Death Camps: The Sanity of Madness (New York: Holmes & 
Meier, 1979) p 293-312 and Yitzhak Arad’s Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka: The Operation Reinhard Death 
Camps (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987) p. 60-62.  
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merely “notes toward a history of the times, and nothing else.”17 He explained his 
comment thus:  
Diaries usually restrict themselves to the lived experience of the diarist; 
they reflect his feelings and thinking; they are personal outpourings, 
confessions of a sort.  Notes from the Warsaw Ghetto is nothing like that.  
Much of the material Ringelblum recorded he heard or saw himself; but he 
rarely describes how he felt about it.18 
 
This dismissive categorization of Ringelblum’s writing as a mere chronicle is 
inaccurate.  The Notes are unlike most Holocaust diaries for two reasons.  First, as a 
trained historian, Ringelblum was more attuned to the broader context in which events 
transpired than most diarists.  Second, the goal of the chronicle was to represent a history 
of the ghetto which future historians could draw upon, as Sloan mentioned.   
These Notes are not simply a dispassionate account, sterile and shorn of all 
personal sentiment.  Even choosing which events to include in them revealed 
Ringelblum’s point of view and made writing it a personal, autobiographical act in the 
most general sense.  But even more, his choice of language showed that he inserted 
himself into the text — opining and editorializing while providing a professional account 
of the facts of Nazi aggression at the same time.19  Ringelblum’s entire “chronicle” was 
                                                 
17 Sloan seems to believe that the importance of the Notes lies in the fact that they establish certain 
facts about life in the Warsaw ghetto.  Here, the concern is to discover how Ringelblum felt about those 
who put him there. Ringelblum, p. xxii. 
18 Ringelblum, p. xxii. 
19 An example of this would include a entry written on 13 April 1941 in which Ringelblum 
includes a quote from a ghetto newspaper Against the Stream, forcefully laying out the general rationale for 
Jewish resistance.  Ringelblum called it a “fine lead article,” and seemed to appropriate the sentiment for 
himself.  “It’s the thing to say that the war is turning people into beasts.  But we did not wish the war, and 
we do not wish it now, and we will not be turned into beasts.  We were, and we will remain, human 
beings.”  Ringelblum, p. 151.  In another entry written on 17 June 1942, Ringelblum discusses a 
problematic way in which Jews were being reduced to “beasts.”  He wrote, “…we are left to be led as 
sheep to a slaughterhouse.”  He attempts to explain why this is so later in the same letter.  He argues, 
“…every Jew knew that lifting a hand against a German would endanger his brothers…Not to act, not to 
lift a hand against the Germans, has since then become the quiet, passive heroism of the common Jew.” 
Joseph Kermish, “Emmanuel Ringelblum’s Notes hitherto Unpublished,” Yad Vashem Studies, vol. VII 
(Jerusalem, 1968), p. 179-180.  This assertion of “heroism” is problematic – taken by historians like Martin 
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suffused with telling linguistic remarks and signs which indicated that he had developed a 
code he was inviting the reader to decipher.  For instance, he used the words “They” 
“Them” or “Their” in a specific context on no less than 145 separate occasions.20  He also 
described Nazis as “the Others,” (also capitalized) some 70 times.21  Sloan commented on 
this in his introduction,  
We know from the very first page of the notes who the cryptic “They” 
refers to.  “They” are the Germans.  It is not a good idea to mention Their 
real name too often; the notes may be confiscated by Them.  For the same 
reason, the notes have many phrases and passages in pidgin Hebrew.  
“They” can easily understand Yiddish, the language of the notes, Yiddish 
being basically a medieval variant of German.  But “They” would have 
more trouble decoding the Hebrew.22  
 
Sloan was wrong here for several reasons.  First, the Notes contain multiple references to 
Nazis, Hitler, the SS and so on.23  If Ringelblum were attempting to hide the presence of 
Nazis in the text, he did so very poorly, and in a manner inconsistent with the rest of the 
work as a whole.  Second, Yiddish may derive from German, but it is written in Hebrew 
characters the average Nazi would not be able to read.  Third, if the Notes did fall into the 
wrong hands and if any effort at all were made to translate them, there was enough 
                                                                                                                                                 
Gilbert to indicate some sort of moral victory, while others like Lawrence Langer consider it “an obviously 
desperate struggle on Ringelblum’s part to rescue some shred of meaning from a hopeless situation.” 
Langer, p. 165.  Langer seems more correct.  Ringelblum was explaining why Jews seemed like sheep 
(another linguistic swerve), but actually remained human beings – a mechanism of defense in that it is an 
attempt to maintain the integrity of the Jew as human being. 
20These Sloan capitalized regardless of their position in the sentence – thereby defining them as 
proper nouns rather than as pronouns.  
21 Because Sloan’s edition is abridged, the value of these numbers is to demonstrate that these 
words appear regularly in Ringelblum’s work, not to establish some empirical truth or meaning in them. 
22 Ringelblum, p. xxv.  It is important to note that there are no capital letters in the Hebrew 
alphabet.  By capitalizing them in the English translation, Sloan is drawing attention to their peculiar 
context or placement in a sentence.   
23 For example, on 8 May 1942 Ringelblum discussed communiqués that gave hope to ghetto 
inhabitants by depicting the Führer as weak.  He wrote “Another communiqué disembarked the whole army 
in Murmansk, borne by 160 ships, not one of which was sunk en route.  Of course, when Hitler heard this 
news…he collapsed.”  Ringelblum, p. 260. 
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information to doom the writer or the bearer of the documents, whether certain names 
were thinly disguised or not.24 
  Sloan was on the right track when he wrote “It is not a good idea to mention 
Their real names to often…,” but not for the reasons he thought.  When examining 
linguistic turns in Ringelblum’s discourse, it is possible to see that several things were 
happening at once.  First, he interjected himself into the text, but in a subtle way different 
from the very personal tone used in most diaries.  Second, his style revealed a keen 
understanding of the power of language.  A belief, well-established in Jewish mysticism 
and theology long before the arrival of post-structuralist discourse, posits that the very act 
of naming confers power.  It was not a good idea to mention “Them” too often because 
these utterances made “Them” more real, more powerful and less easy to ignore.   
The other subject of this chapter’s analysis, Etty Hillesum (1914–1943), was the 
daughter of Dutch and Russian Jewish parents.  As a young woman, she studied law, 
Slavic languages and psychology in Amsterdam.  In March of 1941, about a year after the 
Nazis occupied the Netherlands, Hillesum began a diary.  After she was imprisoned in the 
Westerbork transit camp, she wrote letters to friends describing the treatment of Jews 
there.25  In 1943, she was deported with her family and about 900 other Jewish victims to 
Auschwitz, where she was murdered later that year on 30 November.  Salvaged and 
                                                 
24 The pages that form the Notes were buried in metal boxes and three milk cans in cellars across 
the Warsaw ghetto in 1943.  One milk can was recovered in 1946.  Another milk can and several containers 
were found in 1950.  The third milk can has never been recovered.   
25 The majority of Hillesum’s diary entries were written before her imprisonment in Westerbork 
and many of the letters she wrote while there were smuggled out of the camp, thereby evading Nazi 
censors.  Her final letter was thrown from the inside of a cattle car bound for Auschwitz. 
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published after the war, her writings reveal an intimate portrait of a highly intelligent, 
spiritual individual.26   
In some ways, Hillesum’s letters and diaries were more personal and less 
problematic than Ringelblum’s.  Though she employed tropes on many occasions which 
swerved away from obvious meanings, her style was more reflective, relaxed and 
demonstrated less need to commit every fact to paper than Ringelblum’s.27  Her concerns 
were more inwardly directed and point to a personality more devoted to maintaining 
everyday relationships than with the social, political and military matters discussed by 
Ringelblum. 
At the same time, Hillesum’s writings were similar to Ringelblum’s because they 
demonstrated ways in which writing was used as an act of resistance.  This resistance was 
not only outwardly directed – helping to create communal bonds among Jews –  but 
inwardly directed as well because the act of writing itself reinforced individuality amid 
Nazi attempts to eradicate difference amongst Jewish victims.28  Yet in both sets of 
sources there remains an intrinsic tension between the goal of leaving behind a record of 
Nazi crimes on the one hand and maintaining the will to resist on the other.  In an effort 
to relieve these tensions, these diarists resorted to the use of linguistic devices like 
                                                 
26Originally published in Dutch, the diaries earned a wide readership and were translated into 
multiple editions in many languages, including French and English.  The edition used here is the most 
recent English translation entitled The Letters and Diaries of Etty Hillesum, 1941-1943 translated by 
Arnold J. Pomerans (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002).  All 
biographical information comes from the introduction to this book. 
27 It might be supposed that Hillesum’s diaries are less complicated than Ringelblum’s 
“chronicles” because she was younger and had less riding on the details of her writing than Ringelblum 
had.  This is not the case.  Throughout, she demonstrates sophisticated insights and a keen intelligence.  
She was simply more interested in the good than the bad – for reasons to be discussed below. 
28 Nazis were extraordinarily concerned with categories – this is why concentration camp inmates 
were made to wear different colored triangles on their uniforms: pink for homosexuals, purple for religious 
objectors like Jehovah’s Witnesses, red for political prisoners, two yellow triangles forming the Star of 
David for Jews etc. For all groups, the color of the triangle signified a violation of some aspect of the Nazi 
“moral” code, but for Jews, the fact that they wore the yellow star at all meant there could be no 
rehabilitation for them. They were expressly marked for death.  
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metaphors, jokes and sarcasm to explain something that was inconceivable –  both to 
themselves and to those who would read their work. This manipulation of language was a 
method of relieving the contradictions inherent in an extremely traumatic and deadly 
environment. 
III: The Limitations of Language and the Need for Meaning 
The study of Holocaust diaries is the study of language and the limitations of 
language.  In ordinary circumstances, everyday language is used to transmit everyday 
ideas.  However, in the murderous environment in which Jewish diarists found 
themselves during the Second World War, no language was able to convey the totality of 
meanings the historian expects or hopes to find.  As mentioned in the introduction, within 
the genocidal atmosphere of the Holocaust, words and their meanings did not remain 
static but fluctuated in an effort to express a traumatic reality. A wall existed in Holocaust 
diaries between the act-idea of genocide and the capabilities of the victim’s language and 
imagination to deal with it. When reading diaries, the full psychological magnitude of the 
trauma can only be inferred and thus comprehension can be incomplete at best.  Simply 
put, genocide was more real than language – and so the experience was inexplicable at 
the most basic level.  In this sense, the Holocaust remains, as Primo Levi and other 
memoirists contended, beyond comprehension.29  
The diarists writing at the time understood that the incomprehensibility of the 
circumstances interfered with their ability to communicate to readers.  Etty Hillesum 
                                                 
29 See Primo Levi’s discussion of language and comprehensibility in The Drowned and the Saved, 
(translated from the Italian by Raymond Rosenthal, New York: Vintage International, 1989), and in Jean 
Améry’s At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities translated by 
Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), p. 21-40. 
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addressed this issue explicitly.  In a letter written from Amsterdam in December of 1942, 
she wrote 
To simply record the bare facts of families torn apart, of possessions 
plundered and liberties forfeited, would soon become monotonous.  Nor is 
it possible to pen picturesque accounts of barbed wire and vegetable swill 
to show outsiders what it’s like.30 
  
The reader who was not there, Hillesum seemed to argue, must of necessity experience 
difficulty grasping the truth accounts of the Holocaust represent.  This is because 
extraordinary or traumatic realities cannot be dealt with adequately using everyday 
language.  At the same time, Hillesum recognized that the quotidian was the only idiom 
readers would possess – hence the conundrum.  Historians are as aware of this problem of 
language as Hillesum was.  Nevertheless, it is only by rising to Saul Friedländer’s 
challenge to “probe the limits of representation” that we can hope to historicize the 
experiences and mentalities forged in the moment of genocide or to increase our 
understanding of the experience of victims as they lived it.31  This analysis represents an 
attempt not to recover lost voices, but to recover lost meanings – to translate the language 
of atrocity into something more comprehensible.  This idea of “translating” is supported 
by William Reddy’s recent argument that  
the concept of translation allows one to speak of the relations between 
language and the world in a way that is neither Cartesian (distinguishing 
sharply between subjective and objective conditions, as most 
psychologists continue to do) nor poststructuralist.  It allows one to say 
meaningfully that there are kinds of thought that lie ‘outside’ of language, 
yet are intimately involved in the formulation of utterances.32   
 
                                                 
30 Hillesum, p. 581. 
31 Saul Friedländer, Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the “Final Solution 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
32 William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 64. 
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Through the creative use of language, Holocaust diarists offered readers their nearest 
rendition of an extreme reality.  It is the task of the historian to break down and examine 
potential meanings these offerings might convey. 
Emmanuel Ringelblum also commented on the paucity of language when trying 
to relate the events of the Warsaw ghetto.  In an entry written sometime in late June 
1942, he observed that “The German soldiers’ willful treatment of the Jews is beyond 
description.”33  This comment is interesting because “willful treatment” is such an 
understated phrase.  By “willful treatment,” he meant rapine, sadism and murder.  But 
by expressly leaving those incommunicable words out, he underscored his point – 
nothing he said or wrote could make the reader any more aware of the true reality of the 
ghetto than a simple phrase like “willful treatment.”  The way these words are used 
indicates Ringelblum’s belief that the imagination cannot follow where the victims 
were forced to go.   
Hillesum repeatedly stressed the difficulty transmitting the true nature of what was 
happening to her, but also indicated the need to do so.  In the same letter quoted above, 
she displays her concern with finding meaning.  She wrote, 
True, things happen here that in the past our reason would not have judged 
possible.  But perhaps we have faculties other than reason in us, faculties 
that in the past we didn’t know we had but that possess the ability to 
grapple with the incomprehensible [my emphasis].  I believe that for every 
event, man has a faculty that helps him deal with it.34 
 
                                                 
33 Ringelblum, p. 302. 
34 Hillesum, p. 586.   
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Hillesum was expressing the desire or need to make sense of her experiences, as well as 
the hope that she could explain their meaning to others.35  More importantly however, it 
was clear to her that she needed “faculties other than reason” to do so.  Language is a 
function of reason, and it is worth noting that Hillesum used a verb of metaphoric force 
(“grapple”) to indicate the problem she was confronting.36   
In fact, Hillesum seemed to believe suffering conferred meaning, something later 
Holocaust memoirists like Primo Levi would dispute.37   In the same letter, she 
illuminated the paradoxes of language in an argument which initially promoted and then 
dissolved the idea of Jewish specificity or proprietary monopoly of the tragedy presented 
by the Holocaust 
It is not easy – no doubt less easy for us Jews than for anyone else – yet if 
we have nothing to offer a desolate postwar world but our bodies saved at 
any cost, if we fail to draw new meaning from the deep wells of our 
distress and despair, than it will not be enough.  New thoughts will have to 
radiate outward from the camps themselves, new insights, spreading 
lucidity, will have to cross the barbed wire enclosing us and join with the 
insights that people will have to earn just as bloodily, in circumstances 
that are slowly becoming almost as difficult.  And perhaps, on the 
common basis of an honest search for some way to understand these dark 
events, wrecked lives may yet take a tentative step forward.  
That’s why it seemed such a great danger to me when all around 
one could hear, ‘we don’t want to think, we don’t want to feel, it’s best to 
shut your eyes to all this misery.’”38  
 
                                                 
35 Christian Meier has recently argued that while the Holocaust might not be comprehensible, it is 
explainable.  Christian Meier, From Athens to Auschwitz: The Uses of History, (translated by Deborah 
Lucas Schneider Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 137-169. 
36Incidentally, Zygmunt Bauman has claimed that both language and reason are essential 
components of genocide.  Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000). 
37 Hillesum’s need to find meaning in suffering can be seen as a precursor to a similar debate that 
took place among Jewish scholars and theologians in the 1960’s and 1970’s as authors like Emil 
Fackenheim, Irving Greenberg and Elie Wiesel grappled with the implications of Richard Rubenstein’s 
seminal book, After Auschwitz: Radical Theology and Contemporary Judaism (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1966) in which he asserted that he could no longer believe in God or Israel as the chosen people in 
the aftermath of the Holocaust. 
38 Hillesum, p. 586-587. 
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In this passage, it seems clear that Hillesum needed to believe there was meaning in 
suffering. If there were not – if suffering were only just that – she would have been bereft 
of any reason to stay strong or continue resisting. Throughout the text of her letters and 
diary entries she frequently stated, often very explicitly, that the mind required events to 
have meaning – this despite the fact that she also said it was impossible to write a 
description capable of conveying that meaning.  This need to use communication to resist 
was the primary, though implicit, argument for witnessing and recording the events she 
lived through.  At the same time, she seemed to have been under no delusions about the 
difficulties this posed.  The fascinating, and very human thing about Hillesum was that 
even though she claimed it was “dangerous” for others not to want to “think” or “feel,” 
an examination of her diaries and letters indicates that, over a long period of time, she 
avoided certain types of confrontation herself – particularly in the diaries, but also in the 
letters she wrote during the process of deportation.  
In the sense that the need for meaning was of extreme importance, especially to 
young writers, Hillesum’s comments are reminiscent of the assertion made by Anne 
Frank (1929–1945) another Dutch Jew.  Frank wrote, “…I still believe, in spite of 
everything, that people are truly good at heart.” At first, this passage simply seems to be 
the heartbreakingly naïve wishful thinking of a teenage girl.  Closer scrutiny, however, 
suggests a protective denial of the exterminatory reality of Nazi-occupied Amsterdam in 
1944.39   
                                                 
39 This comment was written 15 July 1944, shortly before the Frank family was discovered and 
Anne sent to Auschwitz.  She was subsequently transferred to Bergen-Belsen, where she died of typhus. 
See Anne Frank, The Diary of a Young Girl: The Definitive Edition (edited by Otto H. Frank and Mirjam 
Pressler, translated by Susan Massotty, New York: Anchor Books Doubleday, 1995), p. 332. 
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In an undated letter written sometime after 26 June 1943, Hillesum made another 
comment similar both to her previous statements and to Anne Frank’s.  She wrote 
And in spite of everything you always end up with the same connection: 
life is good after all, it’s not God’s fault that things go awry sometimes, 
the cause lies in ourselves.  And that’s what stays with me, even now, 
even when I’m about to be packed off to Poland with my whole family.40   
 
By shifting the blame for events from the divine to the human, Hillesum seemed to be 
saying the events she was living through were not God’s fault – humans were to blame.  
If God were at fault, the suffering Hillesum witnessed at Westerbork would have been 
pointless.  She could not bear for this to be the case.  Though there is a veneer of 
hopefulness, this statement seems to be a symptom of denial and avoidance rather than 
one of true optimism.  As in the case of Anne Frank, the denial functioned to insulate the 
self from what the senses said was going on around it.  The world these two saw around 
them was not good.  Neither were many of the people.  Nevertheless, they both began 
optimistically, saying “in spite of everything,” or “even now.”  This suggests a need or 
even a compulsion to paint things in bright terms.  People are “truly good at heart.” “Life 
is good after all.”   
One reading of Frank’s passage focuses on her suggestion that people were 
inwardly good “at heart,” although they may not have outwardly demonstrated that 
goodness.  This implies the belief in a sort of Cartesian dualism between subjective and 
objective realities.  Frank seemed to indicate that the cause for the discrepancy between a 
good nature and a bad deed was that people were alienated from themselves.  Hillesum’s 
approach was the opposite.  She believed the reason things went “awry” was “in 
ourselves” – though it is not entirely clear if she thought the answer to the problem was 
                                                 
40 Etty Hillesum, Etty, p. 608. 
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inside as well, or if it needed to come from an outside source like God.  Her emphasis on 
faith would suggest it is the latter.   In either case, both writers seem to demand an 
ultimately positive meaning.  If that meaning could not be found it was either because it 
was hidden or because there were those who chose not to find it.  This point of view is 
indicative of a deep-seated need for a positive world-view.  Events which did not fit this 
perspective (they both said “in spite of everything”) were anomalous in the bigger 
picture.  These young women not only needed to believe that “goodness” existed, but that 
the “good” in the heart would triumph in the end.  This optimism itself can be read as a 
mechanism of defense and perhaps even as one of hostility.  Not only did it enable the 
holder of the belief to maintain a needed distinction between those who were only good 
“at heart” and those who were good both outwardly and inwardly, but it also implied the 
superiority of those whose outward and inward natures were reconciled. 
IV: Linguistic Mechanisms of Defense – Metaphors 
A problem that arose for the authors of Holocaust diaries was that the events they 
wrote about were completely disconnected from any other type of previous reality.  It 
was impossible to make a comparison to their experiences because nothing had ever been 
like them.  This did not mean writers could not describe their experiences in language at 
all, but it did mean that language had to be modified and meaning encoded in a different 
way to even partially convey its significance.  The remainder of this chapter will deal 
specifically with ways diarists encoded perpetrators, their motivations, and their attitudes 
toward oppressors symbolically in their diaries.41   
                                                 
41 In an essay, Jonathan Morse quotes Raymond Federman, saying “We must dig in to see where 
raw words and fundamental sounds are buried so that the great silence within can finally be decoded,” in 
“Words Devoted to the Unspeakable,” American Literary History, vol. 5, no. 4 (Winter 1993), p. 719. 
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The evidence indicates that the extreme conditions of the Holocaust gave rise to a 
different, perhaps inassimilable, form of historical writing based on trauma and atrocity – 
a new epistemology and language of genocide.42  No period in history so demonstrated 
the fact that everything was indeed possible.  When Nazi Germany willed or imagined a 
hellish new reality into existence, perpetrators and victims were both forced to create a 
new language to describe it.43  These new types of understanding and language were not 
incidental, but inseparable components of a deadly new world, one where genocide was 
possible.44  In other words, that new world was as much about how it was imagined or 
felt to be as it was about how it was purported to be in some “objective” reality.45 
The meanings created in the discourse of genocide were purposeful, even if they 
were sometimes unconscious.  As Berel Lang contended, “the writer is responsible for 
what the imagination does, and this is true even if the directions in which it moves are not 
the results of deliberation in its usual sense.” 46  In Holocaust discourse, meaning shifted 
                                                 
42 In an essay entitled “Unclaimed Experience: Trauma and the Possibility of History,” Cathy 
Caruth has said that history is no longer “straightforwardly referential,” and that rethinking about history in 
terms of trauma means that “reference [in the post-structuralist sense of knowledge being based upon a 
system of experience] is not aimed at eliminating history, but a resituating it in our understanding, that is, 
of precisely permitting history to arise where immediate understanding may not.” Yale French Studies, no. 
79 (1991), p. 182. 
43 In his essay “Fantasies about the Jews: Cultural Reflections on the Holocaust,” History & 
Memory, vol. 17. no. 1-2 (Fall 2005) Histories and Memories of Twentieth Century Germany, Alon 
Confino says “truth is a creation of the imagination.”  He also quotes Paul Veyne as saying “It is we who 
fabricate our truths, and it is not ‘reality’ that makes us believe.  For ‘reality’ is the child of the constitutive 
imagination of our tribe.” p. 317. 
44 Robert Jay Lifton quotes an Auschwitz survivor as saying “The world is not this world.”  Lifton 
explains, “What I think he meant by that was that, after Auschwitz, the ordinary rhythms and appearances 
of life, however innocuous or pleasant, were far from the truth of human existence.  Underneath those 
rhythms and appearances lay darkness and menace.” Lifton in “The World is not this World,” John K. Roth 
and Michael Berenbaum eds., Holocaust: Religious & Philosophical Implications, (New York: Paragon 
House, 1989), p. 191. 
45 Wendy S. Hesford supports this contention.  In “Reading Rape Stories: Material Rhetoric and 
the Trauma of Representation” she says, “Cultural narratives and fantasies are not antithetical to material 
“reality” but fundamental to social and political life.” College English, vol. 62, no. 2 (November 1999), p. 
193. 
46 Berel Lang, Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 
p. 118. 
84 
 
and alternate definitions filled the spaces between the quotidian and the grotesque.  
Holocaust diarists built tenuous bridges between what had been possible and what was 
now possible – and in doing so translated between alternate realms of experience.  Lang 
continued, arguing that  
…linguistic developments which occurred at the time of the Nazi 
genocide would disclose features resembling those of the process 
of genocide itself; it would be difficult to understand how that 
process might occur without corresponding changes in the 
language. 47 
 
Here, Lang was discussing the way perpetrators manipulated and changed language in 
order to find better ways to kill through the use of euphemisms.  Words like 
Sonderbehandlung (“special treatment”) come to mind when one thinks of ways Nazis 
sought to disguise their intentions, perhaps even from themselves, by conferring new 
meaning on normal language.48  The ways Nazis twisted language reflected their attempt 
to create a new morality in which genocidal mass-murder was not only permissible, but 
an imperative.  In order to do this, they sanitized genocide by investing old words with 
new meanings – hence the sinister connotations we now have for words like Säuberung 
(“cleansing”).49  
                                                 
47 Lang, p. 83. 
48 The creation of euphemisms and languages of separation and degradation were one way of 
depersonalizing victims.  See the Jew as “gangrenous appendix” in Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors 
Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 1986),  p. 16; Jews and 
psychiatric patients as “portions,” Götz Aly, Peter Chroust, Christian Pross, Cleansing the Fatherland: Nazi 
Medicine and Racial Hygiene (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 250; Jewish bodies as 
Scheißstücke – “pieces of shit,” Olga Lengyel, Five Chimneys (New York: Ziff and Davis, 1947), p. 83; 
Jewish corpses as Figuren – puppets or dolls or Schmattes – rags, Claude Lanzmann, Shoah (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1985), p. 9; Jews and mentally ill as “animals in human form,” Michael Burleigh, Death 
and Deliverance: Euthanasia in Germany 1900-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 
119; Jews and mentally ill as Ballastexistenzen – human flotsam and jetsam, Henry Friedlander, The 
Origins of the Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution, (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1995) p. 15 and targeted victims as unnütze Esser – “useless eaters,” Lifton, The Nazi 
Doctors,  p. 22.   
49 This process of redefinition was incomplete, however.  Nazis changed language to mock, 
degrade and dehumanize their victims in order to make it easier to kill, but it was only partially successful.  
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The development of strategies of differentiation and dehumanization was 
necessary for Jewish diarists as well, though for reasons very different from that of the 
Nazis.  It is my contention that Jewish diarists during the Holocaust also avoided the full 
reality of the situation by altering language.  But for them, the goal was to stay alive.  An 
example of this alteration includes the way the word “organizing” was understood in 
completely different ways by victims in Auschwitz and other camps than it was by the 
outside world. In some instances in Holocaust diaries, victims used language figuratively 
or metaphorically to depict their persecutors.  Writers were forced into this linguistic 
detour because of the contradictory necessity of keeping perpetrators mentally at bay 
while at the same time expressing the subconscious urge to confront them.   
One example comes from the work of Emmanuel Ringelblum, who relayed an 
account not only of fascist and anti-Semitic violence, but also provided evidence for how 
perpetrators were viewed by members of the Jewish community.  In a passage written in 
January of 1940, he told of the arrival of three German soldiers into the ghetto.  He wrote, 
“Three ‘Skulls’ from the Totenkopf company came to an apartment on Wloclaweka 
Street, with spitters, sawed-off shotguns, in their hands, [and] took all the money there 
was.”50   
“Skulls” obviously referred to the insignia worn by the SS, especially the 
Totenkopfverbände, who not only wore the sign of the death’s head on their headgear, but 
                                                                                                                                                 
For example, the SS extermination contingent at Treblinka not only referred to the narrow barbed-wire 
“tube” through which victims were flogged on their way to the gas chambers as the Himmelfahrtsstraße 
(“the Road to Heaven”),but they also put up a sign, surmounted by a Star of David, in Hebrew reading 
“This is the gateway to God.  Righteous men will pass through.”  Besides being cynical, the notice points to 
Nazi use of the tropic. In one sense it is saying the gas chamber is a portal to another, better place.  In 
another, it is a prima facie admission of Nazi guilt – “Righteous men” by definition should not be put to 
death.  See, Arad, p. 120 and Gitta Sereny, Into that Darkness: An Examination of Conscience (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1983), p148. 
50 Ringelblum, p. 13.  In Sloan’s translation of Ringelblum’s writings, italicized words are written 
not in Yiddish, but in Hebrew, a significant point that will be discussed below. 
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also upon their collars.  The repetition of the skull motif in both Yiddish and German is 
significant.  The sentence is almost redundant unless one reads “Skulls” and “Totenkopf” 
in different ways because Totenkopf already connotes skulls.  Rendered in quotation 
marks by Sloan, this suggests the term was commonly used by other ghetto inhabitants, 
not just Ringelblum. This indicates that a new language specifically related to Nazis and 
atrocities was formed in the traumatic conditions of the ghetto.  The short definition of 
spitters, written in Hebrew, performs the same function - making the reader aware of the 
development of slang particular to the Jewish denizens of Warsaw.  However, “Skulls” 
seemed to be a more common term than spitters, as shown by Ringelblum’s decision to 
define the latter.   
By transforming the Germans wearing the uniforms of the death’s head into 
“Skulls” themselves, Ringelblum pointed to another meaning.  By using “Skulls” as a 
synecdoche (allowing a part – the skull – to stand in for the whole – the Nazi perpetrator) 
he was not only identifying those was responsible for the theft, but he was also 
underscoring their menacing connection with death in the minds of the ghetto’s 
inhabitants.  Like classical European depictions of Death coming with his scythe to 
harvest souls, so the Nazis came like Death with their spitters, gathering money in lieu of 
lives – for the moment.51   
This reading of the Ringelblum’s passage suggests that Death was personified in 
the form of these perpetrators.  Like Death, these men were no longer human.  Though 
they had recognizably human features, they had no feeling or remorse – no human 
qualities.  To Ringelblum, the Nazis were death. They were the antithesis of what was 
                                                 
51 One thinks in some ways of the painting Death and the Miser by Jan Provost (c. 1500).  As in 
the ghetto, the painting seems to say Death can be avoided, but ultimately cannot be bought off. 
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human and alive – their existence as well as their insignia a grinning example of life’s 
negation.52  Ringelblum distinguished between what was human and what was inhuman 
in order to separate himself and his people from this deadly “other.” 
There is another synecdoche in the Notes that parallels this use of “Skulls.”  It 
concerns Ringelblum’s discussion of the way Nazis drove Jewish police to ever more 
stringent measures against their own people.  In an undated entry, written sometime in 
late 1942, he wrote of witnessing a scene “one day when every policeman had to meet a 
quota of four ‘heads.’”53  Again, the synecdoche, rendered in quotes by Ringelblum’s 
translator Sloan, indicates that this was common slang used in the ghetto, not just a 
creation of Ringelblum’s. The fact that Nazis entering the ghetto were “Skulls,” while the 
victims were “heads” suggests a kind of equivalence.54  Ringelblum could have simply 
reported the event (as Sloan wrongly implies he did), but he does otherwise.  Instead of 
laying out the simple facts, he moved to a more poetic and illustrative way of narrating 
experience.  At least if Hayden White is to be believed, such tropic devices correspond to 
the use of mechanisms of defense.55 Just as the Nazis represented death, so too the Jewish 
                                                 
52 In some ways, Ringelblum’s images of Death look back to a longer European tradition of death 
as the ultimate equalizer.  This is symbolized by medieval tradition of mementos mori, as well as in the 
depictions of the danse macabre. To the degree both of these traditions echo the recognition that in death 
and decomposition all men become the same, the inclusion of this imagery in the Notes can be seen as an 
example of resistance through projection of a form of equality. See Johan Huizinga, The Autumn of the 
Middle Ages (translated by Rodney J. Payton and Ulrich Mammitzsch, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), p. 156-172. 
53 Ringelblum, p. 331. 
54 “Skulls” appears to be Jewish ghetto slang.  It is not necessarily clear if “heads” is also slang, or 
an example of Jewish appropriation of a dehumanizing German term.  Nevertheless, Ringelblum is still 
implying equivalence between the figuratively “dead” German and those Jews who were destined for 
murder.   
55Ringelblum did not always write this way.  Some of his entries can be classified as strictly 
descriptive reportage.  For example in an entry from 8 May 1940 he writes – “At twilight, Poles were all 
seized in every street.  Jews had their papers checked to make sure they weren’t Christians.  Stopped 
streetcars, dragged everyone in them off to the Pawia Street prison; from there, it is said they are sent to 
Prussia…All the Jewish barbers were picked up, ordered to cut the hair of those being deported.  Seized not 
only young people, but older people as well over forty.”  Ringelblum, p. 38.  
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victims were outside the bounds of the living.  Even to other Jews, they were the walking 
doomed – written off and hopeless.  Perhaps this attitude seems cold coming from people 
in a situation very similar to that of the poor victims, but even earlier in the Notes 
Ringelblum took pains to mention that the Jewish ghetto dwellers were developing a 
“marked, remarkable indifference to death, which no longer impresses.”56  By turning 
their own doomed people into simple ‘heads” who existed now only to be counted and 
murdered, ghetto inhabitants resisted by preserving and consolidating the strength of 
those who remained among the living. 
The diaries and letters of Etty Hillesum provide examples of both swerves and 
types of repressed aggression.  In a letter written in December 1942, she described the 
two Commandants of Westerbork, the transit camp from which Jews were sent to their 
deaths in Auschwitz.  She wrote,  
We have a Dutch Commandant and a German one. The first is taller, but 
the second has more of a say.  We are told, moreover, that he likes music 
and that he is a gentleman.  I’m no judge, although I must say that for a 
gentleman he certainly has a somewhat peculiar job.57   
 
It is interesting to note that the Dutch Commandant, who starts out being the 
subject of the sentence, seems to dissolve or disappear into the German Commandant by 
the end of the paragraph.  Either the two became indistinguishable to Hillesum, or she 
was shielding her fellow countryman from the repressed furor of her subsequent remarks.  
It seems more likely that the distinction between perpetrator and collaborator was 
beginning to dissolve.  Hillesum implies that the Dutch Commandant was like the 
German one.  While he may have retained the characteristics of the Dutch people, he was 
                                                 
56 Found in an entry dated 26 August, 1942.  Ringelblum, p. 194.   
57 Hillesum, p. 582.  In the English translation, the subject of the third sentence is not entirely 
clear.  The reader could construe the Dutch Commandant as the implied subject.  However, based on other 
descriptions of the Dutchman on other occasions, it seems that here she is referring to the German. 
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nevertheless lumped together with the Nazi in Hillesum’s mind.58  A relationship 
between the two is expressed – the Dutch Commandant is taller but the German has more 
power.  Significantly, power is expressed in terms of language – the Nazi has more “say.”  
The Dutchman is subordinate to, but of a piece with the German.  That the German has 
“more say” implies that the Dutch Commandant also has some “say.”  The way lines of 
logic, causality and identity begin to fragment in these passages indicates something akin 
to what Derrida meant by writing “sous rature” (translated by G.C. Spivak as “under 
erasure.”)59  By writing and physically crossing out a word as Heidegger did in Derrida’s 
example in Of Grammatology, or by figuratively “crossing out” words or identities that 
seemed as if they should be there, the author draws the reader toward a concept or idea 
without forcing her to use words that do not convey the totality of meanings she knows 
she cannot express. In the end, to Hillesum, the specific identities of the Dutch 
Commandant and the German merge together and they become indistinguishable.   
The Commandant (presumably the German one, although it is not specified) likes 
music – his tastes are refined as befits a “gentleman.” However, Hillesum’s tone indicates 
that she believes there is more to a “gentleman” than just the outward expression of 
intellectual and cultural taste.  To her, gentlemanliness is a state of being, not a veneer or 
superficial mask of culture that can be donned and removed at will.  To Hillesum, this 
                                                 
58 There are two Commandants, but in another letter dated Friday 9 July 1943, Hillesum again 
brings up the issue of the Commandant without specifically addressing which she is talking about – 
“Mische [Etty’s brother]…says ‘I’m going to go and tell the Commandant he’s a murderer.’  We have to 
watch out that he doesn’t do anything dangerous.” When examined together it seems as if the 
Commandants’ individual natures begin to disappear and they become indistinguishable in her mind. 
Hillesum, p. 627. 
59 Technically, this is to write a word and then to cross it out – keeping both the word and its 
negation since both are necessary.  Spivak traces this practice from Derrida to Heidegger’s Zur Seinsfrage.  
The point, she writes is that “Word, and thing or thought never in fact become one…We are reminded of, 
referred to, what the convention of words sets up as thing or thought, by a particular arrangement of 
words.”  Gayatri Spivak, “Translator’s Preface” to Jacques Derrida’s Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1974), p. xiv. 
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“gentleman” Commandant was a poseur, and even though the he had the ability to 
manipulate her body, she believed she could defeat him on the transcendent plane of 
culture.  
  The final understated sentence is the most fascinating.  Hillesum begins by 
saying “I’m no judge.”  In doing so, she renounces the power judgment implies, but then 
proceeds to do exactly what she said she would not.  She wants to remain detached from 
the perpetrator – even from the distant contact with him judgment presupposes, yet she is 
compelled to make a statement.  She claims not to want to be the one to decide what 
made someone a “gentleman” (or a human) – this was something “They” do.  But clearly, 
Hillesum is judging the man.  By denying that this is the case, however, she distances 
herself from the perpetrator in an attempt to stand outside the event she describes. 
  Finally, her tone is disdainful, indicating hostility toward the Commandant 
because he has a “peculiar job” for a gentleman.  Hillesum knew where the trains were 
going and was under no illusion about the fate of those who were shipped away.  Here, 
she implies that a gentleman would never do what this man did daily: issue orders to pack 
people into cattle cars for deportation and death.  The conclusion is obvious – far from 
being a “gentleman” (in Dutch the word Heer), the man is a criminal, a thug, and a 
murderer.  This quick and bitter remark helps to differentiate the Jewish prisoner 
(Hillesum herself) from the perpetrator-collaborator and establishes a moral separation 
between one side and the other.  It is significant that Hillesum places the Dutch 
Commandant next to the German one.  As mentioned above, this indicates a breakdown 
in the author’s mind between perpetrator and collaborator.  The blurring of lines between 
Nazis and others persecuting the Jews supports the contention that it was mentally 
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necessary, and simplest, to reduce relationships between victims and “others” to binary 
categories.   
Ringelblum’s “chronicle” not only displays the tendency to blur the lines between 
collaborators and Nazis, but also between perpetrators, collaborators and victims as well.  
In an entry on 25 May 1942, Ringelblum referred to the Nazi roundup of their own 
Jewish agents – informers and policemen – for death or deportation.  As events in the 
ghetto moved towards their climax, he wrote, “The Gestapo beast devours its progeny.”60  
On its face this comment references the myth of Saturn consuming his children.61  Not 
only that, but by the time Ringelblum uses the phrase, it had been co-opted for many 
purposes, but especially modified by intellectuals in the 19th and 20th century as “the 
Revolution devours its children,” in reference to the excesses of the French and Russian 
Revolutions.  More to the point, however, Ringelblum suggests that there is a patriarchal 
role being filled here.62  The Jewish police and informers are now children of the 
“Gestapo beast,” not children of the Covenant.  Here Ringelblum not only explicitly 
labels the Gestapo “beasts” (a dehumanizing term), but also implicitly disowns those 
individuals who sold their brothers and sisters out to these “beasts.”  As far as 
Ringelblum is concerned, these informers and policemen are no longer Jews.   
                                                 
60 Ringelblum, p. 278. 
61 It was prophesied that one of Chronos/Saturn’s children would supplant him.  To prevent this, 
he devoured them.  Only one, Zeus/Jove, was saved because he was hidden.  In the end, he castrated his 
father and usurped his throne.  This topic is the subject of one of the most horrifying pictures ever 
committed to canvas.  Saturn Devouring his Children was painted between 1819 and 1823 by Francisco 
Goya.  A painting from his “black period,” the horror and darkness Goya conveyed has seldom been 
rivaled.  Saturn was king of the titans, forces more elemental than the more rational gods who eventually 
supplanted them.  Associating Nazis with primordial forces dehumanized them by contrasting them with 
humanistic enlightened powers.  This implied two things: first, that Ringelblum believed the Jew, like Jove, 
would eventually triumph and second, that he needed to deny the human origins of the disaster the 
Holocaust represented. 
62The imagery of the father sacrificing his children has a long history - one that owes as much to 
the Biblical story of Abraham offering to sacrifice his son Isaac to God as it does to Greek and Roman 
myth.    
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What is important here is the degree to which Ringelblum collapses the definition 
of perpetrators.  Not only is the wall between perpetrators and non-Jewish collaborators 
broken – as in Hillesum’s description of the Dutch Commandant – but between 
perpetrators and Jews as well.  The two become indistinguishable – one is just a weaker 
version of the other.  It seems that, for Ringelblum, the blackmailers, informers and 
Jewish policemen who herded thousands to their deaths are “progeny” of “beasts” – 
something definitely an insult and almost a curse.  By giving up the “progeny” to the 
“beasts,” the binary distinction between “us” and “them” is re-established in 
Ringelblum’s mind and the world can continue to make sense.   
If one tendency of these writers was to collapse collaborator-perpetrator 
distinctions, another was to reify perpetrator-victim boundaries.  The text at hand is part 
of a letter written by Hillesum dated Tuesday 8 June 1943. She wrote, “Right across from 
me only a few meters away, a blue uniform with a helmet stands in the watchtower.”63 
An incongruity is apparent here – this is not a perpetrator, a collaborator or even a person.  
It is only a “blue uniform.”  This remark is significant because throughout hundreds of 
pages of diary entries and letters to friends, this is one of the only discussions of 
perpetrators at all. 
  Hillesum and the “uniform” occupy the same space – they are in dangerously 
close proximity to each other. The “blue uniform” is only “a few meters away.”  
However, there is a world of separation between them because they occupy different 
categories.  Hillesum is a human being – she lives and she can communicate. The 
                                                 
63 Hillesum, p. 598.  The SS wore field grey or black uniforms and the Wehrmacht also wore grey.  
The Ordnungspolizei wore green. The chances are that this soldier in the watchtower was a Dutch 
collaborationist.  But as mentioned above, the need to keep things in simple binary oppositions required the 
collapse of the distinction between German perpetrator and Dutch collaborator. 
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“uniform” however, has neither ears that can hear nor a heart that can feel compassion or 
mercy – and so it stands in metaphorically for everything Hillesum feels about Nazism 
and the atrocities it commits daily.   
The “uniform” is in a watch tower above – an artificial perch, indicating 
usurpation of authority, not authority itself. Meanwhile, Hillesum herself is in a 
subordinate position on the ground below.  A close reading of this letter indicates that 
Hillesum is not implying surrender by placing the “uniform” above her, but is 
maintaining the separation between “I” and “They” needed to continue to survive.  
Nothing in the sentence indicates that she is recoiling from or was awestruck by the “blue 
uniform.”  She is merely observing it there in the watchtower. 
  The removal of what is human in the perpetrator was an essential component of 
many Holocaust diaries. Perhaps this is because Hillesum and other writers could not 
allow themselves to admit that a real human would willingly participate in such horrible 
events.  The purpose of dehumanizing a hostile “other” in favor of signs and symbols of 
fascist violence and panoptic authority is to establish the separation needed for survival.  
Interestingly, in some ways it also parallels the Nazi need to make killing easier by 
dehumanizing those they murdered.  In this reading of Hillesum’s letter, to remove the 
human element was to remove the tension resulting from the subconscious awareness that 
her incomprehensible position is the result of human agency.  It was necessary for her to 
take this stance considering the importance she attached to meaning.  
There are many instances in the Notes when Ringelblum removed or altered the 
human component in perpetrators and detoured around certain words or names associated 
with Nazi Germany. These swerves took several forms.  The Germans themselves were 
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called “the Occupying Power” on no less than seven different occasions in Sloan’s 
abridged edition.  Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels was never mentioned by name, 
but simply referred to as an “important publicity man.”64  Although Hitler was mentioned 
by name in multiple instances, he was also referred to at various points in the text as 
“That One” (twice), “A.H.,” “a famous villain,” “Someone,” a “modern Haman,” and 
even as “Horowitz” on multiple occasions. This last reference to Hitler is interesting 
because it serves several functions.  First, it hides the immediate subject of the entry, as 
Sloan noted.  More importantly, it mocks and insults Hitler.  Perhaps by giving him a 
Jewish name, Ringelblum was exhibiting aggression.  He did this by calling attention to 
Hitler’s long-rumored Jewish heritage – something known to infuriate the Führer.  
Finally, calling him “Horowitz” functioned as an equalizer.  Ringelblum was a Jew.  
Hitler as “Horowitz” was a Jew too.  By using a Jewish name, Ringelblum brought Hitler 
down to his level and linguistically evened out a disparity in power. 
Another fascinating linguistic swerve taken by Ringelblum was his tendency to 
take a phrase Germans used to characterize themselves and write it in Hebrew, not 
Yiddish.  As mentioned above, Yiddish is derived from German.  Although it is written in 
Hebrew characters, it still owes its sound and structure to the German language.  By 
rendering a phrase in Hebrew, Ringelblum removed it from the German language entirely 
– and took something that represented German identity (a German phrase) and inverted it 
by writing it backwards in the tongue of a “slave” creature “unworthy of life” in Nazi 
eyes.65  This literal inversion was a clever way of mocking the Germans, exhibiting 
                                                 
64 Ringelblum, p. 45. 
65 The phrase “life unworthy of life” was another Nazi euphemism.  Initially it was part of the title 
of the influential 1920 essay Die Freigabe der Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens (Authorization for the 
extermination of life unworthy of life) by legal scholar Karl Binding and psychiatrist Alfred Hoche.  It was 
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hostility and exercising power.66  There are several examples of this technique.  In four 
separate entries in the Sloan edition Ringelblum translated “lords and masters” into 
Hebrew.  He also changed “men (or captains) of valor” into Hebrew on six occasions.  
Another time, Nazis were called “fine fellows” in Hebrew, as Ringelblum blended 
sarcasm and linguistic inversion into a doubly loaded attack.67   
These swerves point in exactly the opposite direction from the literal meaning of 
the words. In another instance, a Nazi slogan was ridiculed and the KdF organization 
(Kraft durch Freude – “Strength through Joy”) referred to as “Strength through Malicious 
Joy.”68 
It is not just well-known Nazi slogans or personalities that are singled out for this 
treatment.  One Nazi soldier in the ghetto is referred to in two separate entries as 
“Frankenstein.”69  He is given this nickname because “he looks and acts like the monster 
in the film of that name.  He’s a bloodthirsty dog who kills one or two smugglers each 
day.  He just can’t eat his breakfast until he has spilled the blood of a Jew.”70  That this 
Nazi is compared to Frankenstein’s monster is significant.  Like the Golem of Jewish 
tradition, the monster was called into life by mysterious, occult means – an affront to 
                                                                                                                                                 
used to describe those members of society whose utility was deemed minimal (the terminally ill and asylum 
patients for example) and whose deaths, according to the authors, would be economically beneficial to 
Germany. The phrase remained in circulation throughout the Nazi period and was eventually applied to 
Jews as well.  See Friedlander, The Origins of Nazi Genocide, p. 14. 
66 Hebrew is written right to left, whereas German, like English is written left to right. 
67 Ringelblum, p. 53. 
68 Ringelblum, p. 252.  The KdF was the Nazi leisure and tourism agency.  For more information 
see Shelley Baranowski, Strength through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
69 Ringelblum, 30 May 1942 p. 283 and mid-June 1942, p. 293. 
70 Emmanuel Ringelblum, Notes, p. 283.  Ringelblum is most likely referring to the 1931 version 
of the film Frankenstein, directed by James Whale starring Boris Karloff.  The sympathy one feels for the 
creature in Mary Shelley’s book is still present in this version, but minimized, as is the intelligence. 
Karloff’s creature is more horrifying than sympathetic. 
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nature.71  This abomination was cobbled together from pieces of dead bodies.  The ghetto 
Frankenstein is similarly dead.  Like the “blue uniform” and the “Skulls,” there is no 
humanity to be found, only the outward resemblance of a man.  Even this meager 
resemblance is immediately called into question by yet another linguistic turn.  The man 
became a “bloodthirsty dog” – indicating the descent of the Nazi to the level of the bestial 
and re-establishing the distinction between the living, human Jew and the dead, inhuman 
German.  This verbal flip indicates a mechanism of defense that attempts to alter reality.  
At the time this entry was written, the ghetto was in its last stages of collapse.  From 
Ringelblum’s vantage point, nothing was more common in Warsaw than dead Jews and 
living Germans.  He turned this dynamic on its head.  Through the hostility of the 
sentence and the separate spheres it created, he indicated that the will to resist remained 
in spite of the carnage around him.  
Etty Hillesum also used this kind of “horror show” imagery to indicate hostility 
and to reinforce the polar “us-them” opposition.  In a letter dated Sunday, 8 August 1943, 
she described a visit from a Dutch collaborationist general and labeled him a “fat toad in 
a green uniform.”72  This depiction is interesting for several reasons.  First, Hillesum, 
who was conversant in several languages, including English, would most likely have 
known that “toad” or “toady” was an expression for a sycophant.73  It seems possible that 
she intended to imply that the Dutch General was not his own man, nor even any longer 
Dutch.  He was one of “them” – an extension of the Nazis and a tool used to implement 
                                                 
71 Like Shelley’s monster, Ringelblum’s “Frankenstein” is an inhuman beast of technology, tied in 
many minds to the stereotype of the Germans as a technological people, cold and emotionless.  To Jews of 
the Warsaw ghetto like Ringelblum, the Nazi and the monster are the living dead. 
72 Hillesum, p. 632. 
73 The term “toady” is a shortened version of “toad-eater” – a “fawning flatterer” – and dates back 
as early as 1629.  It was first used as a verb in 1827. See Douglas Harper, “Online Etymology Dictionary,” 
<http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=toady>, November, 2001. 
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terror and atrocity.  In the traumatic environment of Westerbork, multiple categories were 
not permissible.  For Hillesum, writing this letter shortly before her deportation, a person 
was either with the Jews or against them – there was no middle ground.  Second, a long 
European tradition exists linking the toad with evil – it was one of a witch’s familiars, in 
service to the Devil.  By casting the Dutch General in this light, she indicates her belief 
that the General was metaphorically in league with Hitler in the same way a “toad” was 
in league with Satan.74  Finally, the toad is a cold-blooded creature, almost as far from 
human as anything with a heartbeat.  Hillesum distances herself from the Commandant 
by removing him as far as she possibly can from the living without metaphorically killing 
him the way Ringelblum killed Hitler with a joke at the beginning of this chapter.75 
As these passages show, writers during the Holocaust used unique linguistic 
methods to say a great deal more than the actual text indicates.  However, metaphors 
were not the only way language was manipulated to convey an altered reality.  On the 
surface, Holocaust diaries and chronicles would seem to be the last place to find jokes, 
especially jokes told by victims.  This is not the case.  It was precisely because the 
situation was so dire that some authors resorted to the use of jokes to fend off feelings of 
helplessness and to convey their anger and will to resist. 
                                                 
74 The images of witches and Satan are Christian to be sure, but are also something Hillesum 
would have been very familiar with simply by having been immersed in Western Christian culture and 
folklore in the Netherlands her whole life.  In fact, her entire diary reveals that she was profoundly 
influenced by Christian thought. 
75 There is a final possibility that Hillesum might have foreseen.  Although the Dutch word for 
“toad” is pad, the English word “toad,” which Hillesum would have known, could be thought of as a play 
on the German word Tod or “death.”  The arrival of the Dutch General is as much a harbinger of doom as is 
Ringelblum’s narration of the arrival of the “Skulls” with their spitters.   
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V: Linguistic Mechanisms of Defense – Jokes 
The use of jokes has long been understood to indicate hostility or aggression and 
to establish distance.  Humor is also considered by many psychoanalysts and behavior 
theorists to be a coping mechanism.76  Martin Grotjahn, author of a psychological study 
of humor, wrote that “The Jewish joke constitutes victory by defeat.”  He also observed 
that there is a traditional form of Jewish joke that “contains devastating aggression, 
disguised by restrained, almost humble modesty.”77  
In Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, written in 1905, Sigmund Freud 
also discussed ways jokes were employed to demonstrate aggression and to distinguish 
between one group and another.  He argued that  
…all moral rules for the restriction of active hatred give the clearest 
evidence to this day that they were originally framed for a small society of 
fellow clansmen.  In so far as we are all able to feel that we are members 
of one people [my emphasis], we allow ourselves to disregard most of 
these restrictions in relation to a foreign people.78   
 
He seems to say here that laughter traditionally brought groups together by placing them 
in opposition to other groups.  Freud’s comment refers to the long-term social uses of 
laughter.  Culturally, however, laughter changed considerably throughout the course of 
European history.  According to Mikhail Bakhtin, at the time Rabelais was writing 
Gargantua and Pantagruel in France in the mid–16th century, laughter was considered to 
                                                 
76 Michael Godkewitsch, “The Relationship between Arousal Potential and Funniness of Jokes,” 
Jeffrey H., Goldstein, Paul E. McGhee, eds., The Psychology of Humor: Theoretical Perspectives and 
Empirical Issues, (New York: Academic Press, 1972), p. 144.   
77 Grotjahn, Beyond Laughter: Humor and the Subconscious, (New York: MacGraw-Hill, 1966), 
p. 22-24.  He gives an example of this kind of joke: a “Jew sits in his coffeehouse and dreams about the 
time to come after the war against Hitler is won: ‘I will sit in my coffeehouse and will read the Berliner 
Zeitung, and under my arm I will hold the Wiener Zeitung which I may study later.  Hitler will come.  He 
will point at the Wiener Zeitung and will ask: ‘Are you reading it or may I see it?’ And I will look up and 
say: ‘No, you may not.’” 
78Sigmund Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, translated by James Strachey 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1960), p. 102. 
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be a truth in itself – an open, expansive, life-affirming gesture.  Over time, however 
laughter became an aggressive, cynical tool for ostracism.79  Patricia Keith-Spiegel 
reinforced Bakhtin’s assessment, arguing that “Gradually laughter and humor became a 
substitute for actual assault…Laughter has also been viewed as the means of maintaining 
group standards in primitive times.”80  The sources demonstrate that this was the case for 
Jews victims during the Holocaust.  Jokes made about Nazis served to consolidate their 
sense of community with other Jews and to further increase the psychic distance between 
“us” and “them.” When humor was used in this manner to disparage others, it served two 
functions.  The first was “to increase morale and solidify the in-group [in this case the 
Jewish inhabitants of the ghetto].”  The second was “to introduce and foster a hostile 
disposition toward the out-group [the Nazi perpetrators].”81  Not only did it intensify 
social distinctions, but as Freud continued, “By making the enemy small, inferior, 
despicable or comic, we achieve in a roundabout way the enjoyment of overcoming 
him.…”82  He appeared to mean by this that in certain situations, the making of 
“tendentious” jokes is not only a hostile and aggressive impulse (an act of resistance 
against a threatening “other”), but also an act relished and enjoyed by the one telling the 
joke – a reaffirmation of individual power.  
During the Holocaust, it was most frequently the case that physical resistance was 
impossible – either because it was perceived as a futile waste of one’s life, or because of 
                                                 
79 On of the most important studies of laughter is Mikhail Bakhtin’s Rabelais and His World 
translated by Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 59-144. 
80 Patricia Keith-Spiegel, “Early Conceptions of Humor: Varieties and Issues,” Jeffrey H. 
Goldstein, Paul E. McGhee, eds., The Psychology of Humor: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical 
Issues (New York: Academic Press, 1972), p. 6. 
81 Martineau, “The Psychology of Humor,” Martineau continues, saying “Humor…acts as a safety 
valve for expressing grievance or controlled hostility against deviance.  The result is that normative system 
is reinforced and social cohesion prevails,” p. 121.   
82 Freud, Jokes, p. 103. 
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the threat of reprisals against family or community.  In Holocaust diaries, direct 
confrontation with the perpetrator was avoided in one way through the unconscious 
method of making jokes at the expense of the Nazi perpetrator.  However, simply because 
the aggression in this process was sometimes muffled or even unconscious did not make 
it any less a form of resistance.83  Indeed, Freud argued that these kinds of jokes were 
especially favored in order to make aggressiveness or criticism possible 
against persons in exalted positions who claim to exercise authority.  The 
joke then represents rebellion against that authority, a liberation from its 
pressure.”84   
 
Martin Grotjahn reinforced Freud’s concept of the joke as a subconscious attempt to 
come to terms with an inadmissible hostility when he remarked 
Increasing demands for repression through the ages have changed 
aggression from assault into wit.  Where we would have struck a person in 
earlier times, we restrict our hostility now and often repress it entirely.  
Aggressive wit gives us a new way of admitting dangerous aggression…85 
 
Jokes in Holocaust diaries are significant because they indicated a linguistic “turn” away 
from one meaning and pointed toward another, more subtle, but also more aggressive 
understanding of the perpetrator.  Although it initially seems as though the act of writing 
and the telling of jokes was passive, in the case of Holocaust diaries these forms 
represented a more hostile attitude towards perpetrators than at first might be expected.   
Some of the best instances of this type of joke appear in the chronicles of 
Emmanuel Ringelblum.  In fact, at least two dozen jokes can be found in the edition 
translated by Sloan.  Two will be examined here.  One joke, written 9 May 1940, 
                                                 
83 There are certainly different categories of resistance.  As more obvious physical avenues of 
struggle were gradually rendered impossible by the Nazis, the remaining energy of the victim was 
channeled into lesser forms of resistance whose purpose was not to strike an actual blow to the enemy, but 
to maintain a sense of agency in the victim.    
84 Freud, Jokes, p. 105. 
85 Grotjahn, p. 11-12. 
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indicates repressed hostility and aggression.  Ringelblum wrote, “Horowitz [Hitler] 
comes to the Other World.  Sees Jesus in Paradise.  ‘Hey, what’s a Jew doing without an 
armband?’  ‘Let him be,’ answers Saint Peter, ‘He’s the boss’s son.’”86  Ringelblum was 
imaginatively killing Hitler, who must be dead in order to be in Heaven.  Second, he was 
pointing out Hitler’s arrogance and hubris.  Even in Paradise, the Führer believes he can 
still call the shots.  Third, Hitler is put in his place by Saint Peter.  Here a space is created 
where Hitler’s word is not law.  By putting the words “let him be” in Saint Peter’s mouth, 
Ringelblum was effectively de-fanging the viper.  Fourth, Ringelblum was joking in the 
idiom of the “Christian” perpetrator himself, displaying his mastery of the “other’s” 
culture.  Finally, this is all in the context of a joke that can either be read as modest and 
self-deprecating (obviously if Jesus is the boss’s son, Jews have been wrong all along and 
Christians correct), or a sort of comedy of the absurd (because it is not logical in any kind 
of moral universe for Hitler to be in Paradise).  This is an excellent example of a joke 
being what William Martineau called a “social mechanism…for resolving hostility 
emerging from structural relationships….”87  
Jokes took many forms, but most indicated aggression.  Sometimes this hostility 
was expressed scatologically. In another entry from mid-September, 1941, Ringelblum 
wrote, “They say at the beginning of the Russian campaign Napoleon put on a red shirt to 
hide the blood if he should be wounded.  H. put on a pair of brown drawers.”88  Not only 
is this funny but it indicates several sets of beliefs.  First, it demonstrates the hope in the 
ghetto that “H,” like Napoleon, had picked a fight with a Russian colossus that he could 
                                                 
86 Ringelblum, p. 40. 
87 William H. Martineau, “A Model of the Social Functions of Humor,” Jeffrey H. Goldstein, Paul 
E. McGhee, eds., The Psychology of Humor: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Issues, (New York: 
Academic Press, 1972), p. 111. 
88 Ringelblum, p. 216. 
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not win.  Second, it implies that Napoleon (who emancipated the Jews) was a brave, if 
foolhardy man.  By contrast, “H.” is a coward who will not venture out to fight with his 
men and whose bowels give out on him when things go wrong.89  Third, the very notion 
of defilement also has a specific context in relation to the Holocaust.  Terrence Des Pres 
wrote of a Nazi “excremental assault” on the Jews.  This assault took place in the ghettos 
and concentration camps.  The argument asserts that by debasing the victims through 
filth, feces and urine, the Germans created greater distance between the Herrenmenschen 
and the Untermenschen.  This enabled them to minimize pangs of conscience because the 
victims, smeared in mud and excrement, seemed less human than their impeccably 
dressed “masters.”90  In fact, French philosopher Paul Ricoeur noted that from time 
immemorial, the three primary symbols of evil have been defilement, sin and guilt.91  By 
making Hitler defile himself, Ringelblum sets up a situation in which that which is rotten 
or evil on the inside is now able to be seen on the outside.  Although this is delivered as a 
joke, it nevertheless contains devastating aggression and linguistically points toward an 
alternate meaning.  It was clear to the Jews of Warsaw that Hitler was evil.  Creating this 
joke and wording it in this manner was a way of directing the attention of others toward 
the obvious – Hitler (and all he represented: Nazism, anti-Semitism and malignant 
aggression) are not only metaphorically, but physically evil for all to see. 
Jokes served many functions in Holocaust diaries.  They indicated aggression and 
hostility, they established distance between perpetrators and victims and they revealed a 
                                                 
89 Hitler has been called many things, coward among them – particularly after his suicide and the 
avoidance of responsibility it implied at the end of the war.  But up until the very end, it was not a common 
accusation – as a corporal he had won the Iron Cross first class in the First World War when the medal was 
usually reserved for officers. 
90 Terrence Des Pres, The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), p. 51-71. 
91 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, translated from the French by Emerson Buchanan 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1967) p. 25-46. 
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turn toward alternate meanings that could not be conveyed by ordinary language.  In 
other words, the use of humor in these diaries encompasses the entire spectrum of 
laughter’s cultural history by being both life-affirming and aggressive.  These humorous 
linguistic turns represent a line of psychological defense that helped victims maintain the 
will to resist.  As they resisted, they withdrew both into the community and into 
themselves.  These two places represented havens from the brutal reality victims faced 
and worked together to provide a basis for continued struggle. 
VI: Community, Individuality, and Defense Mechanisms 
Michael Geyer argued in an essay on Jewish resistance during the 
Holocaust that: 
For Jews there were no rules of the game, no spaces of autonomy, no 
voices that mattered, no partial community with the persecutor.  Hence, 
for Jews, every act of establishing ties among themselves was 
resistance…For it is the effort of constituting in transcripts, hidden from 
the persecutors, what is denied to them: community.92 
 
In the diaries, notes, chronicles and transcripts that comprise Jewish writing during the 
Holocaust, creating community was indeed extraordinarily important.  However, exactly 
because there “were no rules of the game,” it would perhaps more correct to say that the 
acts which established ties as well as those which maintained individuality constituted 
resistance.  
Maintaining community was an important form of resistance because it ensured 
the perpetuation of Jewish culture into a future which could mourn those who were lost 
and try to understand what had happened in the past.  Holocaust diaries served this 
function.  The passages above indicate that it was also important for diarists to maintain a 
                                                 
92 Michael Geyer, “Resistance as Ongoing Project: Visions of Order, Obligations to Strangers, 
Struggles for Civil Society,” Journal of Modern History 64, supplement. December 1992, p. S217-S241. 
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sense of individuality when, everywhere they turned, they were being lumped together by 
the Nazis – physically in ghettos and camps as well as categorically as “non-humans.”  
The Jewish writer faced the dual problem of remaining an individual amid German 
attempts to eradicate differences amongst Jews and at the same time draw strength from 
the bonds of community. 
To the individual writer of a Holocaust diary, finding a way to stay alive in hostile 
and unforgiving environment was of paramount importance.  For this reason, the full 
murderous reality of the situation was often avoided.  Because resistance required 
something other than the self to struggle against, to think of the Nazis as people like 
themselves – or  to focus on the humanity beneath the barbarity – would have blurred the 
lines which established the separation between perpetrator and victim required to 
continue the struggle.  Community and individuality were both important.  Bolstering a 
sense of Jewish community created a sense both of belonging and one of differentiation.  
The greater the contrast between “us” and “them” (which could also be perceived as one 
of “good” against “evil”), the greater the motivation to continue the battle.  The more 
thoroughly the diarist understood his/her own individuality, the more importance was 
attached to preserving that identity.  In other words, because composing diaries and 
writing in general was a profoundly personal act, this expression of individuality and 
autonomy reinforced the existence of a separate entity capable of resisting.  To linger too 
long over perpetrators and their motivations for committing what so many diarists refer to 
as “incomprehensible” deeds would have had a detrimental effect in that the very 
inconceivability of the situation tended to reduce the capacity for resistance.  Just as 
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staring at the sun for too long leads to blindness, so focusing excessively on the human 
element in the Nazi criminal would have detracted from the victim’s ability to fight back.  
The two goals of preservation of the community through the creation of a record 
and the preservation of the self by avoiding traumatic reality reinforced each other.  The 
tension indicated in the passages cited above is between two things: the diarist’s 
determination to leave a work behind documenting Nazi outrages and describing Jewish 
suffering that would form another chapter in their people’s history, and their individual 
need to evade the implications any commonalities they might share with the perpetrators 
might have implied. 
VII: Conclusion 
Any effort to find a reason or meaning in the persecution, or to discover humanity 
in the perpetrators, detracted from the Jewish victim’s ability to maintain the mental 
strength necessary to continue resistance.  Nevertheless, Emmanuel Ringelblum and Etty 
Hillesum each attempted some kind of critique of the perpetrator, even if it came in the 
form of linguistic turnings and swerves.  However, for some victims the trauma of daily 
life during the Holocaust was overwhelming.  For these individuals the thought of 
perpetrators and their motivations was too painful to acknowledge, and their diaries 
reveal a lacuna where the historian senses a perpetrator should be found.  The next 
chapter posits that the conspicuous absence of perpetrators in some diaries indicates a 
more profound withdrawal than Hillesum or Ringelblum present – a sort of mental 
“hunkering down.”  The absence of perpetrators can nevertheless be detected by careful 
examination of hints and intimations in the writer’s use of language.  By looking for these 
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clues, it is possible to see the disappearance of perpetrators from Holocaust diaries as a 
form of resistance as well.  
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Chapter 3: Absence 
 
Negation, Identification, and Suicide as Resistance 
 
“Out of a mad soul we forge a sane deed.” 
– Janusz Korczak, 30 March1937 
 
I: Introduction 
 
On 5 or 6 August 1942, an event took place in Poland that has since become the 
stuff of legend.1  That morning, Nazi authorities ordered the deportation of all of the 
children residing in the Warsaw Ghetto’s home for Jewish orphans.  All accounts agree 
that it was with quiet dignity and resignation that the director of the orphanage, Dr. 
Janusz Korczak, organized his 192 charges into rows and, holding one child by the hand 
and clutching another to his breast, walked with the children two miles to the 
Umschlagplatz, from whence cattle cars departed daily.2  Crowds of tearful people 
poured out onto the sidewalks as the children, carrying the green flag of “King Matt,” 
Korczak’s fictional monarch, and the blue flag with the Star of David went by.  Once at 
the Umschlagplatz, an SS officer, aware of Dr. Korczak’s prominence, offered him the 
option of staying behind, but Korczak brusquely waved the officer away.3  And so, after 
clipping the yellow Stars of David from their sleeves and leaving them strewn about the 
                                                 
1 Eyewitnesses disagree about which day it was. Some contend the deportation took place on 5 
August, some say it was the 6th.  The last date in Korczak’s diary is 4 August, but he did not always write 
everyday.  The question remains problematic only to the extent that we cannot positively say when these 
events transpired.  There is no doubt the events occurred on one of the two days.   
2 Betty Jean Lifton, The King of Children: A Biography of Janusz Korczak (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1988), p. 338-345.   
3 Joseph Hyams, A Field of Buttercups (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 251. 
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Umschlagplatz, the “Old Doctor,” as he was known, and his children silently boarded the 
train bound for Treblinka to the strains of Mendelssohn’s Requiem.4    The transport 
departed on schedule at 12:55pm.  Korczak and the children were never seen by Ghetto 
residents again.  They most likely perished in the gas chambers within hours of their 
arrival at the camp.5  
Korczak’s legend has grown over the years to near mythic proportions.  He is 
considered one of the greatest heroes of the Holocaust and in many quarters is practically 
regarded as a saint.  The “hagiography” on Korczak is large, particularly in Europe, and 
the “last march of the children” has been depicted by many playwrights and authors. 6   
What concerns us here is not the worshipful post-war literature that has developed in the 
years since that “last march,” but what Korczak himself may have thought about what 
was going on around him during the final weeks and months of his life.  By looking at 
Korczak’s own writings and the way he treated perpetrators in his diary, it is possible 
both to clarify the historical and psychological portrait of a complicated man and to 
                                                 
4 Hyams discusses the clipping of the yellow stars, something one of the Jewish policemen 
described as being like “a field of buttercups, p. 250.  Lifton describes a young musician being forced to 
play the Mendelssohn’s Requiem on his violin as the children boarded the train. Lifton, The King of 
Children, p. 344. 
5 These dates coincide with the high point of Treblinka’s killing capacity (Hyams claims that 
135,120 people were murdered there in the month of August – A Field of Buttercups, p. 253).  The 
Kommandant at the time, Dr. Irmfried Eberl had managed the project “poorly,” and in early August, the 
process of burying the corpses could not keep pace with the capacity of the gas chambers. Many years later, 
Franz Stangl, the man who replaced Eberl on August 24th claimed Treblinka at this time was like “the end 
of the world” – with mountains of corpses that filled the air with a stench for miles all around.  It is 
interesting that Stangl, who was not present during the murder of Korczak and the children, later became 
obsessed with them.  He discussed Korczak in an interview only hours before he died, and a book of 
Korczak’s fairy tales was found among his few personal effects.  See Gitta Sereny, Into that Darkness: An 
Examination of Conscience (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 363-365.   
6 Examples include Adir Cohen’s Gate of Light: Janusz Korczak, the Educator and Writer who 
Overcame the Holocaust (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickenson Press, 1994), Edith Biewend’s Lieben ohne 
Illusion: Leben und Werke des Janusz Korczaks (Heilbronn: E. Salzer Verlag, 1974), Rudolf Schridde’s 
Janusz Korczak: Leben und Wirken (Dortmund: Kulturamt der Stadt Dortmund, 1980).  In addition to these 
titles, the Library of Congress lists 68 others in Polish, Italian, Yiddish, Hebrew, German and English. 
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recognize that the “theatrical” nature of his last march tells us something about him and 
the means he chose to resist Nazi genocide.    
As we have seen, resistance did not always mean an armed uprising.  However, 
for some it could (and did) mean an internal struggle to preserve one’s dignity, integrity 
and culture.  Some resisted in and through their efforts to leave a record of atrocities 
behind.  By closely examining Korczak’s own writings it is possible to see inward 
defense mechanisms morph and become outward, actual resistance to Nazi atrocity.7 
Korczak’s biographers explain his internal defenses used early in life, but his Ghetto 
diaries reveal how Korczak used suicide and drama as a final form of defiance.  At 
different times, Korczak used every means at his disposal to protect himself and his 
children, and thereby defied the Nazis, even though, paradoxically, the final act of 
defiance did not actually save any lives.  
Although, in the end, Korczak could not save any lives, he was able to salvage 
many things he valued.  It is true that his propensity toward narcissism and self-
aggrandizement (which we will see below) meant that he focused much of his energy on 
preserving his own personal dignity and reputation.  However, it would be a mistake to 
assume that the spectacle he arranged was purely for his own benefit.  In the long term, 
though he could not save the children’s lives, Korczak was able to maintain the children’s 
                                                 
7 Even though Korczak’s final means of resistance was a form of suicide as well, there is a large 
literature that supports classifying suicide as a form of resistance. As Emil Fackenheim has said, “Jews 
committing suicide did so far less frequently out of self-loathing than out of despair or self-respect.” In 
“The Spectrum of Resistance during the Holocaust: An Essay in Description and Definition,” Modern 
Judaism, vol. 2, no. 2 (May 1982), p. 120.  Yael Zerubavel also points out that, for Jews, suicide as 
resistance as well as martyrdom goes back at least as far as the events at Masada in 73 A.D. “The Death of 
Memory and the Memory of Death: Masada and the Holocaust as Historical Metaphors” in 
Representations, no. 45 (Winter 1994), p. 74-77.  Individual and mass suicides were not uncommon in 
other cultures faced with a more powerful enemy and a lack of alternatives.  See William D. Piersen’s 
discussion of Olaudah Equiano’s writings in “White Cannibals, Black Martyrs: Fear, Depression, and 
Religious Faith as Causes of Suicide among New Slaves,” in The Journal of Negro History, vol. 62, no. 2 
(April 1977), p. 147-159. 
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memory and individuality as well as the idea of childhood innocence itself.  By drawing 
attention to this innocence, he starkly accentuated the injustice of the Nazi’s genocidal 
actions.  It could be argued that these things Korczak salvaged were of no practical use to 
the children in their last hours, and that they might be incidental to Korczak’s own goals 
of preserving his sense of importance.  I do not believe this, however.  In the short term, 
by staying with the children, Korczak (who manifestly did not care about his own life) 
was able to give the children something concrete to cling to – his own comfortable and 
familiar presence in their lives, right up to the very end. 
II: The Use of Language to Describe Genocide 
I argued in chapters I and II that writers used different techniques when 
attempting to communicate the reality of the Holocaust to their readers.  Some felt no 
qualms about describing the actions of perpetrators in writing.  Others tried to find a 
middle path between ignoring perpetrators and confronting them head on.  Some of the 
diarists I have discussed resorted to using linguistic mechanisms like metaphor, 
synecdoche, and jokes to partially conceal their persecutors – and to express meanings 
that might not be readily apparent upon a cursory reading of the sources.  Others, like 
Janusz Korczak, however, could not bear to allow the perpetrator into their writings – at 
least any more than was possible given the events transpiring around them.  
It has been suggested that one reason Nazis might not appear in diaries is that, in 
everyday, practical terms, the victims did not have much actual contact with perpetrators 
and so might not have thought about them that much.8  As discussed in the introduction, 
however, this argument seems unlikely.  It is important to recognize that perpetrators, 
                                                 
8 I would like to thank Professor Bernard Wasserstein of the University of Chicago for bringing 
this possibility to my attention again in a personal interview on 31 March 2006. 
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whether in full-view or as part of the background, were a part of diarists’ lives at the 
time.  Indeed, they were the one unavoidable fact of the victim’s existence, and it seems 
inexplicable for them not to show up at least as a kind of antagonistic imaginary.  In fact, 
for perpetrators not to appear (or to appear minimally) should give readers pause and 
make them wonder at this apparent aporia or paradox in Holocaust diaries: namely that 
the people who represented the most concrete fact in these writer’s world fail to appear in 
writings which were created for the purpose of leaving a record of Nazi cruelty and 
atrocity behind. In Korczak’s case, the record clearly establishes that he dealt with 
Germans personally and directly on at least several occasions.  The relative absence of 
perpetrators in his diary is therefore not the result of his ignorance of perpetrators 
individually or as a group9.  It must mean something else. Another reason for this 
omission might be that the diary was one final place of control and autonomy – a haven 
in which the elimination of the perpetrator represented a last stand against an implacable 
enemy.  If this is the case, the exclusion of perpetrators in Holocaust diaries is another 
form of resistance, much like the use of metaphors and tropes seen in the previous 
chapter, and should be analyzed as such.   
The type of language with which they chose to communicate is the only means by 
which we can understand writers of Holocaust diaries today.  There were as many styles 
as there were diarists, but they shared one common aspect.  They were all in some way 
trying to come to terms with what Charlotte Delbo called “l’inconcevable.”10  As we have 
seen so far, victims alternately described perpetrators in what I call “journalistic” or 
                                                 
9 In a diary that is, today in its published form, composed of roughly 111 typed pages, spanning, 
off and on, more than two years, Korczak only mentioned perpetrators four times. 
10 Charlotte Delbo, Auschwitz and After (translated by Rosette C. Lamont, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1995), p. x. 
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“photographic” terms – eliminating an analytic component – or they transformed them 
through the use of tropic devices into metaphors symbolically representing something 
more than mere individuals.  In some diaries, victims ignored perpetrators almost 
completely – negating them textually even as perpetrators were attempting to negate 
these authors physically.  While the act of writing and documenting Nazi actions is 
viewed by most scholars as an act of resistance, the diarist’s excision of perpetrators is 
highly significant and suggests an active and aggressive but not necessarily conscious 
form of mental resistance to Nazi genocide.  Janusz Korczak’s writings seem to be a case 
in which the victim struggled to shut the perpetrator out of his mind, only to have him 
reappear one last time, but only when the need for defense mechanisms was obviated. 
In cases like Korczak’s, it seems likely that the negation of the Nazi perpetrator 
was a form of psychological resistance to the trauma the victim endured.  It is considered 
a truism among Holocaust historians that a multiplicity of psychological mechanisms 
existed whereby Nazis were able to dehumanize their victims, and therefore distance 
themselves from them.  It does not seem far-fetched then, to look within gaps or absences 
in the diaries (where one would expect to find accusation, recrimination, hate, fear or 
other emotions directed at the perpetrator),  for psychological mechanisms used by 
victims to dehumanize and negate perpetrators. In fact, it is possible to speculate that this 
dehumanization or negation of the hostile “Other” was helpful, if not necessary, to the 
continued functioning and mental health of those diarists as they struggled to survive.  
For example, in every diary examined in this thesis, the authors try to establish some kind 
of distance – whether through direct aggression, resort to dehumanizing metaphors, or by 
holding the perpetrators at arms length by sticking to a strictly factual style.  The only 
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exception to this is Janusz Korczak’s final entry, which will be discussed in greater detail 
below.  
  In Korczak’s case, the collapse of these interior defense mechanisms, as 
indicated by his final diary entry, seems to have led to a final symbolic volley directed at 
the perpetrators once the possibility of survival was all but extinguished.  When Korczak 
became aware that he had no way out, or that there were no choices left that were 
acceptable to him, interior defense mechanisms became obsolete, and freed him to act in 
a way that performed several important functions.  First, his actions preserved his dignity, 
and that of his children, by interfering with the Nazi goal of transforming them from 
people into objects.  Second, these actions prevented his children from becoming just 
another mass of anonymous victims, thereby preserving some of the individuality the 
Nazis were trying to take from them.  It is precisely because of the decisions Korczak 
made during those last frantic hours that the obliteration, or negation, the Nazis 
envisioned for their victims was not entirely successful in the case of the orphans in his 
care.11   
Korczak’s diary is a valuable tool because it helps historians establish the logic of 
his actions that final morning – actions which followed, at least to some degree, from the 
thoughts he expressed in writing.  For the Nazis, genocide meant more than just murder.  
It meant that victims were objectified and stripped of their individuality before they were 
subjected to the cold disgrace of an anonymous death.  The “final march” of Korczak’s 
                                                 
11 Of course, in the most fundamental sense, the Nazis were successful – Korczak and the children 
died, naked and degraded, with hundreds of others in the gas chambers at Treblinka.  However, it could be 
argued that from a more historical perspective that Korczak accomplished a great deal.  In an environment 
in which death was not only familiar, but ubiquitous, the doctor succeeded in indelibly engraving the 
memory of these particular individuals into the minds of those who were present to the extent that today 
they remain both tragic exemplars of the Holocaust, as well as individuals whose singularity is preserved as 
well.  Romcia, Szymonek, Giena, Eva, Halinka, Jakub, Leon, and so many others are not anonymous 
numbers because Korczak did what he did.  Lifton, The King of Children, p. 340. 
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children, while it did not prevent death, prevented the complete success of Nazi intent – 
something Korczak foresaw - and this is why it was such a profound act of resistance. 
III: Silence 
What was left unwritten in Holocaust diaries can be as important as what was 
committed to the page.  There are several reasons why diarists might have left 
perpetrators out of their writings: perhaps they wanted to create a record of Jewish life, 
not Jewish death.   Or maybe the perpetrators’ actions, presence, or even existence 
constituted a threat so dire that the writer found it necessary to avoid mentioning them at 
all costs.  While historians can envision a broad spectrum of possibilities, the evidence 
indicates that on many occasions these reactions were protective and represented a type 
of psychological resistance to Nazi genocide.   
Historians, theologians, philosophers, and others who study the destruction of the 
European Jews, have been divided about the nature of Holocaust testimony.  It is 
generally contended that victims of the Holocaust experienced a reality so far outside the 
bounds of normal human experience that it exceeds the capacity for imagination or 
comprehension for those David Rousset called “normal men.”  In other words, some 
assert that language cannot convey the meaning of extreme situations like torture, atrocity 
and genocide.  In this sense, Holocaust diaries are problematic because they are 
attempting to tell us something we cannot, and could never, understand.  Some have even 
suggested that silence is the best response to the caesura represented by the reality of 
Auschwitz.12  Lawrence Langer clearly recognized the paucity of language when he 
                                                 
12 For example in Irving Greenberg’s assertion, quoted in the essay “Where is God Now?”, that 
“no statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in the presence of the 
burning children,” in John K. Roth and Michael Berenbaum (eds.), Holocaust: Religious & Philosophical 
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asserted that “the human need…to see the Holocaust as some kind of continuum in the 
spiritual history of man repeatedly stumbles over the limits of language, to say nothing of 
the limits of traditional moral theory.”13   
This approach has been critiqued for clouding what is essentially an historical 
occurrence which should be subject to the same rules and methodologies as other events. 
For instance, scholars like Christian Maier have pointed out that while the Holocaust may 
not be completely comprehensible, it is explainable.14  This analysis of Janusz Korczak’s 
diary acknowledges the problem of comprehension yet still attempts to interrogate, or 
probe, those boundaries of representation – or in the case of the absence of perpetrators, 
the boundaries and meanings of a strategy of representation through un-representation. In 
this way, it is possible to respond to Giorgio Agamben’s assertion that philosophers and 
historians need to find a way out of the impasse in which the urge to understand meets 
the “incomprehensible” nature of genocidal reality.15  
The events Korczak bore witness to were to some degree beyond comprehension, 
even to him.  But looking carefully at his writings allows us to see that it is precisely in 
the gaps in the narrative, especially those gaps that seem as if they should contain 
perpetrators, that he is telling us something – both about incomprehensibility and about 
genocidal reality.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Implications (New York: Paragon House, 1989), p. 262.  Theodor Adorno also famously remarked “after 
Auschwitz, to write a poem is barbaric,” although he recognized later that he may have phrased the 
sentiment incorrectly. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (translated by E.B. Ashton, New York: 
Seabury Press, 1973). 
13 Lawrence Langer in “The Dilemma of Choice in the Deathcamps,” in John K. Roth and Michael 
Berenbaum (eds.), Holocaust: Religious & Philosophical Implications (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 
p. 228. 
14 Christian Meier, From Athens to Auschwitz: The Uses of History, translated by Deborah Lucas 
Schneider (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 137-169. 
15 Giorgio Agamben comments in Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (translated 
by Daniel Heller-Roazen, New York: Zone Books, 2002) that “some want to understand too much and too 
quickly; they have explanations for everything.  Others refuse to understand; they offer only cheap 
mystifications.  The only way forward lies in investigating the space between these two options.” p. 13. 
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  Although Lawrence Langer is skeptical about how much truth can be understood 
about the Holocaust through any medium, he has also remarked that  
When fantasies become literally true, the artist, the writer, must record a 
reality that has become the expression of the impossible, at the same time 
convincing his audience that whatever distortions he employs do not 
negate, but clarify [Langer’s emphasis] reality and subject it to an 
illuminating metamorphosis.16 
  
Korczak’s negation of perpetrators only seems to be a distortion when in fact this strategy 
most accurately reflects the experience he was living.  It is not that perpetrators were not 
on his mind, it is that their existence was being mediated or repressed in a way that 
allowed Korczak to function more easily.  
Giorgio Agamben recognized that absence is a prominent, indeed unavoidable, 
element of the unthinkable nature of the Nazi genocide when he wrote,  
at a certain point, it became clear [to me] that testimony contained at its 
core an essential lacuna; in other words, the survivors bore witness to 
something it is impossible to bear witness to.  As a consequence, 
commenting on survivors’ testimony necessarily meant interrogating this 
lacuna or, more precisely, attempting to listen to it.17   
 
Interrogating these lacunae can prove a very difficult task for the historian, who must try 
to reconstruct an event or a mentality based upon hints and clues obtained through the 
study of the context in which the lacuna appears.  The essence of Holocaust diaries is that 
they narrate portions of journeys (which were never identical) from life to death, and tell 
us something about the stages people pass through on the way.18 It is therefore possible to 
see the relative absence of perpetrators in Korczak’s diary in two distinct ways.19  First, 
                                                 
16 Lawrence Langer, The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1975), p. 24. 
17 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 13. 
18 Obviously, by definition, there are no “Muselmänner diaries.” 
19 Agamben reformulates Foucault’s dictum that the nature of sovereignty is such that it has the 
power to “make die and let live.”  He argues that in the creation of the Muselmann, the Nazis exercised 
complete control by having the power to “make live and let die.”  Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 82-
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the lacuna itself – the absence of perpetrators in these diaries – displays the victim’s 
comprehension of the genocidal dynamic and even suggests a kind of reversal of roles.  
In Korczak’s diary, the “Old Doctor” and his orphans are not nameless or numberless 
“non-humans.”  Rather, it is the Nazi perpetrator who is now subject to this effacement.  
This reversal represents a form of resistance in which the victim exercises a form of 
imaginary control, not only over his or her own life, but over that of his persecutors as 
well.  Second, if it is correct to surmise that victims passed through stages on the path to 
becoming the nameless “drowned,” then it is possible to see Holocaust diaries in general 
as the articulation of resistance to being placed in a position in which death or 
“drowning’ was the pre-ordained outcome.  Moreover, one would expect that as 
individuals passed through the various stages toward the silence the Nazis intended for 
them, there would be corresponding changes in the form their testimony takes.  Clearly 
Korczak’s testimony changes over time.  
We can see, in the development of Korczak’s treatment of perpetrators, a growing 
awareness of what we might call the “dynamics of genocide.” When these suspicions 
became certainties, Korczak’s inward mechanisms of defense were no longer necessary, 
and he took direct action against the Nazis in the form of a highly theatrical suicide.  This 
“suicide” was clearly a kind of outward resistance to genocide – one which assured that 
Korczak (and the children) would not submit silently or anonymously to the fate their 
persecutors had decreed for them.  In other words, Korczak was exercising his will, or 
volition, to halt the progression or downward spiral that Agamben discusses – though the 
price remained his life and the lives of those he loved.   
                                                                                                                                                 
83.  See also “Right of Death and Power of Life” in The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, vol. I by 
Michel Foucault (translated by Robert Hurley, New York: Vintage Books, 1990), p. 135-159. 
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This is not to say that there is a direct correlation between the stage of 
dehumanization in which all victims found themselves and the kind of diary they wrote.  
While those on the verge of “drowning” may have been alike in their emptiness and 
degradation, the authors of diaries were not (yet); and they responded to their 
environment in different ways. However, I believe that the relative absence of 
perpetrators in Holocaust diaries like Korczak’s is significant and that it is only by 
“listening to” this lacuna that the historian is better able to understand the context in 
which these documents of atrocity were written.  The choices Korczak made about how 
to respond to the Nazi goal of reducing him to something less than human tells us a great 
deal about the limits of control and about the dynamics of genocide. 
Primo Levi spoke of levels of understanding, and he knew that those who 
survived to write about Nazi genocide and what took place in the concentration camps 
had not “fathomed them to the bottom.”20  The diaries we have examined thus far are 
different, however. In almost every case except for that of Abel Herzberg – from that of 
Éva Heyman, Hannah Senesh and Dawid Sierakowiak who wrote explicitly of 
perpetrators, to that of Emmanuel Ringelblum and Etty Hillesum, who wrote of them 
both realistically and metaphorically – the authors ultimately did fathom Nazi genocide to 
the bottom, and were murdered in by starvation, firing squads or in the gas chambers.  
These diaries are all the writings of the “drowned,” not the “saved.”  They were written in 
transit, as it were.  The case of Janusz Korczak is no exception.  And, although a message 
from the “bottom” is naturally impossible (dead men and women tell no tales), it seems 
important to get as close as we can to that moment-of-no-return if we are to move 
                                                 
20 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, (translated by Raymond Rosenthal, New York: 
Summit Books, 1986), p. 17. 
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forward in our understanding of the structure and effects of genocide, and comprehend 
more of what these diaries tell us about resistance.  
IV: Sources and Biographical Information  
 
Scholarly sources of information about Korczak are somewhat scarce in English 
language translations.  The primary source of our information about Korczak’s thoughts 
and feelings during the period in question is his Ghetto Diary, which was begun briefly in 
January of 1940, but then set aside and taken up again from May to August, 1942.21 This 
diary represents our closest glimpse into the mind of a man who was clearly aware of the 
dangers besetting him and the children he cared for.  And, it is worth noting pursuant to 
our discussion of absence and silence that although Korczak had contact with Nazis and 
was even imprisoned at one point (at the end of November, 1941) by the Gestapo for not 
wearing his armband, he seemed to go out of his way to ignore those perpetrators who 
accounted for so much of the misery he saw around him during the period in which he 
was writing.  
In addition to the Ghetto Diary, Korczak’s beloved children’s book, King Matt the 
First, published in Poland in 1923, is a kind of primary source as well.  The title 
character, King Matt, is clearly a stand-in for Korczak in the same way Peter Pan is a 
stand-in for the writer J.M. Barrie.  Korczak admits this much himself in the introduction 
to the book when he discusses the use of his own photograph as a young boy of about ten 
on the frontispiece of the novel.  He directs his remarks to the children he hopes will read 
the book and says to them, 
                                                 
21 See Igor Newerly’s “Preface” to Janusz Korczak’s Ghetto Diary (New York: Holocaust Library, 
1978), p. 67. 
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When I was the little boy you see in the photograph, I wanted to do all the 
things that are in this book.  But I forgot to, and now I’m old.  I no longer 
have the time or the strength to go to war or travel to the land of the 
cannibals.  I have included this photograph because it’s important what I 
looked like when I truly wanted to be a king, and not when I was writing 
about King Matt.22 
 
Although the novel was written long before the events of the Holocaust, it still contains 
many of the same images and sentiments apparent in Korczak’s wartime diary.  This 
means that through a comparison of these two very disparate sources we can to trace 
some of the themes of Korczak’s life that were independent of the trauma caused by Nazi 
genocide and aggression – particularly Korczak’s emphasis on a “good death.” 
Two final sources of information, Joseph Hyams 1968 biography, A Field of 
Buttercups, which focuses on those last few months in the ghetto, and Betty Jean Lifton’s 
1988 full-length biography, The King of Children, though not primary, supplement King 
Matt, and allow us to understand some of the basic threads and common themes of 
Korczak’s life.  They therefore help us make some critical conclusions about the more 
enigmatic points in the Ghetto Diary, especially about how Korczak could, at the very 
end, set aside internal defense mechanisms and seize upon a much more direct, though 
suicidal, assault upon his Nazi persecutors in the form of his final, dramatic “march” 
through the streets of the ghetto and his insistence upon dying with his children.     
Korczak was born Henryk Goldszmit in 1878 or 1879 – he did not know which 
year – to an assimilated Jewish family in Warsaw.  The first concrete fact of young 
Henryk’s existence was his father’s wild, unpredictable, and sometimes violent behavior.  
Over time it became increasingly clear that the elder Goldszmit suffered from serious 
mental illness which was perhaps related to syphilis.  Henryk’s mother was actually 
                                                 
22 Janusz Korczak, King Matt the First (translated by Richard Lourie, Chapel Hill: Algonquin 
Books of Chapel Hill, 2004), p. 1. 
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afraid to leave her son alone with his father.23  As a result, Henryk was raised by his 
overprotective mother and grandmother – that “stern regiment of women,” as he would 
later call it.24  
Henryk studied medicine in Warsaw and became a pediatrician.  During his years 
in school, he wrote for several Polish language newspapers.25  It was at this time that he 
adopted the sobriquet “Janusz Korczak’ – the name he continued to use throughout the 
remainder of his life.  During the Russo-Japanese War he served as a military doctor – a 
role he was to reprise in 1914 during the Great War.  From 1911 onward, he also served 
as the director of an orphanage for Jewish children on Krochmalna Street in Warsaw.  It 
was during this time that Korczak became well known in his home country and even 
throughout Eastern Europe for his creative work as a pedagogue and his books of 
humorous and humane advice for raising children.  He even had his own talk radio 
program called “Ask the Old Doctor” in Warsaw.  His fame was not limited, however, to 
his homeland and his works on education made him something of a celebrity during his 
visits to Palestine in the mid-30s.   
Korczak’s father’s erratic behavior and propensity toward violence instilled a 
lifelong fear of both madness and sex in his son.  Korczak never married and never had a 
sexual relationship to the best of anyone’s knowledge, because he regarded sex as 
“dangerous, unhealthy and undignified.”26  In addition to his fear of madness and 
sexuality, he was also obsessed with death and suicide throughout his life.  This too may 
have been rooted in his relationship with his father, who died, most likely by his own 
                                                 
23 Lifton, The King of Children, p. 27. 
24 Lifton, The King of Children, p. 14. 
25 He continued writing in Polish for the remainder of his life, occasionally garnering the ire of the 
Jewish community, some of whom thought it would be more appropriate if he wrote in Yiddish. 
26 These are Korczak’s own words, quoted by Lifton in The King of Children, p. 27.   
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hand, in 1896.27  When Korczak’s mother passed away in late 1919 or early 1920 during 
a typhus epidemic, he was even prompted to suggest a suicide pact to his sister.  His early 
writings contain poems like “Ah, let me die / Ah, don’t let me live / Ah, let me descend 
into my dark grave!”  Lifton suggests that the frequency of writings of this type indicates 
that he may have suffered from severe depression throughout his life.28  Following his 
mother’s death, Korczak also began keeping mercuric chloride and morphine in his 
drawer at all times.  He is known to have visited her grave with these pills and may have 
even attempted suicide at one point around 1920.29  Although it is not certain that he 
attempted suicide, the possibility is suggested by the experiential tone of comments in his 
diary that “nothing is more loathsome than an unsuccessful attempt at suicide…this sort 
of plan should be worked out so as to insure certainty of success.”30 Korczak seems to 
have been repeatedly tempted to end his life over a period of many years, although he 
protested later that “having once tried the delights and joys of committing suicide, a man 
lives to an advanced old age without the temptation to try again.”31 
An obsession not just with death, but with a “good death” also seems to have 
preoccupied Korczak.  At a funeral for his good friend and mentor, Waclaw Nalkoski, 
Korczak delivered the eulogy.  In a speech that seems to have echoed his own hopes for 
the type of “good death” for which he longed, he said 
A happy man died – a man who lived the way he wanted, and died the way 
he wanted, in a hospital bed.  He was not killed by those who today, like 
cowards sing his praise.  He was not killed by those who lived and got fat 
                                                 
27 Lifton, The King of Children, p. 29. 
28 Lifton, The King of Children, p. 30.  
29 It cannot be determined with any degree of certainty when this might have happened, but from 
accounts of Korczak’s depression at the time of his mother’s death, it seems possible it occurred sometime 
in early 1920 (if it occurred at all) while the grief was fresh in his mind. Lifton, The King of Children, p. 
103. 
30 From an entry of 15 May, 1942. Ghetto Diary, p. 111. 
31 Lifton, The King of Children, p. 103. 
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eating the crumbs of his thought.  He was not killed by those who could not 
see his greatness.  He did not fight any of them.  He merely dismissed them 
with a toss of his head.32    
 
This passage is even echoed in his books for children and points to some of the things 
Korczak valued or wished for: happiness, freedom, acclaim and recognition, and 
greatness.33  All accounts of Korczak’s last march demonstrate that he followed this 
formula very closely.  In the end, that final, quixotic act seems very much to be the 
symbolic equivalent of the “dismissal” with the “toss of his head.”  In a diary entry dated 
21 July 1942, as life rapidly disintegrated around him, he wrote again about his wish for a 
good, or beautiful death, though he clearly does not envision his death (or his children’s) 
as a collective experience at this time.  He wrote: 
It is a difficult thing to be born and to learn to live.  Ahead of me is a 
much easier task: to die.  After death, it may be difficult again, but I am 
not bothered about that.  The last year, month or hour.  I should like to die 
consciously, in possession of my faculties.  I don’t know what I should say 
to the children by way of farewell.  I should want to make clear to them 
only this – that the road is theirs to choose, freely.34   
 
A final important trait of Korczak’s is his apparent sense of mission or self-
importance.  As with the other aspects of his psychology, this too seems as if it can be 
traced back partially to his father, who, though he often treated his son very poorly, was 
extremely proud of a letter of blessing he received from the Chief Rabbi of Paris on the 
occasion of Henryk’s birth.  This letter told the elder Goldszmit “your son will be a great 
man of Israel.”35  This may have just been a kindly sentiment on the part of the Rabbi, but 
                                                 
32 Lifton, The King of Children, p. 64. 
33 Korczak has King Matt say to a friend at the end of the novel, “’Don’t cry, Klu Klu, we’ll die a 
beautiful death.  And then people will stop saying that kings only declare wars but don’t die fighting like 
soldiers.’  To die a hero’s death was Matt’s only desire.  Then suddenly he wondered: What kind of funeral 
will my enemies give me?” As mentioned above, the character of King Matt seems to speak directly for 
Korczak. Korczak, King Matt the First, p. 317. 
34 Korczak, Ghetto Diary, p. 175. 
35 Lifton, The King of Children, p. 14. 
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the fact that the younger Goldszmit/Korczak kept the letter his entire life suggests that he 
attached considerable importance to it.  This tendency to view himself as important, 
combined with his lifelong role not only as a physician, but as a public personality and a 
symbol of “children’s rights” throughout Poland, Palestine and Eastern Europe, point to 
his embrace of and identification with a style of living that was at least as much 
performative as it was genuine.36  
As we will see, the life-long importance he attached to fame (he acknowledges 
wishing to be a king in King Matt) was exacerbated by the genocidal situation in which 
he wrote the Ghetto Diary. There is also no doubt that Korczak relied heavily on his 
authoritative public persona to mitigate the myriad disasters that befell the orphaned 
children of the Warsaw Ghetto on a nearly daily basis.  But he did so at a cost.  When his 
prestige and prominence were no longer enough to earn him the respect he felt was his 
due, the old depression and suicidal thoughts came flooding back in.37  It is certain, then, 
that Korczak brought a considerable amount of psychological baggage, as well as 
personal history with him into the traumatic environment of the ghetto – where traumatic 
conditions no doubt accentuated both good and bad characteristics. Korczak was an 
individual devoted to children (often to the exclusion of adults).  He was also someone 
who fought for children’s rights and for their safety.  However, at the same time, he was 
chronically depressed, perhaps frequently suicidal, not to mention someone whose 
personality contained narcissistic and self-important elements. 
                                                 
36 Lifton describes Korczak as “a utopian and yet pragmatic figure,” one who “behaved as if he 
had a divine calling.” Lifton, The King of Children, p. 4-5. 
37 Frequent self-deprecating remarks by Korczak seem to indicate his wry sense of humor as well 
as a kind of false humility.  Korczak remained confident in the power of his own name to ward off harm 
until almost the very end. 
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When the Nazis invaded Poland and formed the Warsaw Ghetto in 1940, 
Korczak’s orphanage was moved inside the ghetto walls.  As a prominent personality, he 
was well-known to other diarists and chroniclers of life in the ghetto like Michael 
Zylberberg, Chaim Kaplan, Emmanuel Ringelblum, and Adam Czerniakow, head of the 
Warsaw Judenrat.38  Korczak maintained a high profile throughout the duration of the 
ghetto’s existence, and he lobbied ceaselessly on behalf of his orphans.  As mentioned 
above, he and the children were sent to Treblinka on 5 or 6 August 1942. 
Fortunately for historians, the doctor left his diary lying next to his bed that 
morning.  Interestingly enough, he left his cracked glasses behind as well.  Perhaps it is 
reading too much into the historical record, but one wonders if Korczak perhaps left them 
behind because he wanted to indicate he had finally seen the way before him clearly, or 
conversely, that he felt there was nothing more to see.39  The diary was salvaged and 
taken to safety by Korczak’s friend Igor Newerly, and was first published in Polish in 
1956.  Over the years, Korczak’s legacy grew and he came to be regarded as one of the 
great heroes of the Holocaust – especially in Europe and Israel.  Today, his memory is 
revered by people all around the world. 
V: Suicide and Daydreams 
By analyzing Korczak’s depictions of perpetrators, we are able to get an 
impression of the way he felt about the Germans who invaded his country and threatened 
                                                 
38 Korczak is mentioned no less than six times in Czerniakow’s diary – always in favorable terms.  
Adam Czerniakow, The Warsaw Diary of Adam Czerniakow: Prelude to Doom (translated by Stanislaw 
Staron, edited by Raul Hilberg, Stanislaw Staron, and Josef Kermisz, New York, Stein and Day, 1979), p. 
102, 149, 197, 203, 208, 231.  In fact, Czerniakow and Korczak both shared an extraordinarily concern 
with the well-being of the ghetto’s children.  Lifton even suggests that the final provocation that led to 
Czerniakow’s suicide was the German order to deport Korczak’s children to Treblinka. Lifton, The King of 
Children, p. 328-29. 
39 Lifton, The King of Children, p. 347. 
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to take away his beloved children.  We are also able to surmise what kind of defense 
mechanisms he used to cope with life in the Ghetto and how they helped him cope with 
the everyday terror that threatened to break down his carefully composed public persona.  
Most importantly, we can see how his depictions of perpetrators changed over time as his 
situation became increasingly impossible. 
Korczak only spoke of Germans directly or indirectly on four occasions in his 
diary, and never before May 1942, a year and a half after the establishment of the 
Warsaw Ghetto.40  The first entry, dated 15 May 1942, does not discuss perpetrators 
explicitly but alludes to them in the description of a “daydream.”  Analysis of this 
passage requires the historian to follow Agamben’s advice to “listen” to the lacuna where 
the perpetrator should appear.  This passage is the most concrete example of an 
“absence” that indicates a kind of “representation through non-representation.” It also 
reinforces the idea that Korczak was obsessed with suicide yet avoided the prospect of his 
own negation or absence by resorting to fantasy. Therefore, Korczak’s first entry in his 
diary pertaining to perpetrators stands apart from all the others and goes directly to our 
discussion of absence and silence.  Not only does the passage recapitulate the themes of 
Korczak’s life in many ways (fear of madness, narcissism, and preoccupation with 
suicide), but it also demonstrates a way in which he was able to confront his enemies in a 
grand manner in keeping with his sense of self-importance.  
We know that in real life Korczak was unafraid of standing up for himself or 
those he loved. 41  In King Matt, the protagonist (Korczak’s stand-in) repeatedly takes on 
                                                 
40 The Ghetto was established on 16 October 1940 by order of Hans Frank, the Governor-General 
of the Nazi Generalgouvernement. 
41 When confronted with a situation that threatened his orphans, Korczak could be quite 
aggressive.  On one occasion when the supply of potatoes to the orphanage was confiscated, Korczak 
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the world in an attempt to realize positive changes.  This fictional stance as well as l 
actions we know he took in real life seems to indicate that Korczak wished to confront his 
enemies and did so both physically and through his writing.  At the same time, he had 
learned from the incident with the potatoes (see fn. 43) that an outright physical or verbal 
assault against the Nazis would most likely leave his children alone in a hostile world 
with very bleak prospects.  This passage provides an outlet for his hostility, while it also 
masks the extent of his rage.  Although I have quoted part of this passage before, I am 
repeating it in its entirety for the sake of clarity.  In this entry, written 15 May 1942, the 
doctor wrote  
There were years when I kept mercuric chloride and morphine pills 
hidden in the far corner of a drawer.  I would take them out only when I 
went to my mother’s grave at the cemetery.  But since the start of the war, 
I have kept them in my pocket, and it’s interesting that they were not 
confiscated when I was searched in jail.. 
There can be nothing (no experience) more loathsome than an 
unsuccessful attempt at suicide.  This sort of plan should be fully matured 
so as to ensure absolute certainty of success. 
If I kept on postponing my otherwise fully thought-out plan, it was 
because always at the very last moment some new daydream would sweep 
me away and could not be abandoned before I worked it out in detail.  
These were something like themes for short stories.  I put them under a 
common heading of: “Oddities.” 
Thus: 
I have invented a machine (I made a detailed design of the whole 
mechanism).  Something in the nature of a microscope.  The scale – one 
hundred.  If I should turn the micrometer screw to ninety-nine, everything 
would die that did not contain at least one percent of humanity.  The 
amount of work was unbelievable.  I had to determine how many people 
(living beings) would go out of circulation each time, who would take 
their place, and what would be the outcome of such a purged tentative new 
life.  After a year’s deliberations (at night, of course) I came half way with 
the distillation.  Now the only people left were half-beasts, all others have 
perished.  How minutely, to the last detail I planned everything – the best 
proof that my own person was completely excluded from this peculiar 
                                                                                                                                                 
personally went to Gestapo headquarters to protest – an action which luckily only cost him a month in 
prison.   
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system.  By a mere turn of the micrometer screw of my ‘microscope’ I 
could have taken my own life.  What then? 
I confess with some embarrassment that I return to this theme 
today, too, on the more difficult nights.  Nights in prison have produced 
the most interesting chapters of my tale. 
There were about a dozen of these daydreams in the workshop to 
choose from. 
Thus…I have found the magic word.  I am the ruler of the light.42 
 
The first paragraph of this passage reconfirms Korczak’s long-term obsession 
with suicide.  It also gives us some additional information about his state of mind.  
Initially, the doctor kept the pills in a separate location apart from his person, except 
during visits to his mother’s grave.  Before the war, the suicide tablets seem symbolic – a 
sign of his loss and grief indeed, but a loss and grief that was manageable.  This state of 
affairs changed once the war began, and Korczak prepared to end his life at any moment. 
  In his diary, he expressed surprise that the pills were not taken from him in jail, 
but he did not immediately address the more perplexing question of why he did not take 
him then.  Perhaps this is because, as he stated in the second paragraph, he found 
unsuccessful suicide attempts “loathsome” – and one made in jail would allow for too 
many factors beyond his control.  For Korczak, at this point in his life, suicide was no 
longer about emotion, as it was when he proposed the suicide pact to his sister; it was 
about rationality – a sane response to the insane world he saw around him.  This is why in 
the third paragraph he explicitly stated that his suicide plan was fully worked-out.  Why 
then did he not go through with it?  The answer was contained in the power of 
“daydreams” that occupied Korczak’s troubled mind. 
As a physician and an intellectual familiar with the writing of Sigmund Freud, 
Korczak recognized and acknowledged that “daydreams” represented repressed wishes.  
                                                 
42 Korczak, Ghetto Diary, p. 111-112. 
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In fact, Lifton quotes the doctor as saying “Feelings that have no other outlet become 
daydreams.  And daydreams become the internal script of life.  If we knew how to 
interpret them, we would find they come true, but not always in the way we expect.”43  It 
appears that Korczak’s daydreams performed several functions with respect to his mental 
condition.  First, they expressed a wish.  Secondly, and more importantly, they performed 
the function of keeping him alive precisely because the daydream “sweeps [him] away” 
from imminent thoughts of suicide.44  
What then is the nature of this particular daydream and what does it tell us about 
Korczak’s feelings about perpetrators?  The daydream itself is somewhat ambiguous.  
Korczak obviously did not really invent a machine, and it is doubtful that he actually 
drew designs.  This is our first clue that he is narrating the episode as it occurred over and 
over only in his mind.  The killing machine he “invents” is based upon a microscope.  It 
is not surprising that a doctor would envision a scientific instrument, but it is illustrative 
to point out that rationalization of mass-murder through an appeal to and use of science is 
exactly the approach taken by Nazis in the development of the “Final Solution”45  How 
does Korczak determine who he is going to kill?  It is again through a “rational” resort to 
                                                 
43 Lifton, The King of Children, p. 15. 
44 Paragraph 3, block quote immediately above. 
45 The German word for “Final Solution” (Endlösung) itself expresses a technological point of 
view – the “Jewish Question” is a “problem” to be “solved.”  Also, there can be no doubt that technological 
innovations inspired by the Nazi medical community contributed to the German capability to commit 
genocide – whether the development of gas vans and gas chambers or the “thanatological” experiments 
performed by Nazi doctors.  See Götz Aly, Peter Chroust and Christian Pross, Cleansing the Fatherland: 
Nazi Medicine and Racial Hygiene (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Michael Burleigh, 
Death and Deliverance: ‘Euthanasia’ in Germany 1900-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), Michael Burleigh, Ethics and Extermination: Reflections on Nazi Genocide (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997); Henry Friedlander, The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final 
Solution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); James M. Glass, “Life Unworthy of 
Life”: Racial Phobia and Mass Murder in Hitler’s Germany (New York: Basic Books, 1997); Robert Jay 
Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 
1986); John J. Michalczyk (ed.), Medicine, Ethics and the Third Reich: Historical and Contemporary 
Issues (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1994) and Robert N. Proctor, Racial Hygiene: Medicine Under the 
Nazis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988). 
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numbers and percentages.  He begins by making the sweeping, though egalitarian, 
assumption that everyone is made up of certain parts “human” and certain parts “beast” – 
and more importantly that these differences can be differentiated and measured.  This 
enables him to construct a “machine” that can be set to kill anyone composed of more 
than a certain percentage “beast.”  Korczak is the one who gets to determine this 
percentage – something which confers upon him all the power in the world, and which 
indicates profound narcissism.  In his daydream he proceeds about this task rationally, as 
a scientist and a physician.  Just like a scientist, he clearly has to take into consideration 
many factors – such as what human life will look like with so much “beast” expunged 
from it and how much “beast” he should allow to remain.   
Even as Korczak proceeds scientifically about his experiment, he is also 
profoundly aware of the irrationality at the heart of his project.  It is obvious that he 
originally comes up with this “daydream” in jail (“Nights in prison have produced the 
most interesting chapters of my tale”).  The dream also causes him “embarrassment.”  If 
it made sense, then it would not shame him.  This passage clearly expresses rage, but the 
target of this anger is carefully concealed.  This is an obvious example of one of the 
lacunae Agamben discussed.  By listening carefully to it, we can infer that the rage that 
drove him to these wishful daydreams was directed at the people who put him in a 
powerless position – the Nazis.  This “daydream,” which Korczak himself understood as 
a repressed wish, clearly indicates aggression and hostility toward perpetrators (without 
whom there would be no need for his “machine”).  The doctor is clearly aware of the 
faulty logic of his proposition.  He knows that if he takes it upon himself to decide who is 
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human and who is “beast,” he is no better than those he murders, and hence he is as much 
“beast” as they are (and so it is important that he remain outside of the system).   
What we have here then, in at least some sense, is Korczak appropriating Nazi 
methods (the scientific rationalization of mass-murder), their “logic” (minus the racial 
overtones), their language (“out of circulation” is as much a euphemism as “special 
treatment”), and their goals (the elimination of those who are not “human”).  Korczak’s 
fantasy is one of domination and control and an attempt psychologically to make up for 
his feelings of powerlessness.  This can also be ascertained from the enigmatic last 
paragraph (“I have found the magic word.  I am the ruler of the light”).  What exactly he 
meant by this is uncertain, but Korczak himself had claimed in the past to have looked to 
Germany “for light and knowledge.”46  If we read the passage this way (“I am the ruler of 
Germany/Germans”) it makes perfect sense.  Locked in a jail cell in Warsaw on the 
orders of the Gestapo, Korczak fantasizes about turning the tables and reorienting the 
positions of victim and perpetrator. 
The ironic thing about this passage, however, is that it is only by adopting the sort 
of logic of murder and genocide employed by perpetrators that Korczak is able to refrain 
from committing suicide.  It was with catastrophic results that Nazi fantasies about Jews 
came true.  Korczak’s fantasy is remarkably similar to Nazi fantasies, yet it served the 
positive purpose of keeping him alive.47  Without daydreams of this sort, he readily 
                                                 
46 Lifton, The King of the Children, p. 54 – a quote from a 1907 essay by Korczak “Impressions of 
Berlin.” 
47 One could say that Nazi fantasies served the same function: to distance perpetrators from their 
own actions and the humanity of their victims enough so that the “self” could be preserved intact even as 
genocide was committed.  That this dynamic was understood by the Nazi hierarchy is clear from Himmler’s 
famous Posen Speech of 4 October 1943. 
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admitted that he would have committed suicide.  Paradoxically then, murderous fantasy 
itself becomes a form of resistance to Nazi genocide.    
Fantasies of this type are apparently not rare. In a chapter on necrophilia in his 
book, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, psychologist Erich Fromm recorded the 
dream of one of his patients – one that is extraordinarily similar to Korczak’s.  Fromm’s 
patient says: 
 I have made a great invention, the ‘superdestroyer.’  It is a machine 
which, if one secret button is pushed that I alone know, can destroy all life 
in North America within the first hour, and within the next hour all life on 
earth.  I alone, knowing the formula of the chemical substance, can protect 
myself.” (Next scene) “I have pushed the button; I notice no more life, I 
am alone, I feel exuberant.48 
 
Fromm’s analysis of this case is short, almost curt.  He says 
 
This dream is an expression of pure destructiveness in an extremely 
narcissistic person, unrelated to others and with no need of anyone.  This 
was a recurrent dream with this person, together with other necrophilous 
dreams. He was suffering from severe mental sickness.49  
 
Ostensibly, this patient was not under duress when he described this dream, nor 
was he subject to any genocidal pressures.  It is interesting and illustrative, however, to 
compare this “extremely narcissistic” person’s dream with a daydream that Korczak 
described.  Was Korczak “suffering from severe mental illness?”  This does not seem to 
be the case.  As he mentioned himself, the daydream was protective and it was precisely 
by resorting to fantasies – “necrophilous” or otherwise – that he was able to cope with the 
traumatic environment of the Warsaw Ghetto.  It seems in Korczak’s case that an 
“expression of pure destructiveness” enabled him to continue to live and resist.  In this 
May entry, Korczak’s attitude toward perpetrators is hostile and aggressive, although 
                                                 
48 Erich Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1973), p. 
372. 
49 Fromm, p. 372. 
133 
 
suppressed (no individuals or nations are named).  His approach changes considerably by 
the next time he mentions them. 
VI: Identification and Denial 
The second passage, written 27 July 1942, only eleven days before the doctor and 
his children were sent to their deaths, represents Korczak’s only discussion of 
perpetrators specifically as Germans or Nazis.  It is striking because, in it, he adopts the 
voice and persona of a perpetrator. It is also notable because both its (seemingly 
defensive) naïveté, as well as the way it laid out the possibilities Korczak saw before him, 
including suicide and heroism. 
  The doctor was obviously trying to find some kind of logic or sense in his 
situation, and so, as if to clarify things to himself, he wrote about the meaning of the war 
from what he imagined to be the German point of view.  The passage displays an attempt 
at identification with the perpetrator which is clearly hampered by Korczak’s failure to 
comprehend the nature of Nazi intentions for Jews.  He wrote: 
We are running a giant enterprise.  Its name is war.  We work in a 
planned, disciplined manner, methodically.  Your [you Jews] petty 
interests, ambitions, sentiments, whims, claims, resentments, cravings do 
not concern us. 
Meanwhile, in order not to prolong the matter, things must get a bit rough 
and painful, and if I many put it that way, without particular precision, 
elegance or even scrupulousness.  Just roughly cut for current expediency. 
You yourself [the Jews] are longing to see all this over.  So are we.  
Therefore, don’t interfere. 
Jews go East.  No bargaining.  It is no longer the question of a 
Jewish grandmother but of where you are needed most – your hands, your 
brain, your time, your life.  Grandmother.  This was necessary only to 
hook you on to something, a key, a slogan.   
You say you cannot go East – you will die there. So, choose 
something else.  You are on your own, you must take the risk.  For clearly 
we, to keep up appearances, are obliged to bar the way, to threaten, 
prosecute and reluctantly to punish.   
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And you butt in, uninvited, with a fresh wad of bank notes.  We 
have neither time nor desire for that sort of thing.  We are not playing at 
war, we were told to wage it with the greatest possible expedition, 
efficiently, as honestly as possible.   
The job is not clean, or pleasant, or sweet smelling.  So for the 
present we must be indulgent to the workers we need… 
We are Germans.  It is not a question of the trademark, but of the 
cost, the destination of the products.   
We are the steel roller, the plow, the sickle. So long as it bears 
fruit.  And it will, provided you don’t interfere, don’t whine, get all upset, 
poison the air.  We may feel sorry for you at times, but we must use the 
whip, the big stick or the pencil, because there must be order. 
A poster. 
“Whoever does this or  that – will be shot.” 
“Whoever does not do this or that – we will shoot.” 
Someone seems to be asking for it.  A suicide?  Too bad. 
Someone else is not afraid.  Hail! A hero? 
Let his name shine in letters of gold but – now, out of the way 
since there is no alternative. 
A third is afraid – livid with fear, constantly runs to the toilet, dulls 
himself with tobacco, liquor, women, and obstinately wants his own way.  
What would you do with him?50            
 
This entry is quite remarkable, but like the “daydream” passage is also indirect.  No 
individual is named.  Even the nation issuing the imaginary directive or statement of 
purpose is only mentioned once.  The passage indicates many beliefs about what was 
going on, but in the end, Korczak, though attempting to “grapple with the 
incomprehensible,” could still not understand it.   
It is first important to discuss what Korczak imagined the Germans to be like.  
Nazis, according to his scenario are “disciplined” and “methodical,” interested only in the 
success of their war at the end of the day.  Korczak believes he understands the means 
Germans use to achieve their goals; while perhaps amoral and Machiavellian, they can 
still be comprehended.  Korczak the doctor, the rationalist, mitigates the irrational aspects 
of Nazi policy (murdering people who could be working for the war effort, for example) 
                                                 
50 Korczak, Ghetto Diary, p. 177-179. 
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by implying there must be some “reason” behind it.  Like the “rational” German, the 
doctor temporarily appropriates and lays out the stereotype of the Jew – a group of people 
of “petty interests, ambitions, sentiments, whims, claims, resentments [and] cravings” 
with “wads of banknotes”– as if that stereotype is true – thereby staying in character.  As 
a “German” who makes these assumptions, Korczak asserts that brutality is sometimes 
necessary when dealing with these reluctant workers.  It makes a kind of sense from this 
“logical” perspective that the Nazis must “reluctantly” punish them on occasion.  Again, 
this “reluctance” reinforces the proposition that German behavior is logical and not based 
on irrational or emotional arguments.  Korczak does not seem to be overly sarcastic or 
cynical here.  He genuinely seems either to be trying to come to terms with the Nazi 
rationale for persecution, or simply spouting out in anger what he has heard so many 
times.  Although there is a distinction made between German and Jew in the entry, it is 
not on its own based upon the visceral appeal of racism – something the doctor does not 
seem to understand.  Korczak believes the nature of German war (genocide is not a term 
he would allow himself to apply to this situation, even if it had been coined at the time) – 
is only to achieve a military victory at all costs.51  He does not comprehend the idea of a 
racial war.  
Victory, not hatred, demands that protestations, bribes or appeals to sympathy not 
reach the German heart.  Efficiency is the watchword.  “We are the Germans,” he says, 
“We are the steel roller the plow, the sickle.”52  As we saw in the previous chapter, during 
                                                 
51 This is not necessarily true. It has been mentioned many times by many scholars that to Hitler, 
the important war was not the one against Bolshevism, but against the Jews. 
52 These metaphors are interesting in that Korczak takes the image of how the Soviet Union sought 
to join the industrial to the agricultural—the hammer and sickle—and applies the imagery to the Germans.  
Perhaps this indicates that the doctor understood the goals of communist totalitarianism better than those of 
National Socialism. 
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particularly stressful moments, the metaphors frequently take over in Holocaust diaries, 
and in this instance, like so many others, the perpetrator is reduced to a non-living object 
(like Hillesum’s “blue uniform”) or a machine.  The words Korczak chooses are 
metaphors for tools – for useful appliances that both destroy and create.  However, a 
change is taking place here.  The perpetrator is fragmenting and losing his humanity.  
One senses that Korczak is having a hard time keeping this exercise in identification 
going.  Germans have now been conflated with their products. At this point in the entry, 
perpetrators are machines, human only insofar as those they have conquered aid them in 
their project.  As long as these subjugated folk are pacified and “bear fruit,” the “whips,” 
“big sticks,” and the “pencils” will remain quiescent.  
 It never occurs to Korczak throughout this entire passage that the murder and the 
horror he saw around him were the twisted culmination and zenith of that systematic, 
rational and efficient character that he was trying to come to terms with.  It was not 
within the scope of this limited exercise in identification for Korczak to be able to 
imagine that it was precisely the harnessing of bureaucracies and the power of the 
modern state to a profoundly illogical purpose that was the defining characteristic of the 
totalizing system he was attempting to describe.  The logic of the Third Reich was not the 
logic of the world Korczak knew. 
By the time Korczak reaches the line “A poster,” his ability to identify with his 
persecutors has completely fractured.  He begins to comprehend the no-win position he 
and the other Jews of Warsaw find themselves in (“Whoever does this or that – will be 
shot.  Whoever does not do this or that – we will shoot”).  It is at this point that he lays 
out the options available as he sees them.  It is important to note that the first thing that 
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comes to his mind is suicide.  Throughout his life, this was Korczak’s fallback position, 
and it remains so during the last fortnight of his life.  The second option is also in keeping 
with Korczak’s narcissistic and self-important nature – to go out in a blaze of glory as a 
hero, someone whose “name shine[s] in letters of gold.”  The third is to dull the pain or to 
continue to retreat from the real problem by resorting to pain killing measures Korczak 
considers distasteful, like “tobacco, liquor [and] women.”  In the end, we will see that the 
“Old Doctor” chose a combination of the first two options as his final method of 
resistance against genocide.      
The passage analyzed above is similar to the “daydream” entry, but different in 
significant ways, showing that Korczak’s view of the world, the war, and his place in 
both were coming under intense psychological pressure.  Both represent attempts to come 
to terms with an impossible situation by mobilizing coping mechanisms which increased 
his sense of power.  The first entry expresses rage and hatred toward (apparently non-
existent) perpetrators, yet adopts the tactics of the enemy in order to prevent despair and 
suicide.  The second completes the process of identification with the enemy, yet still 
breaks down in the end when Korczak realizes he is not one of them and that he therefore 
has only limited options left to choose from.  
VII: The End of Defense Mechanisms 
  The final two passages are the most amazing.53  In them, Korczak first appears to 
repeat some of the same motifs that are present in the earlier entries, then, apparently 
                                                 
53 The original copy of Korczak’s ghetto diary has been lost.  It was found the morning of 
Korczak’s transport to Treblinka and, shortly thereafter, several copies were made by typewriter.  After the 
war, Korczak fell into disfavor with the communist regime, who considered him a “bourgeois” educator.  
When his work was finally published in 1956, the originals had disappeared, making it impossible to 
examine the handwriting to see if it appeared rushed or changed from previous entries, or to know if it had 
been edited as copies were made.  
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recognizing that the end had come, switches tactics.  In the last seven paragraphs, he 
eschews all stylistic pretense, all naïveté, and all forms of literary defense.  In those last 
moments, he both saw the perpetrators for what they really were, and at the same time 
moved toward one final direct assault against those who were taking his life from him.  
Taken together, these passages depict a progression that allows us to follow Korczak’s 
reactions to perpetrators during his last 24-48 hours in the Ghetto, as well as to trace 
changes in the ways he defended himself and his children amid genocidal surroundings. 
These last entries of Korczak’s life were most likely written on the morning of 5 
August 1942, though it may have been the next day.54  Early in the entry labeled “4 
August,” Korczak, clearly despairing, addresses “gentlemen officers.”  Exactly which 
officers he is speaking to is unclear.  It could be SS officers or Wehrmacht officers, but, 
more likely than not, he was still distancing himself from the actual perpetrators and the 
men he describes are hypothetical representations or abstractions of military leaders, not 
real people.  It is important to note, however, that he includes himself among these 
military men.  He writes to them in an intensely sarcastic tone,  
(7) You drank, and plenty, gentleman officers, you relished your drinking 
– here’s to the blood you’ve shed – and dancing you jingled your medals 
to cheer the infamy which you were too blind to see, or rather pretended 
not to see.   
(8) My share in the Japanese war.  Defeat – disaster.  
In the European War – defeat – disaster.   
In the World War…   
I don’t know how and what a soldier of a victorious army feels like.55  
 
                                                 
54 The last date inserted by Korczak is 4 August., though he did not always date his entries  It 
begins with the line “I have watered the flowers.” Ghetto Diary, p. 187.  The final section begins again “I 
am watering the flowers.” (p. 189).  This makes it seem most likely that Korczak is at least writing as late 
as 5 August.  Lifton dates this entry to the early morning of 6 August.  Lifton, The King of Children, p. 338.  
Hyams places it on the morning of the 5th.  p. 237.   
55 Korczak, Ghetto Diary, p. 188. The “sections” in this entry are numbered, more likely by those 
who transcribed the document than by Korczak himself. 
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In this portion of the diary, it seems as if Korczak is repeating some of the themes from 
earlier entries.  The target of his anger is nebulous and not specifically defined, as in the 
“daydream” passage.  And, like in the “identification” passage, the doctor is apparently 
lumping himself in with these men with the jingling medals.  In this version of himself, 
he is not Korczak the subjected Jew; he is Korczak the army doctor – the officer. In this 
way, he retains some sense of privilege and power. However, the bitterness of defeat and 
weariness are present in Korczak’s tone of voice as well, as is the narcissism that was 
always present.  He resents not winning, or not being on the side of the powerful – as if 
he still believed this were an ordinary kind of war. He still does not seem to comprehend 
what is happening.  Genocide (as a concept, not as a word) has not entered his mind.   
At the same time, as always, the doctor is astute enough to know that there are 
things these officers/people have “pretended not to see.”  Since Korczak has included 
himself in his conversation of “gentlemen officers” this implies that Korczak knows he is 
hiding something from himself.  If it is not “the blood,” (and we are not aware that 
Korczak ever shed any – and it is obvious that he believes he sees that aspect clearly) 
what could it be?  It seems things were beginning to break down in his mind and that 
protective mechanisms were no longer functioning as they had in the past.  In place of 
denials, Korczak is beginning to comprehend that the time for real action, which is 
necessitated when genuine awareness combines with the complete loss of freedom, has 
almost come. 
The next two sections (parts 8 and 9) express a deep sadness, but have nothing to 
do with perpetrators.  It is the final section (10) that is the most poignant and expresses a 
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profound change that comes over the Korczak on what may very well have been the last 
morning of his life.  He wrote.  
I am watering the flowers.  My bald head in the window.  What a 
splendid target.   
He has a rifle.  Why is he standing and looking on so calmly?   
He has no orders to shoot. 
And perhaps he was a village teacher in civilian life, or a notary, a 
street sweeper in Leipzig, a waiter in Cologne?   
What would he do if I nodded to him?  Waved my hand in a 
friendly gesture? 
Perhaps he doesn’t even know that things are – as they are? 
He may have arrived only yesterday, from far away….56 
 
This passage is striking because, although the suicide/death wish theme is still 
present (“My bald head in the window.  What a splendid target.”), the understanding of 
the perpetrator shifts drastically.  Korczak drops the defensive rage present in the 
“daydream” sequence, and he does not feel compelled to use metaphors to describe the 
Nazi he sees outside his window.  There is no wordplay, no sense of alternate meanings 
or subterfuge, whether conscious or unconscious.  Korczak simply sees a man with a rifle 
“looking on so calmly.” The distance he places between them indicates that he has given 
up identifying with the perpetrator – though at the same time he does not dehumanize 
him or label him a “beast.”  Here the diary depicts two men looking at each other through 
a window, and Korczak suddenly sees the commonality inherent in their situations. This 
is very much like Hillesum’s “blue uniform” passage, which we examined in chapter II: 
the perpetrator could be anyone.  There is an emptiness here that Korczak attempts to fill 
in at the last minute with positive content.  The man he sees might be a soldier now, but 
perhaps only in the way Korczak was incidentally a medical officer in the Polish Army. 
                                                 
56 Korczak, Ghetto Diary, p. 189. 
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He could be anything at all…a teacher, a notary, a street sweeper, a waiter.57  Korczak 
finally sees this soldier as a man and a human being in a new light – as someone who is 
complicated and who has his own thoughts and reasons for doing things – not as someone 
controlled by impersonal forces like war.  There is the hint of contact (“What would he 
do if I nodded to him?  Waved my hand in a friendly gesture?”) that implies Korczak’s 
recognition of the man’s individual agency. The doctor is stepping out, momentarily at 
least, from his accustomed self- absorbed reflection and narcissism. Now, finally, there is 
no “crisis of imagination.”  Korczak sees the perpetrator.  And, in doing so, frees himself 
from the need for internal defense mechanisms.   
VIII: Conclusion 
 
Why this change in the very last entry of the diary?  It would be very interesting 
to know exactly when Korczak wrote this last passage.  It was written either the morning 
before he and the children were sent to their deaths, or the morning the deportation was 
ordered.  Based on the radical change in perspective, the historian is tempted to place the 
timing of this event as late as possible.  The theory that he scribbled this entry during the 
short period of time he was given to gather the children and their belongings together is 
appealing, but not necessary.58  The existence of the orphanage had been threatened for 
months, and Korczak was plainly aware that the noose was tightening.  It was no longer a 
                                                 
57 Korczak was right.  Many of the men involved in the Nazi genocide were not professional 
soldiers.  As Christopher Browning tells us in his examination of Reserve Battalion 101 of the 
Ordnungspolizei, who took part in massacres in Poland, many soldiers had jobs in civilian life as dock 
workers, truck drivers, warehouse and construction workers, machine operators, seamen and waiters, as 
well as other jobs.  Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New 
York: HarperPerennial, 1992), p. 47. 
58 Both Hyams, who dates the passage from 5 August. and Lifton, who dates if from 6 August, 
assert that this entry was written within less than an hour of the time the order for deportation was given, 
though they do not explain how they made that determination. See, Hyams, p. 237-238, and Lifton, The 
King of Children, p. 338-339. 
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matter of if, but of when Korczak’s carefully constructed world would collapse around 
them.  The question really is one of the relationship between this final entry and his 
subsequent actions that morning rather than of the exact moment the passage was written.  
We know beyond any doubt that Korczak cared more for his children than 
anything else in the world.  We also know that he had a great deal of experience with the 
public through the fame he won for his writing, his advocacy for children’s rights, as well 
as for his radio show.  It is speculative, but a distinct possibility exists that sometime after 
he had written parts eight and nine of his final entry he was made aware of the order for 
the children’s deportation.  It is at this point, I believe, that Korczak penned this final 
paragraph.  Now, internal mechanisms of defense were rendered obsolete.  In view of the 
impending deportation and death of the children, it no longer mattered what the doctor 
did or did not think of perpetrators.  The time for keeping them at bay had passed.  This is 
why the guard in the last paragraph seems so real compared to other examples we have 
seen.   
With the move away from internal defense mechanisms of resistance, Korczak 
was free to exercise the “options” he had discussed the week before, in the entry written 
on 27 July.  He could commit suicide, or he could be a hero.  With his history of 
depressive episodes and melancholy, the first would have been appealing (and he always 
kept the poison pills on his body).  However, as a figure accustomed to authority, 
prestige, and as a man not immune to narcissistic tendencies, the second option might 
have been attractive.  My contention is that he tried, and succeeded, in accomplishing 
both. 
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Hyams claims that Korczak specifically asked for and received permission from 
an SS Obersturmführer named Klosterman to lead his children to the Umschlagplatz in 
place of the regular band of soldiers.59  All witnesses agree that the children were lined 
up – as for a parade – complete with flags and banners.  Korczak’s familiarity with both 
military spectacle and theatrics paid off.  The word went out and people began to line the 
sidewalks to see the children go by, with the famous “Old Doctor” at their head.60  At the 
Umschlagplatz, Korczak knew that the second part of his plan (to become a hero, not just 
a suicide) required that he stay with the children – hence his rejection of the possibility of 
remaining behind when given the chance.  The symbolic cutting of the yellow stars from 
the children’s sleeves also seems designed to make the most dramatic impact possible on 
eyewitnesses.  In the end, by removing those hated stars, the doctor was able to signal 
that these were 192 individuals, not 192 Jews. In doing so, he reinforced the concept of 
their individual integrity. 
What did Korczak believe he was accomplishing by turning his death, and the 
children’s death, into a kind of spectacle?  I believe his final entry allows us to see that he 
had reached a point where he knew internal mechanisms of resistance were futile.  He 
also knew that he could no longer save the lives of his children. He therefore understood 
that another form of resistance was required if anything were to be salvaged of the 
children’s memory and innocence.  Korczak’s actions are a remarkable kind of resistance 
because he halted a downward trajectory towards anonymity and negation – not 
figuratively, but literally.  He did not allow the Nazis to completely control the way his 
                                                 
59 Hyams, p. 239. 
60 This was shocking to many Ghetto residents.  Lifton quotes one, a young man named Josef 
Balcerak, as saying “My God, they’ve got Korczak!” I am contending that it was precisely this shock that 
the doctor intended to provoke.  Lifton, The King of Children, p. 341.  
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life ended.  Korczak was able to make a decision.  He was not devoid of any freedom or 
volition, and he did not allow his children to disappear anonymously into the genocidal 
blackness waiting to receive them.  Suicide and theatrics became an act of freedom and a 
statement of individuality.  
Korczak also achieved his wish of becoming a hero.  While it could be argued that 
by turning the “last march” of the children into a kind of parade of the doomed bespeaks 
a kind of cynicism and manipulation, I believe this was not Korczak’s intent. Just as he 
did not want to be deprived of all control and all choice, Korczak did not want his 
children to be reduced in death to the kind of anonymity that was the fate of the 
thousands of other Warsaw Jews who died before (and after) them.  Because of his fame, 
Korczak knew that he would be remembered.  But for the “Old Doctor,” now seeing quite 
clearly what lay before him, staging the “final march” was a heartrending necessity.   By 
doing so, he engraved the memory of those children in the minds of everyone who saw 
them go by. 
In a very real way, through Korczak’s efforts, his children did not lose their 
humanity or individuality, even though they died together with so many others and their 
bodies were obliterated from the face of the earth.  The fact that so many books, plays 
and accounts of that “last march” have been written is proof that his plan worked.  As we 
have seen, the nature of genocide is both to completely objectify its victims – to turn 
them into numbers or aggregates and so something less than human – as well as to 
completely negate victims by submitting them to a completely impersonal and 
anonymous death.  In the case of Janusz Korczak and his children, the Nazis failed at 
both.  Even though these victims lost their lives, they remained humans – people whose 
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faces and even photographs are still present, and still mean something today.  In this 
sense, the doctor succeeded, because Hella and Hanna and Zygmus and Sami and so 
many others are alive today in the memories and imagination of people around the world.  
This is why Korczak’s story is so appealing and why he is a hero to so many.   
    By maintaining the ability to analyze the situation clearly – by knowing when 
to set aside the private defense mechanisms that preserved only his individual life and 
peace of mind, Korczak was able to salvage the dignity and memory of 192 other lives.  
Paradoxically, through sacrifice and death, Korczak saved himself and his children from 
the anonymous fate planned for them by the Nazis. This sacrifice is commemorated today 
at  the memorial at Treblinka, where 17,000 stones, each engraved with the name of a 
town or village decimated by Nazi genocide, have been erected surrounding the site 
where the gas chambers once stood.  Only one stone has the name of a person on it.  This 
stone reads “Janusz Korczak (Henryk Goldszmit) and the Children.”  
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Conclusion 
 
Directions for Further Thought and Research 
 
“Anyone who has worn a star is marked for ever.  He becomes different 
from the person who saw a star being worn.” 
Abel J. Herzberg, 3 September 1944. 
 
 
Holocaust diaries represent a large and relatively untapped pool of resources for 
the professional historian.  The diarists examined here clearly experienced a tension 
between the need to testify and the need to avoid written confrontation with their 
persecutors.  The evidence I have analyzed demonstrates that this tension can be found in 
diaries, and that close scrutiny of these points of tension provides unique and valuable 
ways for historians to think about how resistance to trauma and the need to testify come 
together to tell us something about genocide.  This thesis provides a place for scholars to 
begin looking at relationships between perpetrators and victims in genocidal context, but 
it also points the way to new territory – something important in fields as well-developed 
as Holocaust Studies and Comparative Genocide. 
Identifying “Presence,” “Dissolution,” and “Absence” in Holocaust diaries 
provides a useful framework for classifying victims’ responses to perpetrators.  By 
discussing ways perpetrators appear in Holocaust diaries, I have developed a novel means 
of looking at the problem of psychological resistance to genocide.  As I look forward, I 
see at least three possibilities further research might profitably consider. 
First, in this thesis, I have worked only with published sources.   In the future, an 
intense engagement with a greater number of unpublished works will enrich the body of 
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source material, and offer a means to refute potential methodological critiques suggesting 
that the diaries may have been edited or reformulated to some degree after the war, 
especially through translation.  It is easy to say perpetrators must either be present, absent 
or somewhere in-between.  It remains to be seen where the majority of these depictions 
fall.  A more comprehensive examination of both published and unpublished sources 
would clarify this point. 
Secondly, much more work could be done on the general demographic 
distribution of Holocaust diarists.  For instance, it also remains to be seen if certain 
patterns of dealing with perpetrators were more typical among certain groups than others. 
Did assimilated Jews choose forms of representation differently than unassimilated ones? 
Did Jews from western and eastern Europe have similar concerns?  Again, more 
comprehensive research and analysis would both address these questions, and raise new 
ones.   An approach focusing on class and gender differences in depictions of 
perpetrators, or on generational or age disparities in the ways victims psychologically 
deal with the trauma represented by Nazis would also be interesting and elucidating.  I 
have tried to indicate, where possible, reasons why certain diarists may have written as 
they did – whether because of environmental or personal factors.  A more systematic 
study of these differences could prove extremely valuable.  
Finally, genocide is not strictly the province of Jewish diarists who wrote during 
the Holocaust.  Without doubt, diaries have been written during other genocidal moments 
as well.  One thinks immediately of letters and diaries that surely must have been written 
from Soviet gulags, from Cambodian prisons and killing fields, from rape camps in the 
former Yugoslavia or during the Rwandan genocide.    A more thorough and comparative 
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discussion of ways victims react to perpetrators and to genocide could prove useful in the 
broader field of Comparative Genocide, as well as for students of the Holocaust. 
The diarists examined here were only a small portion of those who experienced 
the Holocaust.  The criticisms of Abel Herzberg, the jokes of Emmanuel Ringelblum and 
the metaphors of Etty Hillesum are a good place to begin a deeper level of historical 
analysis.  Although fascinating aspects of Holocaust history are still being uncovered, it 
seems to me that the general outlines of the event are well-known.  “Events” are much 
different from “mentalities.”  What concerns me, and the direction I in which I would like 
to see the field move, is toward the study, not of events, but of the perceptions and 
mentalities created during this incredibly traumatic time. By combining our detailed 
knowledge of political, military, cultural and social history with a new focus on diaries 
and other primary sources as both literary and historical texts, a more nuanced and 
comprehensive view of the Holocaust, and genocide in general, can emerge. 
For the time being, I believe it is sufficient to have considered the importance of 
Holocaust diaries, both as literary artifacts, as historical documents, and as a means of 
psychological resistance.  Further study of this topic is not only warranted, but important.  
Only future research will tell how valuable this approach will turn out to be, but I am 
convinced that increased scrutiny of the most marked points of tension in Holocaust 
diaries will tell us important things about victims, about perpetrators, and especially 
about ways the two groups thought about each other during moments of trauma and 
genocide.  
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